managed futures Archives - Flirting with Models

Is Managed Futures Value-able?

On June 19, 2023

In Craftsmanship, Inflation, Portfolio Construction, Trend, Value

In Return Stacking^TM: Strategies for Overcoming a Low Return Environment, we advocated for the addition of managed futures to traditionally allocated portfolios. We argued that managed futures’ low empirical correlation to both equities and bonds and its historically positive average returns makes it an attractive diversifier. More specifically, we recommended implementing managed futures as an overlay to a portfolio to avoid sacrificing exposure to core stocks and bonds.

The luxury of writing research is that we work in a “clean slate” environment. In the real world, however, investors and allocators must contemplate changes in the context of their existing portfolios. Investors rarely just hold pure beta exposure, and we must consider, therefore, not only how a managed futures overlay might interact with stocks and bonds, but also how it might interact with existing active tilts.

The most common portfolio tilt we see is towards value stocks (and, often, quality-screened value). With this in mind, we want to briefly explore whether stacking managed futures remains attractive in the presence of an existing value tilt.

Diversifying Value

If we are already allocated to value, one of our first concerns might be whether an allocation to managed futures actually provides a diversifying return stream. One of our primary arguments for including managed futures into a traditional stock/bond portfolio is its potential to hedge against inflationary pressures. However, there are arguments that value stocks do much of the same, acting as “low duration” stocks compared to their growth peers. For example, in 2022, the Russell 1000 Value outperformed the broader Russell 1000 by 1,145 basis points, offering a significant buoy during the throes of the largest bout of inflation volatility in recent history.

However, broader empirical evidence does not actually support the narrative that value hedges inflation (see, e.g., Baltussen, et al. (2022), Investing in Deflation, Inflation, and Stagflation Regimes) and we can see in Figure 1 that the long-term empirical correlations between managed futures and value is near-zero.

(Note that when we measure value in this piece, we will look at the returns of long-only value strategies minus the returns of broad equities to isolate the impact of the value tilt. As we recently wrote, a long-only value tilt can be effectively thought as long exposure to the market plus a portfolio that is long the over-weight positions and short the under-weight positions¹. By subtracting the market return from long-only value, we isolate the returns of the active bets the tilt is actually taking.)

Figure 1: Excess Return Correlation

Source: Kenneth French Data Library, BarclayHedge. Calculations by Newfound Research. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

Correlations, however, do not tell us about the tails. Therefore, we might also ask, “how have managed futures performed historically conditional upon value being in a drawdown?” As the past decade has shown, underperformance of value-oriented strategies relative to the broad market can make sticking to the strategy equally difficult.

Figure 2 shows the performance of the various value tilts as well as managed futures during periods when the value tilts realized a 10% or greater drawdown².

Figure 2: Value Relative Drawdowns Greater than 10%

Source: Kenneth French Data Library, BarclayHedge. Calculations by Newfound Research. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

We can see that while managed futures may not have explicitly hedged the drawdown in value, its performance remained largely independent and accretive to the portfolio as a whole.

To drive the point of independence home, we can calculate the univariate regression coefficients between value implementations and managed futures. We find that the relationship between the strategies is statistically insignificant in almost all cases. Figure 3 shows the results of such a regression.

Figure 3: Univariate Regression Coefficients

Source: Kenneth French Data Library, BarclayHedge. Calculations by Newfound Research. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 level. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

But How Much?

As our previous figures demonstrate, managed futures has historically provided a positively diversifying benefit in relation to value; but how can we thoughtfully integrate an overlay into an portfolio that wants to retain an existing value tilt?

To find a robust solution to this question, we can employ simulation techniques. Specifically, we block bootstrap 100,000 ten-year simulated returns from three-month blocks to find the robust information ratios and MAR ratios (CAGR divided by maximum drawdown) of the value-tilt strategies when paired with managed futures.

Figure 4 shows the information ratio frontier of these portfolios, and Figure 5 shows the MAR ratio frontiers.

Figure 4: Information Ratio Frontier

Source: Kenneth French Data Library, BarclayHedge. Calculations by Newfound Research. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

Figure 5: MAR Ratio Frontier

Source: Kenneth French Data Library, BarclayHedge. Calculations by Newfound Research. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

Under both metrics it becomes clear that a 100% tilt to either value or managed futures is not prudent. In fact, the optimal mix, as measured by either the Information Ratio or MAR Ratio, appears to be consistently around the 40/60 mark. Figure 6 shows the blends of value and managed futures that maximizes both metrics.

Figure 6: Max Information and MAR Ratios

Source: Kenneth French Data Library, BarclayHedge. Calculations by Newfound Research. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

In Figure 7 we plot the backtest of a 40% value / 60% managed futures portfolio for the different value implementations.

Figure 7: 40/60 Portfolios of Long/Short Value and Managed Futures

Source: Kenneth French Data Library, BarclayHedge. Calculations by Newfound Research. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

These numbers suggest that an investor who currently tilts their equity exposure towards value may be better off by only tilting a portion of their equity towards value and introducing a managed futures overlay onto their portfolio. For example, if an investor has a 60% stock and 40% bond portfolio and the 60% stock exposure is currently all value, they might consider moving 36% of it into passive equity exposure and introducing a 36% managed futures overlay.

Depending on how averse a client is to tracking error, we can plot how the tracking error changes depending on the degree of portfolio tilt. Figure 8 shows the estimated tracking error when introducing varying allocations to the 40/60 value/managed futures overlay.

Figure 8: Relationship between Value/Managed Futures Tilt and Tracking Error

Source: Kenneth French Data Library, BarclayHedge. Calculations by Newfound Research. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

For example, if we wanted to implement a tilt to a quality value strategy, but wanted a maximum tracking error of 3%, the portfolio might add an approximate allocation of 46% to the 40/60 value/managed futures overlay. In other words, 18% of their equity should be put into quality-value stocks and a 28% overlay to managed futures should be introduced.

Using the same example of a 60% equity / 40% bond portfolio as before, the 3% tracking error portfolio would hold 42% in passive equities, 18% in quality-value, 40% in bonds, and 28% in a managed futures overlay.

What About Other Factors?

At this point, it should be of no surprise that these results extend to the other popular equity factors. Figures 8 and 9 show the efficient information ratio and MAR ratio frontiers when we view portfolios tilted towards the Profitability, Momentum, Size, and Investment factors.

Figure 9: Information Ratio Frontier for Profitability, Momentum, Size, and Investment Tilts

Source: Kenneth French Data Library, BarclayHedge. Calculations by Newfound Research. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

Figure 10: MAR Ratio Frontier for Profitability, Momentum, Size, and Investment Tilts

Source: Kenneth French Data Library, BarclayHedge. Calculations by Newfound Research. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

Figure 11: Max Information and MAR Ratios for Profitability, Momentum, Size, and Investment Tilts

Source: Kenneth French Data Library, BarclayHedge. Calculations by Newfound Research. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

Once again, a 40/60 split emerges as a surprisingly robust solution, suggesting that managed futures has historically offered a unique, diversifying return to all equity factors.

Conclusion

Our analysis highlights the considerations surrounding the use of managed futures as a complement to a traditional portfolio with a value tilt. While value investing remains justifiably popular in real-world portfolios, our findings indicate that managed futures can offer a diversifying return stream that complements such strategies. The potential for managed futures to act as a hedge against inflationary pressures, while also offering a diversifying exposure during relative value drawdowns, strengthens our advocacy for their inclusion through a return stacking^TM framework.

