Tag: risk parity

One Hedge to Rule Them All

On March 30, 2020

In Craftsmanship, Portfolio Construction, Risk Management, Weekly Commentary

This post is available as a PDF download here.

Summary

About two years ago, we compared and contrasted different approaches to risk managing equity exposure; including fixed income, risk parity, managed futures, tactical equity, and options-based strategies.
Given the recent market events as the world navigates through the COVID-19 crisis, we revisit this analysis to see how these strategies would have fared over the past two years.
We find that all eight strategies studied have continued to successfully reduce risk, with two of the previously underperforming options-based strategies now jumping to the forefront of the pack.
Over time, performance of the risk management strategies still varies significantly both relative to the S&P 500 and compared to the other strategies. Generally, risk-managed strategies tend to behave like insurance, underperforming on the upside and outperforming on the downside.
Diversifying your diversifiers by blending a number of complementary risk-managed strategies together – even at random – can be a powerful method of improving long-term outcomes.

“The primary requirement of historical time is that inly one of the possible alternatives coming at you from the future can be actualized in the present where it will flow into the pat and remain forever after unalterable. You may sometimes have “another chance” and be able to make a different choice in some later present, but this can in no way change the choice you did in fact make in the first instance.”

– Dr. William G. Pollard, Prof. of Physics, Manhattan Project

23 trading days.

In a little over a month, the S&P 500 dropped nearly 35% from all-time highs in a sell-off that was one of the fastest in history. Many investors experienced the largest drawdowns their portfolios had seen since the Financial Crisis.

While the market currently sits in a drawdown closer to 25% (as of the time of this writing), the future remains could take any path. Following the relative calm in the market over the preceding year, we are now living through a historic time with the uncertainty and severity of the growing COVID-19 pandemic and its far-reaching ramifications.

However, as a firm that focuses on managing risk, we are used to not knowing the answers.

In the summer of 2018, we published a piece entitled The State of Risk Management where we examined the historical trade-offs in terms of returns during market downturns versus returns during calm market environments of a variety of risk management methods.

Since that time, especially with the benefit of hindsight, one might argue that risk management was unnecessary until this past month. While the S&P 500 experienced a 19% drawdown in Q4 of 2018, it quickly recovered and went on to post a gain of 32% in 2019, rewarding those who stayed the course (or, better yet, bought the dip).

Source: Tiingo. Returns are gross of all management fees, transaction fees, and taxes, but net of underlying fund fees. Total return series assumes the reinvestment of all distributions. Data through 3/27/2020.

With the future poised to follow a variety of uncertain paths, we think it is a prudent time to check in on some of the more popular ways to manage risk and see how they are handling the current events.

The Updated Historical Track Record

For risk management, we examine eight strategies that roughly fit into four categories:

Diversification Strategies: strategic 60/40 stock/bond mix¹and risk parity²
Options Strategies: equity collar³, protective put⁴, and put-write⁵,⁶
Equity Strategies: long-only defensive equity that blends a minimum volatility strategy⁷, a quality strategy⁸, and a dividend growth strategy⁹ in equal weights
Trend-Following Strategies: managed futures¹⁰ and tactical equity¹¹

Index data was used prior to fund inception when necessary, and the common inception data is December 1997.

The following charts show the return and risk characteristics of the strategies over the entire historical period. Previously, we had used maximum drawdown as a measure of risk but have now switched to using the ulcer index to quantify both the duration and severity of drawdowns.

Data Source: CBOE, Tiingo, S&P. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results. All returns are hypothetical index returns. You cannot invest directly in an index and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses, sales charges, or trading expenses. Index returns include the reinvestment of dividends. No index is meant to measure any strategy that is or ever has been managed by Newfound Research. Data is from December 1997 to 3/27/2020.

Relative to when we previously presented these statistics (as of July 2018), the most notable changes are that the 95-100 Collar index and Risk Parity have improved and that Managed Futures moved into the top-performing spot up from the middle of the pack. Trend Equity dropped slightly in the rankings, which is partially attributable to our switching over to using the Newfound Trend Equity Index, which includes exposure to small- and mid-cap companies and invests in cash rather than corporate bonds for the defensive position.

Six of the eight strategies still exhibit strong risk-adjusted performance relative to the S&P over the entire time period.

But as we also showed in 2018, the dispersion in strategy performance is significant.

This chart also highlights the current trailing one-year performance for each strategy as of 3/27/2020.

Both the 95-110 Collar and the 5% Put Protection indices are in the top 10% of their historical one-year returns, with the put protection index forging new maximum territory. Trend equity and defensive equity have exhibited returns closer to their median levels, while managed futures, strategic diversification with bonds, and risk parity have had returns above their medians.

