The Research Library of Newfound Research

Category: Portfolio Construction Page 4 of 10

Global Growth-Trend Timing

This post is available as a PDF download here.

Summary­

  • While trend following may help investors avoid prolonged drawdowns, it is susceptible to whipsaw where false signals cause investors to either buy high and sell low (realizing losses) or sell low and buy high (a missed opportunity).
  • Empirical evidence suggests that using economic data in the United States as a filter of when to employ trend-following – a “growth-trend timing” model – has historically been fruitful.
  • When evaluated in other countries, growth-trend timing has been historically successful in mitigating whipsaw losses without sacrificing the ability to avoid large drawdowns. However, we see mixed results on whether this actually improves upon naïve trend-following.
  • We find that countries that can be influenced by factors originating outside of their borders might not benefit from an introspective economic signal.

We apologize in advance, as this commentary will be fairly graph- and table-heavy.

We have written fairly extensively on the topic of factor-timing in the past, and much of the success has been proven to be both hard to implement and recreate out of sample.

One of the inherent pains of trend following is the existence of whipsaws, or more precisely, the misidentification of perceived market trends, which turn out to be more noise than signal. An article from Philosophical Economics proposed using several economic indicators to tune down the noise that might affect price-driven signals such as trend following.  Generally, this strategy imposed an overlay that turned trend following “on” when the change in the economic indicators were negative year-over-year signaling a higher likelihood of recession, and conversely, adopted a buy-and-hold stance when the economic indicators were not flashing warning lights.

This strategy presents a certain appeal as leading economic indicators may, as their name implies, lead the market for some time until capital preservation is warranted.  Switching to a trend-following approach may allow a strategy to continue to participate in market appreciation while it lasts.  On the other hand, using economic confirmation as a filter may help a strategy avoid the whipsaw costs generated from noisy market dips while positive economic conditions persist.

In an effort to test such a strategy out-of-sample, we took the approach global, hoping to capture a broader cross-section of economic and market environments.

First, we will consider trend following with no timing using the economic indicators.1

Below we plot the equity curves for Australia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States, alongside a strategy that is long the market when the market is above the trailing twelve-month average (“12 Month average”) and steps to cash when the price is below it.  The ratio between the two is also included to show the relative cumulative performance between the trend strategy and the respective market. An increasing ratio means that the trend following strategy is adding value over buy-and-hold.

Source: MSCI, Global Financial Data.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  Performance is backtested and hypothetical.  Performance figures are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes.  Performance assumes the reinvestment of all distributions. 

Through the graphs above, it becomes clear that much of the trend premium is realized by avoiding the large, prolonged bear markets that tend to occur during economic distress.  In between these periods, however, the trend strategy lags the market. It makes sense, then, that a potential improvement to this strategy would be to implement an augmentation that could better distinguish between real price break-outs and those that lead to a whipsaw in the portfolio.

Growth-Trend Timing

For each country, we look at a number of economic indicators, including: corporate earnings growth, employment, housing starts, industrial production, and retail sales growth.2  The strategy then followed the same rules as described above: if the economic indicator in question displays a negative percentage change over the previous twelve-month period, a position is taken in a trend following strategy utilizing a twelve-month moving average signal.  Otherwise, a buy-and-hold position is established.

To ensure that we are not benefitting from look-ahead bias, a lag of three months was imposed on each of the economic indicators, as it would be unrealistic to assume that the economic levels would be known at the end of each month.

Unfortunately, some of the economic data points could not be found for the entire period in which prices are available, though the analysis can still prove beneficial by indicating what economic regimes trend following is benefitted by growth-trend timing, or the potential identification where one indicator may work when another does not.3

In the charts below, we plot the growth-trend timing (referred to as GTT for the remainder of this commentary) for each country utilizing the available signals. The charts represent the relative cumulative performance over the respective country’s market return.  For example, when the lines remain flat, the GTT approach has adopted buy-and-hold exposure and therefore matches the respective market’s returns. Any changes in the ratios are due to the GTT strategy investing in the trend following strategy.

Source: MSCI, Global Financial Data, St. Louis Fed, Bloomberg.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  Performance is backtested and hypothetical.  Performance figures are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes.  Performance assumes the reinvestment of all distributions. 

What we see from the above figures is a mixed bag of results.

The overlay of economic indicators was by far successful in the mitigation of whipsaw losses, as each country reaped the benefits of being primarily long the market during bull markets. As the 12-month moving average strategy tended to slowly give up a portion of the gains realized from severe market environments, the majority of the GTT strategies remained relatively stagnant until the next major correction.