Our examination of the correlation between managed futures and value reveals a near-zero relationship, suggesting that managed futures can provide distinct benefits beyond those offered by a value-oriented approach alone. Moreover, our analysis demonstrates that a more conservative tilt to value, coupled with managed futures, may be a prudent choice for inverse to tracking error. This combination offers the potential to navigate unfavorable market environments and potentially holds more of a portfolio benefit than a singular focus on value.

Appendix A: Index Definitions

Book to Market – Equal-Weighted HiBM Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Profitability – Equal-Weighted HiOP Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Momentum – Equal-Weighted Hi PRIOR Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Size – Equal-Weighted SIZE Lo 30 Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Investment – Equal-Weighted INV Lo 30 Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Earnings Yield – Equal-Weighted E/P Hi 10 Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Cash Flow Yield – Equal-Weighted CF/P Hi 10 Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Dividend Yield – Equal-Weighted D/P Hi 10 Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Quality Value – Equal-Weighted blend of BIG HiBM HiOP, ME2 BM4 OP3, ME2 BM3 OP3, and ME2 BM3 OP4 Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Value Blend – An equal-weighted Returns of Book to Market, Earnings Yield, Cash Flow Yield, and Dividend Yield returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Passive Equities (Market, Mkt) – U.S. total equity market return data from Kenneth French Library.

Managed Futures – BTOP50 Index (BarclayHedge). The BTOP50 Index seeks to replicate the overall composition of the managed futures industry with regard to trading style and overall market exposure. The BTOP50 employs a top-down approach in selecting its constituents. The largest investable trading advisor programs, as measured by assets under management, are selected for inclusion in the BTOP50. In each calendar year the selected trading advisors represent, in aggregate, no less than 50% of the investable assets of the Barclay CTA Universe.

Portfolio Tilts versus Overlays: It’s Long/Short Portfolios All the Way Down

By Corey Hoffstein

On April 12, 2023

In Portfolio Construction

Several years ago, I started using the phrase, “It’s long/short portfolios all the way down.” I think it’s clever. Spoiler: it has not caught on.

The point I was trying to make is that the distance between any two portfolios can be measured as a long/short strategy. This simple point, in my opinion, is a very powerful and flexible mental model for understanding portfolios.

If that sounds like gibberish, consider this practical example: you are a value investor who benchmarks to the S&P 500. To implement your strategy, you buy the iShares MSCI USA Value ETF (“VLUE”). If we subtract the weights of holdings in VLUE from the S&P 500, we can identify how much VLUE is over- or underweight any given position.

Figure 1. Relative Weight Differences Between VLUE and S&P 500 for the Top 20 Stocks in the S&P 500 by Weight
Source: SSGA; iShares. Calculations by Newfound Research.

Functionally, this is equivalent to saying, “VLUE is equal to the S&P 500 plus a long/short portfolio” where the longs are the overweights and the shorts are the underweights.

This is important for two reasons. First, it helps us identify our implicit hurdle rate for alpha required to overcome the fee.

If we continue the exercise above for all the holdings of the S&P 500 and VLUE, we find that the longs and shorts both sum up to 86.2%¹. If we normalize the portfolio such that the longs and shorts both add up to 100%, we can say:

VLUE = 100% x S&P 500 + 86.2% x Long/Short

The positions in the long/short capture our active bets while the 86.2% here is our active share. You may recall articles of years past about whether active share is predictive of alpha. I believe it is clear, through this decomposition, that it is the active bets that control whether any alpha is generated. Active share is key, however, in determining whether the strategy can overcome its fee.

For example, the current expense ratio for VLUE is 0.15% and the current expense ratio for the iShares Core S&P 500 ETF (“IVV”) is 0.03%. Using the formula above, we can say:

0.15% = 0.03% + 86.2% x Fee of Long/Short

Doing some simple arithmetic, we find that the implicit fee of the long/short strategy is 0.139%. This is the hurdle rate that the long/short portfolio must clear before it adds any excess return.

What if the active share was just 10% (i.e., the fund was a closet benchmarker)? In that case, the hurdle rate would jump to 1.2%! While active bets are responsible for generating alpha, the combination of a high fee and a low active share can lead to an unclearable hurdle rate.

The second reason I believe this concept is important is because it demystifies the idea of portfolio overlays. Through the lens of long/short portfolios all the way down, everything is an overlay. Buying value stocks? Equity long/short overlay on broad equity market. Rebalancing your portfolio? Multi-asset long/short overlay on top of your prior asset allocation.

Consider the figure below, where I plot the equity curves of two strategies. In the first, I buy the broad US equity market and overlay a 70% position in the classic Fama-French long/short value factor.² In the second strategy is simply buying large-cap value stocks.

Figure 2. Equity Market plus Long/Short Value Overlay versus Value Stocks

Source: Kenneth French Data Library. Calculations by Newfound Research. Market is the Fama-French Market Factor. Value Long/Short is the Fama-French HML Factor. Value Stocks is the Fama-French BIG HiBM. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

We can see how similar these two approaches are. Buying value stocks is, effectively, buying the market and adding a big overlay of the long/short value factor.

There are some subtle, and important, differences. For example, in tilting towards value stocks, the implicit short in any given stock is limited to that stock’s weight in the index (as the weight cannot go below zero). In tilting towards value stocks, the size of the long/short overlay will also vary over time.³

Nevertheless, over the long run, on a log scale, drawn with a large enough crayon, and if we squint, we see a very similar picture.

This is all well and good on paper, but for many leverage-constrained investors, making room for an interesting equity long/short strategy means having to sell some existing exposure, giving the resulting cash to an alternative manager who holds onto it while implementing their strategy. In the figure below, I plot two equity lines. In the first, we hold 80% in broad U.S. equities, 20% in cash⁴, and 20% in the classic Fama-French long/short value factor. In the second, we buy large-cap value stocks.

Figure 3. Selling Stocks to Buy Alternatives Leads to a Beta Drag

Source: Kenneth French Data Library. Calculations by Newfound Research. Market is the Fama-French Market Factor. Value Long/Short is the Fama-French HML Factor. Value Stocks is the Fama-French BIG HiBM. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

The terminal wealth results are not even close for two reasons. First, as we saw in Figure 2, the appropriate overlay level is closer to 70%, not 20%. Second, to make room for the long/short portfolio, we had to sell broad equity beta. Which means the portfolio can really be thought of as:

100% U.S. Equity + 20% Long Cash / Short U.S. Equity + 20% Value Long/Short

Once again, it’s long/short portfolios all the way down. That “long cash / short U.S. equity” component is a big drag over a 100-year period and captures what I like to call the “funding problem.” As attractive as that value long/short may be, can it overcome the hurdle rate of what we had to sell to make room?

Part of the takeaway here is, “implicit leverage is good and may be hard to beat.” The other takeaway, however, is, “there may be interesting things to invest in that may become more interesting if we can solve the funding problem.”

What are some of those things? Ideally, we are adding things to a portfolio that have positive expected returns⁵ and also diversifying our existing holdings. For most allocators, that means a portfolio of stocks and bonds. An easy starting point, then, is to consider when stocks and bonds perform poorly and try to identify things that do well in those environments.

Following the methodology of Ilmanen, Maloney, and Ross (2017)⁶, we identify growth and inflation regimes using a composite of economic growth, inflation, and surprise factors. Growth and inflation regimes are then combined to create four combined regimes: Growth Up / Inflation Down, Growth Up / Inflation Up, Growth Down / Inflation Down, and Growth Down / Inflation Up.