When we examine the current market environment, this makes sense. Many options were relatively cheap (i.e. implied volatility was low) heading into and early in February, and the option rollover date was close to when the drawdown began (positive timing luck). Equity trends were also very strong coming out of 2019.

With the sharp reversal in equity prices, option strategies provided a strong static hedge that any investors had been paying premiums for through the previous years of bull market returns.

Trend equity strategies were slower to act as trends took time to reverse before cash was introduced into the portfolio, and managed futures were eventually able to capitalize on short positions and diversification once these trends were established.

Zooming in more granularly, we can see the trade-offs between the hedging performance of each strategy in down markets and the premiums paid through negative returns in up-markets. This chart shows the returns relative to the S&P 500 (SPY). When the lines are increasing (decreasing), the hedge is outperforming (underperforming). A flatter line during periods of calm markets indicates lower premiums if we think of these strategies as insurance policies.

All eight strategies have provided hedging in both Q4 2018 and the current downturn. The -95-100 Collar- provided some of the lowest premiums. -Trend Equity- also provided low premiums but had a slower time getting back in the market after the hedging period in 2018.

-Managed Futures- have provided some of the best hedging through both down periods but had the highest premium during the strong market of 2019.

With the continued dispersion in performance, especially with the “new” market crisis, this highlights the importance of diversification.

Diversifying Your Diversifiers

Not every risk management strategy will perfectly hedge every downturn while also having a low cost during up markets.

We see the power of diversifying your diversifiers when we test simple equal-weight blends of the risk management strategies. In our 2018 update, we had used an equal weight blend of all eight strategies and a blend of the six strategies that had historical Sharpe ratios above the S&P 500. This latter selection was admittedly biased with hindsight. The two excluded strategies – the 95-110 Collar and the 5% Put Protection indices – were some of the best performing over the period from August 2018 to March 2020!

Our own biases notwithstanding, we still include both blends for comparison.

Both blends have higher Sharpe ratios than 6 of the 8 individual strategies and higher excess return to ulcer index ratios than all of the eight individual strategies.

This is a very powerful result, indicating that naïve diversification is nearly as good as being able to pick the best individual strategies with perfect foresight.

But holding eight – or even six – strategies can be daunting, especially for more aggressive investors who may only want to allocate a small portion of their portfolio to a risk management sleeve.

How much diversification is enough?

The following charts show the distribution of risk-adjusted returns from randomly choosing any number of the 8 strategies and holding them in equal weight.

As is to be expected, the cost of choosing the “wrong” blend of strategies decreases as the number of strategies held increases. The potential benefits initially increase and then back off as the luck of choosing the “right” strategy blend is reduced through holding a greater number of strategies.

Both charts show the distributions converging for the single choice for an 8-strategy portfolio.

Even holding 3 or 4 of the eight risk management strategies, chosen at random, leads to robust results, in general, with narrowed bands in the distribution (e.g. 25^th to 75^th percentiles).

Blending strategies from each of the different categories – static diversification, options, equity, and trend-following – can further reduce concentration risk verses selection at random and ensure that a variety of risk factors within the hedging strategies (e.g. interest rates from bonds, volatility from options, beta from equity, and whipsaw from trend-following) are mitigated.

Conclusion

We’ve said it many times before: There is no holy grail when it comes to risk management. While finding the perfect hedge that beats all others in every environment is enticing, it is impossible via the simple fact that risk cannot be destroyed, only transformed.

In an uncertain world where we cannot predict exactly what the next crisis will look like – or even what the current crisis will look like after today – diversifying your diversifiers by combining a number of complementary risk-managed strategies may be a prudent course of action.

We believe that this type of balanced approach has the potential to deliver compelling results over a full market cycle while managing the idiosyncratic risk of any one manager or strategy.

Diversification can also help to increase the odds of an investor sticking with their risk management plan as the short-term performance lows won’t be quite as low as they would be with a single strategy (conversely, the highs won’t be as high either).

Developing a plan and sticking with it is the most important first step in risk management. It is obviously desirable to keep premiums in strong markets as low as possible while having efficient hedges in down markets, but simple diversification can go a long way to provide a robust results.

Risk management is, by definition, required to be in place before risks are realized. Even when the market is currently down, risks in the future are still present. Therefore, we must periodically ask ourselves, “What risks are we willing to bear?”

One potential path has been locked into history, but the next time potential risks become reality – and they inevitably will – we must be comfortable with our answer.

The State of Risk Management

By Justin Sibears

On August 20, 2018

In Portfolio Construction, Risk Management, Weekly Commentary

This post is available as PDF download here.