There are some instances, however, where the indicator was late to the economic party.  It is worth remembering that the market is, in theory, a forward-looking measure, and therefore sudden economic shocks may not be captured in economic data as quickly as it is in market returns.  This created cases where the strategy either missed the chance to be out of the market during a correction or was sitting on the sidelines during the subsequent recoveries. Notably, the employment signal in Australia, Italy, Singapore, and the United Kingdom tended to be a poor leading indicator as the strategy tended to be invested longer in the bear markets than the trend strategy.

 

A Candidate for Ensembling

The implicit assumption in the analysis above is that the included indicators behave in similar ways.  For example, by using a twelve-month lookback period for the indicators, we are assuming that each indicator will begin to trend in roughly the same way.

That may not be a particularly fair assumption.  Whereas housing starts and retail sales are generally considered leading indicators, employment (unemployment) rates are normally categorized as lagging indicators. For this reason, it may be more beneficial to use a shorter lookback period so as to pick up on potential problems in the economy as they begin to present themselves.  Further, some signals tend to be more erratic than others, suggesting that a meaningful lookback period for one indicator may not be meaningful for another. With no perfect reason to prefer one lookback over another, we might consider different lookback periods so as to diversify any specification risk that may exist within the strategy.

With the benefit of hindsight, we know that not all recessions occur for the same reasons, so being reliant on one signal that has worked in the past may not be as beneficial in the future. With this in mind, we should consider that all indicators hold some information as to the state of the economy since one indicator may be signaling the all-clear while another may be flashing warning lights.

For the same reason medical professionals take multiple readings to gain insight into the state of the body, we should also consider any available signals to ascertain the health of the economy.

To ensemble this strategy, we will vary the lookbacks from six to eighteen months, while holding the lag at three months, as well as combine the available economic signals for each country.  For the sake of brevity, we will hold the trend-following strategy the same with a twelve-month moving average.

Remember, if the economic signal is negative, it does not mean that we are immediately out of the market: a negative economic signal simply moves the strategy into a trend-following approach. With 5 economic indicators and 13 lookback periods, we have 65 possible strategies for each country. As an example, if 40 of these 65 models were positive and 25 were negative, we would hold 62% in the market and 38% in the trend following strategy.

The resulting performance statistics can be seen in the table below.

Source: MSCI, Global Financial Data, St. Louis Fed, Bloomberg.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  Performance is backtested and hypothetical.  Performance figures are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes.  Performance assumes the reinvestment of all distributions. 

From the table above, we see that there are, again, mixed results. One country that particularly stands out is Italy in that the sign on its return flipped to negative and the drawdown was actually deeper with GTT than with a simple buy-and-hold strategy.

Source: MSCI, Global Financial Data, St. Louis Fed, Bloomberg.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  Performance is backtested and hypothetical.  Performance figures are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes.  Performance assumes the reinvestment of all distributions. 

Digging deeper, it appears that the GTT strategy for Italy was actually whipsawed by more than just trend-following. Housing start data for Italy was not readily available until December 2008, so Italy may have been at a relative disadvantage when compared against the other countries.  Since the reliable data we could find begins at the end of 2008 and the majority of the whipsaw losses occur post-Great Financial Crisis, we can run the analysis again, but with housing start data being added in upon its availability.

Source: MSCI, Global Financial Data, St. Louis Fed, Bloomberg.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  Performance is backtested and hypothetical.  Performance figures are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes.  Performance assumes the reinvestment of all distributions. 

Adding housing starts in as an indicator did not meaningfully alter the results over the period. One hypothesis is that the indicators included could not fully encapsulate the complex state of Italy’s economy over the period.  Italy has weathered three technical recessions over the past decade, so this could be a regime where the market is looking to sources outside the country for indications of distress or where the economic indicator is not reflective of the pressures driving the market.

Source: MSCI, St. Louis Fed.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  Performance is backtested and hypothetical.  Performance figures are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes.  Performance assumes the reinvestment of all distributions. 

Above, we can see several divergences between the market movement and changes in real GDP. Specifically, in the past decade, we see that the market reacted to information that didn’t materialize in the country’s real GDP. More likely, the market was reacting to regional financial distress driven by debt concerns.

The MSCI Italy index is currently composed of 24 constituents with multinational business operations. Additionally, the index maintains large concentrations in financials, utilities, and energy: 33%, 25%, and 14%, respectively.4  Because of this sector concentration, utilizing the economic indicators may overly focus on the economic health of Italy while ignoring external factors such as energy prices or broader financial distress that could be swaying the market needle.

A parallel explanation could be that the Eurozone is entangled enough that signals could be interfering with each other between countries. Further research could seek to disaggregate signals between the Eurozone and the member-countries, attempting to differentiate between zone, regional, and country signals to ascertain further meaning.

Additionally, economic indicators are influenced by both the private and public sector so this could represent a disconnect between public company health and private company health.