By design, each of these combined regimes occurs approximately 25% of the time throughout history. We find that any given decade, however, can exhibit significant variation from the average. For example, the 2000s were characterized by the Growth Down environment, whereas the 2010s were characterized by an Inflation Down environment.

Figure 4: Regime Classifications

Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Data; Federal Reserve of Philadelphia Survey of Professional Forecasters. See Appendix B for regime definitions.

Using these regimes, we can evaluate how different asset classes, equity factors, and trading strategies have historically performed. In Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 we do precisely this, plotting the regime-conditional Sharpe ratios of various potential investments.

Note that due to data availability, each figure may cover a different time period. The 60/40 portfolio is included in each graph as a reference point for that sub-period.

Figure 5: Sharpe Ratio of Equities, Bonds, and a 60/40 Portfolio in Different Economic Regimes (March 1962 to March 2023)

Source: Kenneth French Data Library; Tiingo; FRED; AQR; Bloomberg. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions. See Appendix B for economic regime definitions.

Figure 6: Sharpe Ratios of Equity Long/Shorts in Different Economic Regimes (March 1962 to December 2022)

Source: Kenneth French Data Library; Tiingo; FRED; AQR; Bloomberg. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions. See Appendix B for economic regime definitions.

Figure 7: Sharpe Ratios of Hedge Fund Categories in Different Economic Regimes (March 1998 to December 2022)

Source: Kenneth French Data Library; Tiingo; FRED; AQR; Bloomberg; HFRX. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions. See Appendix B for economic regime definitions.

Figure 8: Sharpe Ratios of Commodities and Managed Futures in Different Economic Regimes (March 1985 – December 2022)

Source: Kenneth French Data Library; Tiingo; FRED; AQR; Bloomberg. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions. See Appendix B for economic regime definitions.

There are two standout takeaways:

Stocks and bonds don’t do well during Growth Down / Inflation Up periods.⁷
Other stuff does.

Specifically, we can see that Quality long/short and Managed Futures have historically been robust across regimes and have provided diversification during Growth Down / Inflation Up regimes. Unfortunately, while the Quality long/short – or, at least, a proxy for it – can be achieved by tilting our long-only equity exposure, the same cannot be said for Managed Futures.

One question we might pose to ourselves is, “given the possible canvas of tilts and overlays, if we wanted to maximize the Sharpe ratio of our portfolio for a given active risk budget, what would we do?” We can, at the very least, try to answer this question with the benefit of hindsight.

We’ll make a few assumptions:

Our strategic portfolio is 60% stocks and 40% bonds.
Our equity tilts can only be up to 60% of the portfolio (i.e., replace long-only equity one-for-one).
Our overlays can fill up the rest of the portfolio (i.e., we can replace any remaining long-only stock or bond exposure with capital efficient instruments – like futures or swaps – and allocate the available cash to fund the overlay strategy).

Using these rules, we can run an optimization⁸ maximizing the realized Sharpe ratio subject to a tracking error constraint. The results are illustrated in Figure 9. As the active risk budget increases, so does the allocation to tilts and overlays. To understand the relative proportional exposure to each, normalized weights are presented in Figure 10.

Without emphasizing the specific allocations, the blue band represents the tilts while the orange, grey, green, purple bands represent the different overlay categories (long/short equity, hedge fund strategies, commodities, and managed futures, respectively).

This whole process uses the benefit of hindsight to measure both returns and covariances, so is by no means a prescriptive endeavor. Nevertheless, I believe the results point in at least one clear direction: at all levels of active risk, the solution calls for a mix of tilts and overlays.

Figure 9: Maximizing the Realized Sharpe Ratio of a 60/40 Portfolio for a Given Active Risk Budget

Source: AQR Data Library; Kenneth French Data Library; HFRX. Calculations by Newfound Research. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

Figure 10: Normalized Portfolio Weights

Source: AQR Data Library; Kenneth French Data Library; HFRX. Calculations by Newfound Research. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends. Past performance is not indicative of future results. See Appendix A for index definitions.

For leverage-constrained allocators (e.g. many financial advisors), overlays have historically remained out of reach. More flexible institutions were able to implement it through a process that became known as “portable alpha,” originally pioneered by PIMCO in the 1970s. The implementation, on paper, is fairly simple:

Replace passive beta exposure with a capital efficient derivative (e.g. futures or swaps) to free up capital.
Allocate freed up capital to the desired alpha source.

Figure 11: Portable Alpha Example

The net portfolio construction, in effect, retains the beta and “ports” the alpha on as an overlay.

Historically, this required investors to manage a book of derivatives or hire a separate account manager. Today, mutual funds and ETFs exist that provide pre-packaged capital efficiency.

Figure 12 demonstrates one such example where a 60/40 allocation is packaged into a capital efficient “90/60” fund, allowing an investor to utilize just 2/3^rds of their capital to capture the same exposure. Figure 13 demonstrates that when this freed up capital is allocated, it effectively “stacks” the exposure⁹ on top of the original 60/40 portfolio. We have taken to calling this approach Return Stacking^TM.

Figure 12: Capital Efficient Funds

For illustrative purposes only.

Figure 13: Return Stacking^TM

For illustrative purposes only.

The other in figure 13 is where we can implement our alternative investment, effectively creating an overlay. Ideally this is something that has positive expected returns and low correlation to both stocks and bonds. We’re partial to managed futures for a variety of reasons, but allocators can pick their own adventure here.

Tilts and overlays are not mutually exclusive: it’s long/short portfolios all the way down. While overlays remained out of reach for many leverage-constrained investors, new capital efficient mutual funds and ETFs enable their implementation.

Appendix A: Index Definitions

U.S. Stocks – U.S. total equity market return data from Kenneth French Library until 5/24/2001 when total returns returns from the Vanguard Total Stock Market ETF (VTI) are used. Returns after 5/24/2021 are net of VTI’s underlying expense ratio. Data for VTI provided by Tiingo.

10-Year U.S. Treasuries – The 10-Year U.S. Treasury index is a constant maturity index calculated by assuming that a 10-year bond is purchased at the beginning of every month and sold at the end of that month to purchase a new bond at par at the beginning of the next month. You cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges. The referenced index is shown for general market comparisons and is not meant to represent any Newfound index or strategy. Data for 10-year U.S. Treasury yields come from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis economic database (“FRED”).

Value Tilt – BIG HiBM Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Size Tilt – ME LO 30 Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Momentum Tilt – BIG HiPRIOR Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Quality Tilt – 50% BIG LoINV + 50% BIG HiOP Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Low Beta Tilt – BIG LoBETA Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Value Long/Short – HML Devil Factor Returns for U.S. Equities (AQR Data Library)

Size Long/Short – SMB Factor Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Momentum Long/Short – UMD Factor Returns for U.S. Equities (Kenneth French Data Library)

Quality Long/Short – QMJ Factor Returns for U.S. Equities (AQR Data Library)

Anti-Beta Long/Short – BAB Factor Returns for U.S. Equities (AQR Data Library)

HFRX Equity Long/Short –HFRX Equity Hedge Index (Hedge Fund Research, Inc.)

HFRX Event Driven – HFRX Event Driven Index (Hedge Fund Research, Inc.)

HFRX Macro/CTA – HFRX Macro/CTA Index (Hedge Fund Research, Inc.)

HFRX Relative Value – HFRX Relative Value Arbitrage Index (Hedge Fund Research, Inc.)