Summary

We compare and contrast different approaches to risk managing equity exposure; including fixed income, risk parity, managed futures, tactical equity, and options-based strategies; over the last 20 years.
We find that all eight strategies studied successfully reduce risk, while six of the eight strategies improve risk-adjusted returns. The lone exceptions are two options-based strategies that involve being long volatility and therefore are on the wrong side of the volatility risk premium.
Over time, performance of the risk management strategies varies significantly both relative to the S&P 500 and compared to the other strategies. Generally, risk-managed strategies tend to behave like insurance, underperforming on the upside and outperforming on the downside.
Diversifying your diversifiers by blending a number of complementary risk-managed strategies together can be a powerful method of improving long-term outcomes. The diversified approach to risk management shows promise in terms of reducing sequence risk for those investors nearing or in retirement.

I was perusing Twitter the other day and came across this tweet from Jim O’Shaughnessy, legendary investor and author of What Works on Wall Street.

As always. Jim’s wisdom is invaluable. But what does this idea mean for Newfound as a firm? Our first focus is on managing risk. As a result, one of the questions that we MUST know the answer to is how to get more investors comfortable with sticking to a risk management plan through a full market cycle.

Unfortunately, performance chasing seems to us to be just as prevalent in risk management as it is in investing as a whole. The benefits of giving up some upside participation in exchange for downside protection seemed like a no brainer in March of 2009. After 8+ years of strong equity market returns (although it hasn’t always been as smooth of a ride as the market commentators may make you think), the juice may not quite seem worth the squeeze.

While we certainly don’t profess to know the answer to our burning question from above, we do think the first step towards finding one is a thorough understanding on the risk management landscape. In that vein, this week we will update our State of Risk Management presentation from early 2016.

We examine eight strategies that roughly fit into four categories:

Diversification Strategies: strategic 60/40 stock/bond mix¹ and risk parity²
Options Strategies: equity collar³, protective put⁴, and put-write⁵
Equity Strategies: long-only defensive equity that blends a minimum volatility strategy⁶, a quality strategy⁷, and a dividend growth strategy⁸ in equal weights
Trend-Following Strategies: managed futures⁹ and tactical equity¹⁰

The Historical Record

We find that over the period studied (December 1997 to July 2018) six of the eight strategies outperform the S&P 500 on a risk-adjusted basis both when we define risk as volatility and when we define risk as maximum drawdown. The two exceptions are the equity collar strategy and the protective put strategy. Both of these strategies are net long options and therefore are forced to pay the volatility risk premium. This return drag more than offsets the reduction of losses on the downside.

Data Source: Bloomberg, CSI. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Volatility is a statistical measure of the amount of variation around the average returns for a security or strategy. All returns are hypothetical index returns. You cannot invest directly in an index and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses, sales charges, or trading expenses. Index returns include the reinvestment of dividends. No index is meant to measure any strategy that is or ever has been managed by Newfound Research. The Tactical Equity strategy was constructed by Newfound in August 2018 for purposes of this analysis and is therefore entirely backtested and not an investment strategy that is currently managed and offered by Newfound.

Data Source: Bloomberg, CSI. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Drawdown is a statistical measure of the losses experienced by a security or strategy relative to its historical maximum. The maximum drawdown is the largest drawdown over the security or strategy’s history. All returns are hypothetical index returns. You cannot invest directly in an index and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses, sales charges, or trading expenses. Index returns include the reinvestment of dividends. No index is meant to measure any strategy that is or ever has been managed by Newfound Research. The Tactical Equity strategy was constructed by Newfound in August 2018 for purposes of this analysis and is therefore entirely backtested and not an investment strategy that is currently managed and offered by Newfound.

Not Always a Smooth Ride

While it would be nice if this outperformance accrued steadily over time, reality is quite a bit messier. All eight strategies exhibit significant variation in their rolling one-year returns vs. the S&P 500. Interestingly, the two strategies with the widest ranges of historical one-year performance vs. the S&P 500 are also the two strategies that have delivered the most downside protection (as measured by maximum drawdown). Yet another reminder that there is no free lunch in investing. The more aggressively you wish to reduce downside capture, the more short-term tracking error you must endure.

Relative 1-Year Performance vs. S&P 500 (December 1997 to July 2018)

Data Source: Bloomberg, CSI. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results. All returns are hypothetical index returns. You cannot invest directly in an index and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses, sales charges, or trading expenses. Index returns include the reinvestment of dividends. No index is meant to measure any strategy that is or ever has been managed by Newfound Research. The Tactical Equity strategy was constructed by Newfound in August 2018 for purposes of this analysis and is therefore entirely backtested and not an investment strategy that is currently managed and offered by Newfound.

Thinking of Risk Management as (Uncertain) Portfolio Insurance

When we examine this performance dispersion across different market environments, we find a totally intuitive result: risk management strategies generally underperform the S&P 500 when stocks advance and outperform the S&P 500 when stocks decline. The hit rate for the risk management strategies relative to the S&P 500 is 81.2% in the four years that the S&P 500 was down (2000, 2001, 2002, and 2008) and 19.8% in the seventeen years that the S&P was up.

In this way, risk management strategies are akin to insurance. A premium, in the form of upside capture ratios less than 100%, is paid in exchange for a (hopeful) reduction in downside capture.

With this perspective, it’s totally unsurprising that these strategies have underperformed since the market bottomed during the global market crisis. Seven of the eight strategies (with the long-only defensive equity strategy being the lone exception) underperformed the S&P 500 on an absolute return basis and six of the eight strategies (with defensive equity and the 60/40 stock/bond blend) underperformed on a risk-adjusted basis.

Annual Out/Underperformance Relative to S&P 500 (December 1997 to July 2018)

Diversifying Your Diversifiers

The good news is that there is significant year-to-year variation in the performance across strategies, as evidenced by the periodic table of returns above, suggesting there are diversification benefits to be harvested by allocating to multiple risk management strategies. The average annual performance differential between the best performing strategy and the worst performing strategy is 20.0%. This spread was less than 10% in only 3 of the 21 years studied.

We see the power of diversifying your diversifiers when we test simple equal-weight blends of the risk management strategies. Both blends have higher Sharpe Ratios than 7 of the 8 individual strategies and higher excess return to drawdown ratios than 6 of the eight individual strategies.

This is a very powerful result, indicating that naïve diversification is nearly as good as being able to pick the best individual strategies with perfect foresight.

Why Bother with Risk Management in the First Place?

As we’ve written about previously, we believe that for most investors investing “failure” means not meeting one’s financial objectives. In the portfolio management context, failure comes in two flavors. “Slow” failure results from taking too little risk, while “fast” failure results from taking too much risk.

In this book, Red Blooded Risk, Aaron Brown summed up this idea nicely: “Taking less risk than is optimal is not safer; it just locks in a worse outcome. Taking more risk than is optimal also results in a worst outcome, and often leads to complete disaster.”

Risk management is not synonymous with risk reduction. It is about taking the right amount of risk, not too much or too little.

Having a pre-defined risk management plan in place before a crisis can help investors avoid panicked decisions that can turn a bad, but survivable event into catastrophe (e.g. the retiree that sells all of his equity exposure in early 2009 and then stays out of the market for the next five years).

It’s also important to remember that individuals are not institutions. They have a finite investment horizon. Those that are at or near retirement are exposed to sequence risk, the risk of experiencing a bad investment outcome at the wrong time.

We can explore sequence risk using Monte Carlo simulation. We start by assessing the S&P 500 with no risk management overlay and assume a 30-year retirement horizon. The simulation process works as follows:

Randomly choose a sequence of 30 annual returns from the set of actual annual returns over the period we studied (December 1998 to July 2018).
Adjust returns for inflation.
For the sequence of returns chosen, calculate the perfect withdrawal rate (PWR). Clare et al, 2016 defines the PWR as “the withdrawal rate that effectively exhausts wealth at death (or at the end of a fixed period, known period) if one had perfect foresight of all returns over the period.¹¹
Return to #1, repeating 1000 times in total.

We plot the distribution of PWRs for the S&P 500 below. While the average PWR is a respectable 5.7%, the range of outcomes is very wide (0.6% to 14.7%). The 95 percent confidence interval around the mean is 2.0% to 10.3%. This is sequence risk. Unfortunately, investors do not have the luxury of experiencing the average, they only see one draw. Get lucky and you may get to fund a better lifestyle than you could have imagined with little to no financial stress. Get unlucky and you may have trouble paying the bills and will be sweating every market move.

Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results. All returns are hypothetical index returns. You cannot invest directly in an index and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses, sales charges, or trading expenses. Index returns include the reinvestment of dividends.

Next, we repeat the simulation, replacing the pure S&P 500 exposure with the equal-weight blend of risk management strategies excluding the equity collar and the protective put. We see quite a different result. The average PWR is similar (6.2% to 5.7%), but the range of outcomes is much smaller (95% confidence interval from 4.4% to 8.1%). At its very core, this is what implementing a risk management plan is all about. Reducing the role of investment luck in financial planning. We give up some of the best outcomes (in the right tail of the S&P 500 distribution) in exchange for reducing the probability of the very worst outcomes (in the left tail).