Managed Futures – Time Series Momentum Factor (AQR Data Library). From inception to 2003, a 2% annual management fee and 3% annual estimated transaction cost are applied. From 2003 to 2013, a 1.5% annual estimated transaction cost is applied. From inception to 2013, a 20% annual performance fee is applied at the end of each year, so long as the end-of-year NAV exceeds the prior high-water mark. From 2013 onward a 1.5% annual fee and 0.6% annual estimated transaction cost is applied.

Equal-Weight Commodities – Excess Return of Equal Weight Commodities Portfolio (AQR Data Library)

Appendix B: Regime Classifications

Growth and Inflation are each defined as a composite of two series, which are first normalized to z-scores by subtracting the full-sample historical mean and dividing by the full-sample historical volatility.

“Up” and “Down” regimes are defined as those times when measures are above or below their full sample median.

Growth:

Chicago Fed National Activity Index
Realized Industrial Production minus prior year Industrial Production forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.

Inflation:

Year-over-year CPI change
Realized year-over-year CPI minus prior year NGDP forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.

What Is Managed Futures?

By Steven Braun

On February 2, 2023

In Craftsmanship, Portfolio Construction, Risk Management, Trend

Summary

Much like in 2008, managed futures as an investment strategy had an impressive year in 2022. With most traditional asset classes struggling to navigate the inflationary macroeconomic environment, managed futures has been drawing interest as a potential diversifier.
Managed futures is a hedge fund category that uses futures contracts as their primary investment vehicle. Managed futures managers can engage in many different investment strategies, but trend following is the most common.
Trend following as an investment strategy has a substantial amount of empirical evidence promoting its efficacy as an investment strategy. There also exist several behavioral arguments for why this anomaly exists, and why we might expect it to continue.
As a diversifier, multi-asset trend following has provided diversification benefits when compared to both stocks and bonds. Additionally, trend following has posted positive returns in the four major drawdowns in equities since 2000.

Cut short your losses, and let your winners run. – David Ricardo, 1838

What is Managed Futures?

Managed futures is a hedge fund category originating in the 1980s, named for the ability to trade (both long and short) global equity, bond, commodity, and currency futures contracts. Today, these strategies have been made available to investors in both mutual fund and ETF wrappers. The predominate strategy of most managed futures managers is trend following, so much so, that the terms are often used synonymously.

While trend following is by far the largest and most pronounced strategy in the category, it is not the only strategy used in the space.¹ Managed futures can engage in trend following, momentum trading, mean reversion, carry-focused strategies, relative value trading, macro driven strategies, or any combination thereof. Any individual managed futures manager may have a certain bias towards one of the strategies, though, trend following is by far the most utilized strategy of the group².

Figure 1: The Taxonomy of Managed Futures

Adapted from Kaminski (2014). The most common characteristics are highlighted in orange.

What is Trend Following?

Simply put, trend following is a strategy that buys (‘goes long’) assets that have been rising in price and sells (‘goes short’) assets that have been decreasing in price, based on the premise that this trend will continue. The precise method of measuring trends varies widely, but each primarily relies on the difference between an asset’s price today and the price of the same asset previously. Some common methods of measuring trends include total return measurements, moving averages, and regression lines. These different approaches are all mathematically linked, and empirical evidence does not suggest that one method is necessarily better than another³.

Trend following has a rich history in financial markets, with centuries of evidence supporting the idea that markets tend to trend. The obvious question to then ask is: why? The past few decades of academic research has focused on explaining theories such as the Efficient Market Hypothesis and research into explanatory market factors (such as value and size), diminishing the amount of research being conducted on trend following.

Figure 2: The Life Cycle of a Trend

Adapted from AQR. For illustrative purposes only.

The classification of trend following as an anomaly, however, has not left it without theories for why it works. There are a number of generally accepted explanations for why trend following works, and more importantly, why the anomaly might continue to persist.

Anchoring Bias: When new data enters the marketplace, investors can overly rely on historical data, thereby underreacting to the new information. This can be seen in Figure 3 where, after the catalyst of new information enters the market, the price of a security will directionally follow the fair value of the asset, but not with a large enough magnitude to match the fair value precisely.

Disposition Effect: Investors have a tendency to take gains on their winning positions too early and hold onto their losing positions too long.

Herding: After a noticeable trend has been established, investors “bandwagon” into the trade, prolonging the directional trend, and potentially pushing the price past the asset’s fair value⁴.

Confirmation Bias: Investors tend to ignore information that is contrary to an their beliefs. A positive (or negative) signal will be ignored if the investor has a differing view, extending the time frame for the convergence of an asset’s price to its fair value.

Rational Inattention Bias: Investors cannot immediately digest all information due to a lack of information processing resources (or mental capacity). Consequently, prices move towards fair value more slowly as the information is processed by all investors.

As previously mentioned, methodologies may vary widely when analyzing an asset’s trend, but the general theme is to view an asset’s current price relative to some measure of its recent history. For example, one common example of this is to observe an asset’s current price versus its 200-day moving average: initiating a long position when the price is above its moving average or a short position when it is below. Extending Figure 2, we can graphically depict the trade cycle attempting to take advantage of such a trend.

Figure 3: The Life Cycle of a Trade

Source: Newfound Research, AQR. For illustrative purposes only

Of course, using such an idealized description of a trend is not typically what is found in the market, which leads to many false-starts, The risk-management decisions made to reduce the impact of these false-starts begins to highlight part of the attractiveness of the strategy as a diversifier.

Consider that the fair value of an asset is generally never known with a high degree of certainty. A trend following manager is thus reliant on the perceived direction of trend at any given time, and so, must make choices based on how the trend evolves or not.

Figure 4: Heads I Trend, Tails I Don’t

Adapted from Michael Covel. For illustrative purposes only.

When the model indicates that a trend has formed, the manager will initiate a position in the direction of the indicated trend (either short or long – blue line in Figure 4). As long as the trend continues, the strategy will hold that position, and only exit when the signal indicates that the trend no longer exists. At that time, the manager will remove the position, potentially taking the opposite position⁵.

The second case (red line in Figure 4) is one in which the trend reverses shortly after a position has been initiated. After establishing a position in the asset, the price of the asset reverts to its previous levels, possibly completely reversing in direction. In such a case, the signal will indicate that the trend no longer exists and recommend that the position be removed.

Historically, by quickly cutting losers and letting winning trades run, trend following has created a positively skewed return profile. Managed futures strategies tend to trade many different markets and underlying assets. This minimizes the impact of trends being rejected but may increase the probability of taking a position in an asset that has an outlier trend occurring that might be out of the scope of a traditional portfolio.

Kaminski (2014) refers to this characteristic as divergent risk taking⁶, where a divergent investor “profess[es] their own ignorance to the true structure of potential risks/benefits with some level of skepticism for what is knowable or is not dependable”.

This divergent risk behavior results in a positively skewed return distribution by not risking too much on a trade, removing the position if it goes against you, and allowing a trade to run if it is winning⁷.

The structural nature of trend following minimizes the size of any bets taken, and quickly eliminates a position if the bet is not paying off. By diversifying across many markets, asset classes, and economic goods, while maintaining sensible positions without directional bias, the strategy maintains staying power by not swinging for the fences and staying with a time-proven approach⁸, in a well-diversified manner.

Using Managed Futures as A Diversifier

The traditional investor portfolio has typically been dominated by two assets: stocks and bonds. In recent history, investors have even been able to use fixed income to buffer equity risk as high-quality bonds have exhibited flight-to-safety characteristics in times of extreme market turmoil. In the first two decades of the 2000s, this pairing has worked extremely well given that interest rates declined over the period, inflation remained low, and the bonds were resilient during the fallout of the tech bubble and the Great Financial Crisis.

In Figure 5, we chart the relationship between the year-over-year Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (“CPIAUCSL”) versus the 12-month correlation between U.S. Stocks and 10-Year U.S. Treasuries⁹. We can see that negative correlation is most pronounced when inflation is low. Positive correlation regimes, on the other hand, have historically occurred in all realized ranges of CPI changes, the most striking occurring when inflation was extraordinarily high.

Figure 5: The Relationship Between Inflation and Equity-Bond Correlation

Source: FRED, Kenneth French Data Library, Tiingo. For illustrative purposes only.

Since trend following can hold both long and short positions, it has the potential to trade price trends in assets in any direction that may emerge from increasing inflation risks. This is highlighted by the performance of trend following in 2022, where the year-to-date real returns of U.S. equities¹⁰, 10-Year U.S. Treasuries, and the SG CTA Trend Index as of December 31, 2022 , were -19.5%, -16.5%, and +27.4%, respectively. During 2022, trend following strategies were generally long the U.S. Dollar, short fixed income securities, and short equity indices. Additionally, the managers tended to hold mixed positions in the commodity space, taking long and short positions in the individual commodity contracts exhibiting both positive and negative trends.

Importantly, the dynamics exhibited throughout different economic regimes (such as monetary inflation vs supply/demand inflation) will unfold differently, so positions that were profitable in 2022 will likely not be the same in all environments. Trend following as a strategy, is dynamic in nature, and will adjust positioning as trends emerge and fade, regardless of the economic regime.

In addition to historically providing a ballast in inflationary regimes, one of managed futures’ claims to fame stems from the strategy’s ability to provide negative correlation in times of financial stress, specifically, in equity crises. The net result of including an allocation to trend following strategies during these periods has been a reduction in portfolio drawdowns and portfolio volatility.

Though managed futures have been in existence since the 1980’s, the strategy garnered its popularity coming out of the Great Financial Crisis, as it was one of the few investment strategies to provide a positive return. While this event shot the strategy to prominence, it was not an isolated incident. In fact, this relationship has been repeated frequently throughout history.

Table 1 shows the cumulative nominal returns of stocks, bonds, and managed futures when the equity market realized a greater-than 20% drawdown.

Table 1: Nominal Return of Equities, Bonds, and Managed Futures During Equity Crises

Source: FRED, Kenneth French Data Library, BarclayHedge. Calculations by Newfound Research. Time period is based on data availability. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.

Since the inception of the SG CTA Trend Index¹¹, bonds have provided diversification benefits in three of the four large drawdowns. 2022, however, was the first period in which inflation has been a concern in the market, and U.S. Treasuries were insufficient to reduce risk in a traditional portfolio.

We can see, though, that the SG CTA Trend Index provided similar diversification benefits during the drawdowns in the first two decades of the century, but also proved capable while inflation shocks rose to prominence in 2022.

Figure 6: Performance From 1999 to 2022

Source: BarclayHedge, Tiingo. 60/40 Portfolio is the Vanguard Balance Index Fund (“VBINX”) and returns presented are net of the management fee of the fund. Time period is based on data availability. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.

Conclusion

Traditional portfolios consisting of equity and fixed income exposure have enjoyed two decades of strong performance due to favorable economic tailwinds. With the changing economic regime and uncertainty facing markets ahead, however, investors have begun searching for potential additions to their portfolios to protect against inflation and to provide diversifying exposure to other macroeconomic headwinds.

Trend following as a strategy has extensive empirical evidence supporting both its standalone performance, as well as the diversifying benefits in relation to traditional asset classes such as stocks and bonds. In addition, trend following is mechanically convex in that it can provide positive returns in both bull and bear markets.

Managed futures is a strong contender as an addition to a stock-and-bond heavy portfolio. Finding its roots in the 1980s, the strategy has a tenured history in the investment landscape with a demonstrated history of providing diversifying exposure in times of equity crisis.

In this paper, we have shown that trend following is a robust trading strategy with behavioral underpinnings, suggesting that the strategy has staying power in the long-run, as well as desirable characteristics due to the mechanical nature of the strategy.

As a potential addition to a traditional investment portfolio, managed futures provides a source of diversification beyond that of mainstream asset classes, as well as strong absolute returns on a standalone basis.

APPENDIX A: TREND FOLLOWING AS AN OPTIONS STRADDLE

A trend following strategy can benefit from both positive and negative price trends. If prices are increasing, then a long position can be initiated; if prices are decreasing, then a short position can be initiated. Said differently: a trend following strategy can potentially profit from both increases or decreases in price.

This characteristic is immediately reminiscent of a long position in an option straddle, where a put and call option are purchased with the same strike price. This option position would, thereby, benefit if the price moves largely either positive or negative¹².

Figure A1: Long Straddle Payoff Profile

Source: Newfound Research. For illustrative purposes only.

Empirically, these strategies have in fact performed remarkably similar. To illustrate this, we will create two simple strategies.

The first strategy is a simple trend following strategy that takes a long position in the S&P 500 when its prior 12-month return is positive, and a short position when its negative.

The second strategy will attempt to replicate the delta-position of a straddle expiring in one month, struck at the close price of the S&P 500 twelve months ago. We then compute the delta of this position using the Black-Scholes model¹³ and take a position in the S&P 500 equal to the computed delta. For example, if the price of the S&P 500 12-months ago was $3,000, we would calculate the delta of a straddle struck at $3,000. Since the delta of this position will range between -1 and 1, the strategy will use this as an allocation to the S&P 500.

Figure A2: Replicating Trend Following with Straddles

Source: Tiingo. Calculations by Newfound Research. Returns assume the reinvestment of all dividends. The S&P 500 is represented by the Vanguard 500 Index Fund Investor Shares (“VFINX”). For illustrative purposes only. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.

For both strategies, we will assume that any excess capital is held in cash, returning 0%. Figure A2 plots the growth of $1 invested in each strategy.

As we can see, the option strategy and the trend following strategy provide a roughly equivalent return profile. In fact, if we compare the quarterly returns of the two strategies to the S&P 500, an important pattern emerges. Both strategies exhibit convex relationships in relation to the S&P 500.

Figure A3: Trend Following Relationship to the Underlying

Source: Newfound Research. For illustrative purposes only.

Figure A4: Straddle Replication Relationship to the Underlying

Source: Newfound Research. For illustrative purposes only.

APPENDIX B: Index Definitions

U.S. Stocks: U.S. total equity market return data from Kenneth French Library. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends.

10-Year U.S. Treasuries: The 10-Year U.S. Treasury index is a constant maturity index calculated by assuming that a 10-year bond is purchased at the beginning of every month and sold at the end of that month to purchase a new bond at par at the beginning of the next month. You cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses, or sales charges. The referenced index is shown for general market comparison and is not meant to represent any Newfound index or strategy. Data for 10-Year U.S. Treasury yields come from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis economic database (“FRED”).

SG Trend Index: The SG Trend Index is designed to track the largest 10 (by AUM) CTAs and be representative of the managed futures trend-following space.

One Hedge to Rule Them All

By Nathan Faber

On March 30, 2020

In Craftsmanship, Portfolio Construction, Risk Management, Weekly Commentary

This post is available as a PDF download here.