Conclusion

There is no holy grail when it comes to risk management. While a number of approaches have historically delivered strong results, each comes with its own pros and cons.

In an uncertain world where we cannot predict exactly what the next crisis will look like, diversifying your diversifiers by combining a number of complementary risk-managed strategies may be a prudent course of action. We believe that this type of balanced approach has the potential to deliver compelling results over a full market cycle while managing the idiosyncratic risk of any one manager or strategy.

That being said, having the discipline to stick with a risk management plan also requires being realistic. While it would be great to build a strategy with 100% upside and 0% downside, such an outcome is unrealistic. Risk-managed strategies tend to behave a lot like uncertain insurance for the portfolio. A premium, in the form of upside capture ratios less than 100%, is paid in exchange for a (hopeful) reduction in downside capture. This upside underperformance is a feature, not a bug. Trying too hard to correct it may lead to overfit strategies fail to deliver adequate protection on the downside.

Failing Slow, Failing Fast, and Failing Very Fast

By Justin Sibears

On April 9, 2018

In Risk Management, Sequence Risk, Weekly Commentary

This post is available as a PDF download here.

Summary

For most investors, long-term “failure” means not meeting one’s financial objectives.
In the portfolio management context, failure comes in two flavors. “Slow” failure results from taking too little risk, while “fast” failure results from taking too much risk. In his book, Red Blooded Risk, Aaron Brown summed up this idea nicely: “Taking less risk than is optimal is not safer; it just locks in a worse outcome. Taking more risk than is optimal also results in a worse outcome, and often leads to complete disaster.”
A third type of failure, failing very fast, occurs when we allow behavioral biases to compound the impact of market volatility (i.e. panicked selling near the bottom of a bear market).
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, risk management was often used synonymously with risk reduction. In actuality, a sound risk management plan is not just about reducing risk, but rather about calibrating risk appropriately as a means of minimizing the risk of both slow and fast failure.

On the way back from a recent trip, I ran across a fascinating article in Vanity Fair: “The Clock is Ticking: Inside the Worst U.S. Maritime Disaster in Decades.” The article details the saga of the SS El Faro, a U.S. flagged cargo ship that sunk in October 2015 at the hands of Hurricane Joaquin. Quoting from the beginning of the article:

“In the darkness before dawn on Thursday, October 1, 2015, an American merchant captain named Michael Davidson sailed a 790-foot U.S.-flagged cargo ship, El Faro, into the eye wall of a Category 3 hurricane on the exposed windward side of the Bahama Islands. El Faro means “the lighthouse” in Spanish.

The hurricane, named Joaquin, was one of the heaviest to ever hit the Bahamas. It overwhelmed and sank the ship. Davidson and the 32 others aboard drowned.

They had been headed from Jacksonville, Florida, on a weekly run to San Juan, Puerto Rico, carrying 391 containers and 294 trailers and cars. The ship was 430 miles southwest of Miami in deep water when it went down.

Davidson was 53 and known as a stickler for safety. He came from Windham, Maine, and left behind a wife and two college age daughters. Neither his remains nor those of his shipmates were ever recovered.

Disasters at sea do not get the public attention that aviation accidents do, in part because the sea swallows the evidence. It has been reported that a major merchant ship goes down somewhere in the world every two or three days; most ships are sailing under flags of convenience, with underpaid crews and poor safety records.

The El Faro tragedy attracted immediate attention for several reasons. El Faro was a U.S.-flagged ship with a respected captain – and it should have been able to avoid the hurricane. Why didn’t it? Add to the mystery this sample fact: the sinking of the El Faro was the worst U.S. maritime disaster in three decades.”

From the beginning, Hurricane Joaquin was giving forecasters fits. A National Hurricane Center release from September 29^th said, “The track forecast remains highly uncertain, and if anything, the spread in the track model guidance is larger now beyond 48 hours…” Joaquin was so hard to predict that FiveThirtyEight wrote an article about it. The image below shows just how much variation there was in projected paths for the storm as of September 30^th.

Davidson knew all of this. Initially, he had two options. The first option was the standard course: a 1,265-mile trip directly through open ocean toward San Juan. The second was the safe play, a less direct route that would use a number of islands as protection from the storm. This option would add 184 miles and six plus hours to the trip.

Davidson faced a classic risk management problem. Should he risk failing fast or failing slow?

Failing fast would mean taking the standard course and suffering damage or disaster at the hands of the storm. In this scenario – which tragically ended up playing out – Davidson paid the fatal price by taking too much risk.

Failing slow, on the other hand, would be playing it safe and taking the less direct route. The risk here would be wasting the company’s time and money. By comparison, this seems like the obvious choice. However, the article suggests that Davidson may have been particularly sensitive to this risk as he had been gunning for a captain position on a new vessel that would soon replace El Faro on the Jacksonville to San Juan route. In this scenario, Davidson would fail by taking too little risk.

This dichotomy between taking too little risk and failing slow and taking too much risk and failing fast is central to portfolio risk management.

Aaron Brown summed this idea up nicely in his book Red Blooded Risk, where he wrote, “Taking less risk than is optimal is not safer; it just locks in a worse outcome. Taking more risk than is optimal also results in a worse outcome, and often leads to complete disaster.”

Failing Slow

In the investing context, failing slow happens when portfolio returns are insufficient to generate the growth needed to meet one’s objectives. No one event causes this type of failure. Rather, it slowly builds over time. Think death by a thousand papercuts or your home slowly being destroyed from the inside by termites.

Traditionally, this was probably the result of taking too little risk. Oversized allocations to cash, which as an asset class has barely kept up with inflation over the last 90 years, are particularly likely to be a culprit in this respect.

Data Source: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/histretSP.html. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results.

Take your average 60% stock / 40% bond investor as an example. Historically, such an investor would see a $100,000 investment grow to $1,494,003 over a 30-year horizon. Add a 5% cash allocation to that portfolio and the average end result drops to $1,406,935, an $87k cash drag. Double the cash bucket to 10% and the average drag increases to nearly $170k. This pattern continues as each additional 5% cash increment lowers ending wealth by approximately $80k.

Data Source: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/histretSP.html. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results.

Fortunately, there are ways to manage funds earmarked for near-term expenditures or as a safety net without carrying excessive amounts of cash. For one example, see the Betterment article: Safety Net Funds: Why Traditional Advice Is Wrong.

Unfortunately, today’s investors face a more daunting problem. Low returns may not be limited to cash. Below, we present medium term (5 to 10 year) expected returns on U.S. equities, U.S. bonds, and a 60/40 blend from seven different firms/individuals. The average expected return on the 60/40 portfolio is less than 1% per year after inflation. Even if we exclude the outlier, GMO, the average expected return for the 60/40 is still only 1.3%. Heck, even the most optimistic forecast from AQR is downright depressing relative to historical experience.

Expected return forecasts are the views of the listed firms, are uncertain, and should not be considered investment advice. Nominal returns are adjusted by subtracting 2.2% assumed inflation.

And the negativity is far from limited to U.S. markets. For example, Research Affiliates forecasts a 5.7% real return for emerging market equities. This is their highest projected return asset class and it still falls well short of historical experience for the U.S. equity markets, which have returned 6.5% after inflation over the last 90 years.

One immediate solution that may come to mind is just to take more risk. For example, a 4% real return may still be technically achievable[1]. Assuming that Research Affiliates’ forecasts are relatively accurate, this still requires buying into and sticking with a portfolio that holds around 40% in emerging market securities, more than 20% in real assets/alternatives, and exactly 0% large-cap U.S. equity exposure[2].

This may work for those early in the accumulation phase, but it certainly would require quite a bit of intestinal fortitude. For those nearing, or in, retirement, the problem is more daunting. We’ve written quite a bit recently about the problems that low forward returns pose for retirement planning[3][4] and what can be done about it[5][6].

And obviously, one of the main side effects of taking more risk is increasing the portfolio’s exposure to large losses and fast failure, very much akin to Captain Davidson sailing way too close to the eye of the hurricane.

Failing Fast

At its core, failing fast in investing is about realizing large losses at the wrong time. Think your house burning down or being leveled by a tornado instead of being destroyed slowly by termites.

Note that large losses are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for fast failure[7]. After all, for long-term investors, experiencing a bear market eventually is nearly inevitable. For example, there has never been a 30-year period in the U.S. equity markets without at least one year-over-year loss of greater than 20%. 79% of historical 30-year periods have seen at least one year-over-year loss greater than 40%.

Fast failure is really about being unfortunate enough to realize a large loss at the wrong time. This is called “sequence risk” and is particularly relevant for individuals nearing or in the early years of retirement.

We’ve used the following simple example of sequence risk before. Consider three investments:

Portfolio A: -30% return in Year 1 and 6% returns for Years 2 to 30.
Portfolio B: 6% returns for Years 1 to 14, a -30% return in Year 15, and 6% returns for Years 16 to 30.
Portfolio C: 6% returns in Years 1 to 29 and a -30% return in Year 30.

Over the full 30-year period, all three investments have an identical geometric return of 4.54%.

Yet, the experience of investing in each of the three portfolios will be very different for a retiree taking withdrawals[8]. We see that Portfolio C fares the best, ending the 30-year period with 12% more wealth than it began with. Portfolio B makes it through the period, ending with 61% of the starting wealth, but not without quite a bit more stress. Portfolio A, however, ends in disaster, running out of money prematurely.