Summary

About two years ago, we compared and contrasted different approaches to risk managing equity exposure; including fixed income, risk parity, managed futures, tactical equity, and options-based strategies.
Given the recent market events as the world navigates through the COVID-19 crisis, we revisit this analysis to see how these strategies would have fared over the past two years.
We find that all eight strategies studied have continued to successfully reduce risk, with two of the previously underperforming options-based strategies now jumping to the forefront of the pack.
Over time, performance of the risk management strategies still varies significantly both relative to the S&P 500 and compared to the other strategies. Generally, risk-managed strategies tend to behave like insurance, underperforming on the upside and outperforming on the downside.
Diversifying your diversifiers by blending a number of complementary risk-managed strategies together – even at random – can be a powerful method of improving long-term outcomes.

“The primary requirement of historical time is that inly one of the possible alternatives coming at you from the future can be actualized in the present where it will flow into the pat and remain forever after unalterable. You may sometimes have “another chance” and be able to make a different choice in some later present, but this can in no way change the choice you did in fact make in the first instance.”

– Dr. William G. Pollard, Prof. of Physics, Manhattan Project

23 trading days.

In a little over a month, the S&P 500 dropped nearly 35% from all-time highs in a sell-off that was one of the fastest in history. Many investors experienced the largest drawdowns their portfolios had seen since the Financial Crisis.

While the market currently sits in a drawdown closer to 25% (as of the time of this writing), the future remains could take any path. Following the relative calm in the market over the preceding year, we are now living through a historic time with the uncertainty and severity of the growing COVID-19 pandemic and its far-reaching ramifications.

However, as a firm that focuses on managing risk, we are used to not knowing the answers.

In the summer of 2018, we published a piece entitled The State of Risk Management where we examined the historical trade-offs in terms of returns during market downturns versus returns during calm market environments of a variety of risk management methods.

Since that time, especially with the benefit of hindsight, one might argue that risk management was unnecessary until this past month. While the S&P 500 experienced a 19% drawdown in Q4 of 2018, it quickly recovered and went on to post a gain of 32% in 2019, rewarding those who stayed the course (or, better yet, bought the dip).

Source: Tiingo. Returns are gross of all management fees, transaction fees, and taxes, but net of underlying fund fees. Total return series assumes the reinvestment of all distributions. Data through 3/27/2020.

With the future poised to follow a variety of uncertain paths, we think it is a prudent time to check in on some of the more popular ways to manage risk and see how they are handling the current events.

The Updated Historical Track Record

For risk management, we examine eight strategies that roughly fit into four categories:

Diversification Strategies: strategic 60/40 stock/bond mix¹and risk parity²
Options Strategies: equity collar³, protective put⁴, and put-write⁵,⁶
Equity Strategies: long-only defensive equity that blends a minimum volatility strategy⁷, a quality strategy⁸, and a dividend growth strategy⁹ in equal weights
Trend-Following Strategies: managed futures¹⁰ and tactical equity¹¹

Index data was used prior to fund inception when necessary, and the common inception data is December 1997.

The following charts show the return and risk characteristics of the strategies over the entire historical period. Previously, we had used maximum drawdown as a measure of risk but have now switched to using the ulcer index to quantify both the duration and severity of drawdowns.

Data Source: CBOE, Tiingo, S&P. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results. All returns are hypothetical index returns. You cannot invest directly in an index and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses, sales charges, or trading expenses. Index returns include the reinvestment of dividends. No index is meant to measure any strategy that is or ever has been managed by Newfound Research. Data is from December 1997 to 3/27/2020.

Relative to when we previously presented these statistics (as of July 2018), the most notable changes are that the 95-100 Collar index and Risk Parity have improved and that Managed Futures moved into the top-performing spot up from the middle of the pack. Trend Equity dropped slightly in the rankings, which is partially attributable to our switching over to using the Newfound Trend Equity Index, which includes exposure to small- and mid-cap companies and invests in cash rather than corporate bonds for the defensive position.

Six of the eight strategies still exhibit strong risk-adjusted performance relative to the S&P over the entire time period.

But as we also showed in 2018, the dispersion in strategy performance is significant.

Data Source: CBOE, Tiingo, S&P. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results. All returns are hypothetical index returns. You cannot invest directly in an index and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses, sales charges, or trading expenses. Index returns include the reinvestment of dividends. No index is meant to measure any strategy that is or ever has been managed by Newfound Research. Data is from December 1997 to 3/27/2020.

This chart also highlights the current trailing one-year performance for each strategy as of 3/27/2020.

Both the 95-110 Collar and the 5% Put Protection indices are in the top 10% of their historical one-year returns, with the put protection index forging new maximum territory. Trend equity and defensive equity have exhibited returns closer to their median levels, while managed futures, strategic diversification with bonds, and risk parity have had returns above their medians.

When we examine the current market environment, this makes sense. Many options were relatively cheap (i.e. implied volatility was low) heading into and early in February, and the option rollover date was close to when the drawdown began (positive timing luck). Equity trends were also very strong coming out of 2019.

With the sharp reversal in equity prices, option strategies provided a strong static hedge that any investors had been paying premiums for through the previous years of bull market returns.

Trend equity strategies were slower to act as trends took time to reverse before cash was introduced into the portfolio, and managed futures were eventually able to capitalize on short positions and diversification once these trends were established.

Zooming in more granularly, we can see the trade-offs between the hedging performance of each strategy in down markets and the premiums paid through negative returns in up-markets. This chart shows the returns relative to the S&P 500 (SPY). When the lines are increasing (decreasing), the hedge is outperforming (underperforming). A flatter line during periods of calm markets indicates lower premiums if we think of these strategies as insurance policies.

Data Source: CBOE, Tiingo, S&P. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results. All returns are hypothetical index returns. You cannot invest directly in an index and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses, sales charges, or trading expenses. Index returns include the reinvestment of dividends. No index is meant to measure any strategy that is or ever has been managed by Newfound Research. Data is through 3/27/2020.

All eight strategies have provided hedging in both Q4 2018 and the current downturn. The -95-100 Collar- provided some of the lowest premiums. -Trend Equity- also provided low premiums but had a slower time getting back in the market after the hedging period in 2018.

-Managed Futures- have provided some of the best hedging through both down periods but had the highest premium during the strong market of 2019.

With the continued dispersion in performance, especially with the “new” market crisis, this highlights the importance of diversification.

Diversifying Your Diversifiers

Not every risk management strategy will perfectly hedge every downturn while also having a low cost during up markets.

We see the power of diversifying your diversifiers when we test simple equal-weight blends of the risk management strategies. In our 2018 update, we had used an equal weight blend of all eight strategies and a blend of the six strategies that had historical Sharpe ratios above the S&P 500. This latter selection was admittedly biased with hindsight. The two excluded strategies – the 95-110 Collar and the 5% Put Protection indices – were some of the best performing over the period from August 2018 to March 2020!

Our own biases notwithstanding, we still include both blends for comparison.

Both blends have higher Sharpe ratios than 6 of the 8 individual strategies and higher excess return to ulcer index ratios than all of the eight individual strategies.

This is a very powerful result, indicating that naïve diversification is nearly as good as being able to pick the best individual strategies with perfect foresight.

Data Source: CBOE, Tiingo, S&P. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results. All returns are hypothetical index returns. You cannot invest directly in an index and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses, sales charges, or trading expenses. Index returns include the reinvestment of dividends. No index is meant to measure any strategy that is or ever has been managed by Newfound Research. Data is through 3/27/2020.

But holding eight – or even six – strategies can be daunting, especially for more aggressive investors who may only want to allocate a small portion of their portfolio to a risk management sleeve.

How much diversification is enough?

The following charts show the distribution of risk-adjusted returns from randomly choosing any number of the 8 strategies and holding them in equal weight.

As is to be expected, the cost of choosing the “wrong” blend of strategies decreases as the number of strategies held increases. The potential benefits initially increase and then back off as the luck of choosing the “right” strategy blend is reduced through holding a greater number of strategies.

Both charts show the distributions converging for the single choice for an 8-strategy portfolio.

Data Source: CBOE, Tiingo, S&P. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance does not guarantee future results. All returns are hypothetical index returns. You cannot invest directly in an index and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses, sales charges, or trading expenses. Index returns include the reinvestment of dividends. No index is meant to measure any strategy that is or ever has been managed by Newfound Research. Data is through 3/27/2020.

Even holding 3 or 4 of the eight risk management strategies, chosen at random, leads to robust results, in general, with narrowed bands in the distribution (e.g. 25^th to 75^th percentiles).

Blending strategies from each of the different categories – static diversification, options, equity, and trend-following – can further reduce concentration risk verses selection at random and ensure that a variety of risk factors within the hedging strategies (e.g. interest rates from bonds, volatility from options, beta from equity, and whipsaw from trend-following) are mitigated.

Conclusion

We’ve said it many times before: There is no holy grail when it comes to risk management. While finding the perfect hedge that beats all others in every environment is enticing, it is impossible via the simple fact that risk cannot be destroyed, only transformed.

In an uncertain world where we cannot predict exactly what the next crisis will look like – or even what the current crisis will look like after today – diversifying your diversifiers by combining a number of complementary risk-managed strategies may be a prudent course of action.

We believe that this type of balanced approach has the potential to deliver compelling results over a full market cycle while managing the idiosyncratic risk of any one manager or strategy.

Diversification can also help to increase the odds of an investor sticking with their risk management plan as the short-term performance lows won’t be quite as low as they would be with a single strategy (conversely, the highs won’t be as high either).

Developing a plan and sticking with it is the most important first step in risk management. It is obviously desirable to keep premiums in strong markets as low as possible while having efficient hedges in down markets, but simple diversification can go a long way to provide a robust results.

Risk management is, by definition, required to be in place before risks are realized. Even when the market is currently down, risks in the future are still present. Therefore, we must periodically ask ourselves, “What risks are we willing to bear?”

One potential path has been locked into history, but the next time potential risks become reality – and they inevitably will – we must be comfortable with our answer.

Can Managed Futures Offset Equity Losses?

By Corey Hoffstein

On February 3, 2020

In Risk & Style Premia, Risk Management, Trend, Weekly Commentary

This post is available as a PDF download here.

Summary

Managed futures strategies have historically provided meaningful positive returns during left-tail equity events. Yet as a trading strategy, this outcome is by no means guaranteed.
While trend following is “mechanically convex,” the diverse nature of managed futures programs may actually prevent the strategy from offsetting equity market losses.
We generate a large number of random managed futures strategies by varying the asset classes included. We find that more diverse strategies have, historically, provided a larger offset to negative equity events.
This curious outcome appears to be caused by two effects: (1) diversification allows for increased total notional exposure; and (2) past crises saw coincidental trends across multiple markets simultaneously.
Therefore, for investors trying to offset equity market losses, an allocation to managed futures requires believing that future crises will be marked by a large number of simultaneous trends across multiple assets.
Less diversified strategies – such as just trading S&P 500 futures contracts – appear to work if the volatility target is removed.

Shortly after the 2008 crisis, the appetite for risk management strategies exploded. At the forefront of this trend was managed futures, which had already proven itself in the dot-com fallout. With the Societe Generale Trend Index¹ returning 20.9% in 2008, the evidence for CTAs to provide “crisis alpha”² seemed un-debatable. AUM in these strategies sky-rocketed, growing from $200 billion in 2007 to approximately $325 billion by 2012.

Source: http://managedfuturesinvesting.com

Subsequent performance has, unfortunately, been lack-luster. Since 12/31/2011, the SG Trend Index has returned just 14.2% compared to the S&P 500’s 200.8% total return. While this is an unfair, apples-to-oranges comparison, it does capture the dispersion the strategy has exhibited to the benchmark most investors measure performance against during a bull market.

Furthermore, the allocation to managed futures had to come from somewhere. If investors reduced exposure to equities to introduce managed futures, the spread in performance captures the opportunity cost of that decision. There is hope yet: if the S&P 500 fell 50% over the next year, managed futures would have to return just 32% for their full-period performance (2011-2020) to equalize.

Yet how certain are we that managed futures would necessarily generate a positive return in an S&P 500 left-tail environment? Hurst, Ooi, and Pedersen (2017)³ find that managed futures have generated anything from flat to meaningfully positive results during the top 10 largest drawdowns of a 60/40 portfolio since the late 1800s. This evidence makes a strong empirical case, but we should acknowledge the N=10 nature of the data.

Perhaps we can lean into the mechanically convex nature of trend following. Trend following is a close cousin to the trading strategy that delta-hedges a strangle, generating the pay-off profile of a straddle (long an at-the-money put and call). Even without an anomalous premium generated by autocorrelation in the underlying security, the trading strategy itself should – barring trading frictions – generate a convex payoff.

Yet while mechanical convexity may be true on a contract-by-contract basis, it is entirely possible that the convexity we want to see emerge is diluted by trades across other contracts. Consider the scenario where the S&P 500 enters a prolonged and significant drawdown and our managed futures strategy goes short S&P 500 futures contract. While this trade may generate the hedge we were looking for, it’s possible that it is diluted by trades on other contracts such as wheat, the Japanese Yen, or the German Bund.

When we consider that many investors have portfolios dominated by equity risk (recall that equities have historically contributed 90% of the realized volatility for a 60/40 portfolio), it is possible that too much breadth within a managed futures portfolio could actually prevent it from providing negative beta during left-tail equity events.

Replicating Managed Futures

We begin our study by first replicating a generic trend-following CTA index. We adopt an ensemble approach, which is effectively equivalent to holding a basket of managers who each implement a trend-following strategy with a different model and parameterization.

Specifically, we assume each manager implements using the same 47 contracts that represent a diversified basket of equities, rates, commodities, and currencies.⁴

We implement with three different models (total return, price-minus-moving-average, and dual-moving-average-cross) and five potential lookback specifications (21, 42, 84, 168, and 336 days) for a total of 15 different implementations.

Each implementation begins by calculating an equal-risk contribution (“risk parity”) portfolio. Weights for each contract are then multiplied by their trend signal (which is simply either +1 or -1).

The weights for all 15 implementations are then averaged together to generate our index weights. Notional exposure of the aggregate weights is then scaled to target a 10% annualized volatility level. We assume that the index is fully collateralized using the S&P U.S. Treasury Bill Index.

Below we plot our index versus the SG Trend Index. The correlation of monthly returns between these two indices is 75% suggesting that our simple implementation does a reasonable job approximating the broad trend-following style of CTAs. We can also see that it captures the salient features of the SG Trend Index, including strong performance from 2001-2003, Q4 2008 and Q1 2009, and the 2014-2015 period. We can also see it closely tracks the shape the SG Trend Index equity curve from 2015 onward in all its meandering glory.