One way we can measure sequence risk is to compare historical returns from a particular investment with and without withdrawals. The larger this gap, the more sequence risk was realized.

We see that sequence risk peaks in periods where large losses were realized early in the 10-year period. To highlight a few periods:

The period ending in 2009 started with the tech bubble and ended with the global financial crisis.
The period ending in 1982 started with losses of 14.3% in 1973 and 25.9% in 1974.
The period ending in 1938 started off strong with a 43.8% return in 1928, but then suffered four consecutive annual losses as the Great Depression took hold.

Data Source: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/histretSP.html. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results.

A consequence of sequence risk is that asset classes or strategies with strong risk-adjusted returns, especially those that are able to successfully avoid large losses, can produce better outcomes than investments that may outperform them on a pure return basis.

For example, consider the period from August 2000, when the equity market peaked prior to the popping of the tech bubble, to March 2018. Over this period, two common risk management tools – U.S. Treasuries (proxied by the Bloomberg Barclays 7-10 Year U.S. Treasury Index and iShares 7-10 Year U.S. Treasuries ETF “IEF”) and Managed Futures (proxied by the Salient Trend Index) – delivered essentially the same return as the S&P 500 (proxied by the SPDR S&P 500 ETF “SPY”). Both risk management tools have significantly underperformed during the ongoing bull market (16.6% return from March 2009 to March 2018 for SPY compared to 3.1% for IEF and 0.7% for the Salient Trend Index).

Data Source: CSI, Salient. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Returns include no fees except underlying ETF fees. Returns include the reinvestment of dividends.

Yet, for investors withdrawing regularly from their portfolio, bonds and managed futures would have been far superior options over the last two decades. The SPY-only investor would have less than $45k of their original $100k as of March 2018. On the other hand, both the bond and managed futures investors would have growth their account balance by $34k and $29k, respectively.

Failing Really Fast

Hurricanes are an unfortunate reality of sea travel. Market crashes are an unfortunate reality of investing. Both have the potential to do quite a bit of damage on their own. However, what plays out over and over again in times of crisis is that human errors compound the situation. These errors turn bad situations into disasters. We go from failing fast to failing really fast.

In the case of El Faro, the list of errors can be broadly classified into two categories:

Failures to adequately prepare ahead of time. For example, El Faro had two lifeboats, but they were not up to current code and were essentially worthless on a hobbled ship in the midst of a Category 4 hurricane.
Poor decisions in the heat of the moment. Decision making in the midst of a crisis is very difficult. The Coast Guard and NTSB put most of the blame on Davidson for poor decision making, failure to listen to the concerns of the crew, and relying on outdated weather information.

These same types of failures apply to investing. Imagine the retiree that sells all of his equity exposure in early 2009 and sits out of the market for a few years during the first few years of the bull market or maybe the retiree that goes all-in on tech stocks in 2000 after finally getting frustrated with hearing how much money his friend had made off of Pets.com. Taking a 50%+ loss on your equity exposure is bad, panicking and making rash decisions can throw your financial plans off track for good.

Compounding bad events with bad decisions is a recipe for fast failure. Avoiding this fate means:

Having a plan in place ahead of time.
If you plan on actively making decisions during a crisis (instead of simply holding), systematize your process. Lay out ahead of time how you will react to various triggers.
Sticking to your plan, even when it may feel a bit uncomfortable.
Diversify, diversify, diversify.

On that last point, the benefits of diversifying your diversifiers cannot be overstated.

For example, take the following four common risk management techniques:

Static allocation to fixed income (60% SPY / 40% IEF blend)
Risk parity (Salient Risk Parity Index)
Managed futures (Salient Trend Index)
Tactical equity with trend-following (binary SPY or IEF depending on 10-month SPY return).

We see that a simple equal-weight blend of the four strategies delivers risk-adjusted returns that are in line with the best individual strategy. In other words, the power of diversification is so significant that an equal-weight portfolio performs nearly the same as someone who had a crystal ball at the beginning of the period and could foresee which strategy would do the best.

Data Source: CSI, Salient, Bloomberg. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Returns include no fees except underlying ETF fees. Returns include the reinvestment of dividends. Blend is an equal-weight portfolio of the four strategies that is rebalanced on a monthly basis.

Achieving Risk Ignition

In the wake of the tech bubble and the global financial crisis, lots of attention has (rightly) been given to portfolio risk management. Too often, however, we see risk management used as a synonym for risk reduction. Instead, we believe that risk management is ultimately taking the right amount of risk, not too little or too much. We call this achieving risk ignition[9] (a phrase we stole from Aaron Brown), where we harness the power of risk to achieve our objectives.