Source: Stevens Analytics. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance is not an indicator of future results. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance figures are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all distributions. These results do not reflect the returns of any strategy managed by Newfound Research.

Convexity versus Diversification

To explore the impact of diversification in managed futures versus convexity exhibited against the S&P 500, we will create a number of managed futures strategies and vary the number of contracts included. As we are attempting to create a convex payoff against the S&P 500, the S&P 500 futures contract will always be selected.

For example, a 2-contract strategy will always include S&P 500 futures, but the second contract could be 10-year U.S. Treasuries, the Nikkei, the Australian Dollar, Oil, or any of the other 42 futures contracts. Once selected, however, that pair defines the strategy.

For 2-, 4-, 8-, 16-, and 32- contract systems, we generate the performance of 25 randomly selected strategies. We then generate scatter plots with non-overlapping 6-month returns for the S&P 500 on the x-axis and non-overlapping 6-month returns for the managed futures strategies on the y-axis.⁵ We then fit a 2^nd-degree polynomial line to visualize the realized convexity.

(Note that for the single contract case – i.e. just the S&P 500 futures contract – we plot overlapping 6-month returns.)

Source: Stevens Analytics and Sharadar. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance is not an indicator of future results. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance figures are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all distributions. These results do not reflect the returns of any strategy managed by Newfound Research.

There are two particularly interesting artifacts to note.

First, as the number of contracts goes up, the best-fit model turns from a “smile” to a “smirk,” suggesting that diversification dilutes positive convexity relationships with the S&P 500. This outcome should have been expected, as we generally know how managed futures has done over the 20-year period we’re examining. Namely, managed futures did quite well offsetting losses in 2000-2003 and 2008-2009, but has failed to participate in the 2010s.

Perhaps more interestingly, however, is the increase in left-tail performance of managed futures, climbing from 20% when just trading the S&P 500 futures contract to 150% in the 32-contract case. The subtle reason here is diversification’s impact on total notional exposure.

Consider this trivial example: Asset A and Asset B have constant 10% volatility and are uncorrelated with one another. As they are uncorrelated, any combination of these assets will have a volatility that is less than 10%. Therefore, if we want to achieve 10%, we need to apply leverage. In fact, a 50-50 mix of these assets requires us to apply 1.41x leverage to achieve our volatility target, resulting in 70.7% exposure to each asset.

As a more concrete example, when trading just the S&P 500 futures contract, achieving 10% volatility position in 2008 requires diluting gross notional exposure to just 16%. For the full, 47-contract model, gross notional exposure during 2008 dipped to 90% at its lowest point.

Now consider that trend following tends to transform the underlying distributions of assets to generate positive skewness. Increasing leverage can help push those positive trades even further out in the tails.

But here’s the trade-off: the actual exposure to S&P 500 futures contracts, specifically, still remains much, much higher in the case where we’re trading it alone. In practice, the reason the diversified approach was able to generate increased returns during left-tail equity events – such as 2008 – is due to the fact correlations crashed to extremes (both positive and negative) between global equity indices, rates, commodities, and currencies. This allowed the total notional exposure of directionally similar trades (e.g. short equities, long bonds, and short commodities in 2008) to far exceed the total notional exposure achieved if we were just trading the S&P 500 futures contract alone.

Source: Stevens Analytics. Calculations by Newfound Research.

Our confidence in achieving negative convexity versus equity left-tail events, therefore, is inherently tied to our belief that we will see simultaneously trends across a large number of assets during such environments.

Another interpretation of this data is that because negative trends in the S&P 500 have historically coincided with higher volatility, a strategy that seeks to trade just the S&P 500 futures with constant volatility will lose convexity in those tail events. An alternative choice is to vary the volatility of the system to target the volatility of the S&P 500, whose convexity profile we plot below.

Source: Stevens Analytics and Sharadar. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance is not an indicator of future results. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance figures are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all distributions. These results do not reflect the returns of any strategy managed by Newfound Research.

This analysis highlights a variety of trade-offs to consider:

What, specifically, are we trying to create convexity against?
Can diversification allow us to increase our notional exposure?
Will diversification be dilutive to our potential convexity?

Perhaps, then, we should consider approaching the problem from another angle: given exposure to managed futures, what would be a better core portfolio to hold? Given that most managed futures portfolios start from a risk parity core, the simplest answer is likely risk parity.

As an example, we construct a 10% target volatility risk parity index using equity, rate, and commodity contracts. Below we plot the convexity profile of our managed futures strategy against this risk parity index and see the traditional “smile” emerge. We also plot the equity curves for the risk parity index, the managed futures index, and a 50/50 blend. Both the risk parity and managed futures indices have a realized volatility of level of 10.8%; the blended combination drops this volatility to just 7.6%, achieving a maximum drawdown of just -10.1%.

Source: Stevens Analytics and Sharadar. Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance is not an indicator of future results. Performance is backtested and hypothetical. Performance figures are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all distributions. These results do not reflect the returns of any strategy managed by Newfound Research.

Conclusion

Managed futures have historically generated significant gains during left-tail equity events. These returns, however, are by no means guaranteed. While trend following is a mechanically convex strategy, the diversified nature of most managed futures programs can potentially dilute equity-crisis-specific returns.

In this research note, we sought to explore this concept by generating a large number of managed futures strategies that varied in the number of contracts traded. We found that increasing the number of contracts had two primary effects: (1) it reduced realized convexity from a “smile” to a “smirk” (i.e. exhibited less up-side participation with equity markets); and (2) meaningfully increased returns during negative equity markets.

The latter is particularly curious but ultimately the byproduct of two facts. First, increasing diversification allows for increased notional exposure in the portfolio to achieve the same target volatility level. Second, during past crises we witnessed a large number of assets trending simultaneously. Therefore, while increasing the number of contracts reduced notional exposure to S&P 500 futures specifically, the total notional exposure to trades generating positive gains during past crisis events was materially higher.

While the first fact is evergreen, the second may not always be the case. Therefore, employing managed futures specifically as a strategy to provide offsetting returns during an equity market crisis requires the belief that a sufficient number of other exposures (i.e. equity indices, rates, commodities, and currencies) will be exhibiting meaningful trends at the same time.

Given its diversified nature, it should come as no surprise that managed futures appear to be a natural complement to a risk parity portfolio.

Investors acutely sensitive to significant equity losses – e.g. those in more traditional strategic allocation portfolios – might therefore consider strategies designed more specifically with such environments in mind. At Newfound, we believe that trend equity strategies are one such solution, as they overlay trend-following techniques directly on equity exposure, seeking to generate the convexity mechanically and not through correlated assets. When overlaid with U.S. Treasury futures – which have historically provided a “flight-to-safety” premium during equity crises – we believe it is a particularly strong solution.

The Research Library of Newfound Research

Tag: managed futures Page 1 of 2

Is Managed Futures Value-able?

Portfolio Tilts versus Overlays: It’s Long/Short Portfolios All the Way Down

What Is Managed Futures?

Summary

What is Managed Futures?

What is Trend Following?

Using Managed Futures as A Diversifier

Conclusion

APPENDIX A: TREND FOLLOWING AS AN OPTIONS STRADDLE

APPENDIX B: Index Definitions

One Hedge to Rule Them All

Summary

The Updated Historical Track Record

Diversifying Your Diversifiers

Conclusion

Can Managed Futures Offset Equity Losses?

Summary

Replicating Managed Futures

Convexity versus Diversification

Conclusion