In our opinion, a key part of achieving risk ignition is utilizing changes that can dynamically adapt the amount of risk in the portfolio to any given market environment.

As an example, take an investor that wants to target 10% volatility using a stock/bond mix. Using historical data going back to the 1980s, this would require holding 55% in stocks and 45% in bonds. Yet, our research shows that 20% of that bond position is held simply to offset the worst 3 years of equity returns. With 10-year Treasuries yielding only 2.8%, the cost of re-allocating this 20% of the portfolio from stocks to bonds just to protect against market crashes is significant.

This is why we advocate using tactical asset allocation as a pivot around a strategic asset allocation core. Let’s continue to use the 55/45 stock/bond blend as a starting point. We can take 30% of the portfolio and put it into a tactical strategy that has the flexibility to move between 100% stocks and 100% bonds. We fund this allocation by taking half of the capital (15%) from stocks and the other half from bonds. Now our portfolio has 40% in stocks, 30% in bonds, and 30% in tactical. When the market is trending upwards, the tactical strategy will likely be fully invested and the entire portfolio will be tilted 70/30 towards stocks, taking advantage of the equity market tailwinds. When trends turn negative, the tactical strategy will re-allocate towards bonds and in the most extreme configuration tilt the entire portfolio to a 40/60 stock/bond mix.

In this manner, we can use a dynamic strategy to dial the overall portfolio’s risk up and down as market risk ebbs and flows.

Summary

For most investors, failure means not meeting one’s financial objectives. In the portfolio management context, failure comes in two flavors: slow failure results from taking too little risk and fast failure results from taking too much risk.

While slow failure has typically resulted from allocating too conservatively or holding excessive cash balances, the current low return environment means that even investors doing everything by the book may not be able to achieve the growth necessary to meet their goals.

Fast failure, on the other hand, is always a reality for investors. Market crashes will happen eventually. The biggest risk for investors is that they are unlucky enough to experience a market crash at the wrong time. We call this sequence risk.

A robust risk management strategy should seek to manage the risk of both slow failure and fast failure. This means not simply seeking to minimize risk, but rather calibrating it to both the objective and the market environment.

[1] Using Research Affiliates’ asset allocation tool, the efficient portfolio that delivers an expected real return of 4% means taking on estimated annualized volatility of 12%. This portfolio has more than double the volatility of a 40% U.S. large-cap / 60% intermediate Treasuries portfolio, which not coincidently returned 4% after inflation going back to the 1920s.

[2] The exact allocations are 0.5% U.S. small-cap, 14.1% foreign developed equities, 24.6% emerging market equities, 12.0% long-term Treasuries, 5.0% intermediate-term Treasuries, 0.8% high yield, 4.5% bank loans, 2.5% emerging market bonds (USD), 8.1% emerging market bonds (local currency), 4.4% emerging market currencies, 3.2% REITs, 8.6% U.S. commercial real estate, 4.2% commodities, and 7.5% private equity.

[3] https://blog.thinknewfound.com/2017/08/impact-high-equity-valuations-safe-retirement-withdrawal-rates/

[4] https://blog.thinknewfound.com/2017/09/butterfly-effect-retirement-planning/

[5] https://blog.thinknewfound.com/2017/09/addressing-low-return-forecasts-retirement-tactical-allocation/

[6] https://blog.thinknewfound.com/2017/12/no-silver-bullets-8-ideas-financial-planning-low-return-environment/

[7] Obviously, there are scenarios where large losses alone can be devastating. One example are losses that are permanent or take an investment’s value to zero or negative (e.g. investments that use leverage). Another are large losses that occur in portfolios that are meant to fund short-term objectives/liabilities.

[8] We assume 4% withdrawals increased for 2% annual inflation.

[9] https://blog.thinknewfound.com/2015/09/achieving-risk-ignition/

Building an Unconstrained Sleeve

By Corey Hoffstein

On July 31, 2017

In Portfolio Construction, Risk Management, Weekly Commentary

We’re often asked about how to build an unconstrained sleeve in a portfolio.

Our view is that your mileage will largely vary by where you are trying to go. With that in mind, we focus on three objectives:

Sleeves that seek to hedge equity losses.
Sleeves that seek significant equity upside capture while reducing downside.
Sleeves that seek an absolute return profile.

We explore how these sleeves can be built using common strategies such as tactical equity, minimum volatility equity, managed futures, risk parity, global contrarian, alternative income, and traditional U.S. Treasuries.

You can find the full presentation below.

(If the above slideshow is not working, you can view an online version here or download a PDF version here.)