Conclusion

In this commentary, we sought to answer the question, “can we improve trend-following by drawing information from a country’s economy”. It intuitively makes sense that an investor would generally opt for remaining in the market unless there are systemic issues that may lead to market distress.  A strategy that successfully differentiates between market choppiness and periods of potential recession would drastically mitigate any losses incurred from whipsaw, thereby capturing a majority of the equity premium as well as the trend premium.

We find that growth-trend timing has been relatively successful in countries such as the United States, Germany, and Japan.  However, the country that is being analyzed should be considered in light of their specific circumstances.

Peeking under the hood of Italy, it becomes clear that market movements may be influenced by more than a country’s implicit economic health.  In such a case, we should pause and ask ourselves whether a macroeconomic indicator is truly reflective of that country’s economy or if there are other market forces pulling the strings.

 


 

Macro Timing with Trend Following

This post is available for download here.

Summary

  • While it may be tempting to time allocations to active strategies, it is generally best to hold them as long-term allocations.
  • Despite this, some research has shown that there may be certain economic environments where trend following equity strategies are better suited.
  • In this commentary, we replicate this data and find that a broad filter of recessionary periods does indeed show this for certain trend equity strategies but not for the style of trend equity in general.
  • However, further decomposing the business cycle into contractions, recoveries, expansions, and slowdowns using leading economic indicators such as PMI and unemployment does show some promising relationships between the forecasted stage of the business cycle and trend following’s performance relative to buy-and-hold equities.
  • Even if this data is not used to time trend equity strategies, it can be beneficial to investors for setting expectations and providing insight into performance differences.


Systematic active investing strategies are a way to achieve alternative return profiles that are not necessarily present when pursuing standard asset allocation and may therefore play an important role in developing well-diversified portfolios.

But these strategies are best viewed as allocations rather than trades.1 This is a topic we’ve written about a number of times with respect to factor investing over the past several years, citing the importance of weathering short-term pain for long-term gains. For active strategies to outperform, some underperformance is necessary. Or, as we like to say, “no pain, no premium.”

That being said, being tactical in our allocations to active strategies may have some value in certain cases. In one sense, we can view the multi-layered active decisions simply as another active strategy, distinct from the initial one.

An interesting post on Philosophical Economics looked at using a variety of recession indicators (unemployment, earnings growth, industrial production, etc.) as ways to systematically invest in either U.S. equities or a trend following strategy on U.S. equities. If the economic indicator was in a favorable trend, the strategy was 100% invested in equities. If the economic indicator was in an unfavorable trend, the strategy was invested in a trend following strategy applied to equities, holding cash when the market was in a downtrend.

The reasoning behind this strategy is intuitively appealing. Even if a recession indicator flags a likely recession, the market may still have room to run before turning south and warranting capital protection. On the other hand, when the recession indicator was favorable, purely investing in equities avoids some of the whipsaw costs that are inherent in trend following strategies.

In this commentary, we will first look at the general style of trend equity in the context of recessionary and non-recessionary periods and then get a bit more granular to see when trend following has worked historically through the economic cycle of Expansion, Slowdown, Contraction, and Recovery.

Replicating the Data

To get our bearings, we will first attempt to replicate some of the data from the Philosophical Economics post using only the classifications of “recession” and “not-recession”.

Keeping in line with the Philosophical Economics method, we will use whether the economic metric is above or below its 12-month moving average as the recession signal for the next month. We will use market data from the Kenneth French Data Library for the total U.S. stock market returns and the risk-free rate as the cash rate in the equity trend following model.

The following table shows the results of the trend following timing models using the United States ISM Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) and the Unemployment Rate as indicators.

U.S. Equities12mo MA Trend Equity12m MA Trend Timing Model (PMI)12mo MA Trend Timing Model (Unemployment)
Annualized Return11.3%11.1%11.3%12.2%
Annualized Volatility14.7%11.2%11.9%12.4%
Maximum Drawdown50.8%24.4%32.7%30.0%
Sharpe Ratio0.490.620.610.66

Source: Quandl and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Calculations by Newfound Research. Results are hypothetical. Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results. You cannot invest in an index. Data is from Jan 1948 – Sep 2019.

With the trend timing model, we see an improvement in the absolute returns compared to the trend equity strategy alone. However, this comes at the expense of increasing the volatility and maximum drawdown.

In the case of unemployment, which was the strongest indicator that Philosophical Economics found, there is an improvement in risk-adjusted returns in the timing model.

Still, while there is a benefit, it may not be robust.

If we remove the dependence of the trend following model on a single metric or lookback parameter, the benefit of the macro-timing decreases. Specifically, if we replace our simple 12-month moving average trend equity rule with the ensemble approach utilized in the Newfound Trend Equity Index, we see very different results. This may indicate that one specific variant of trend following did well in this overall model, but the style of trend following might not lend itself well to this application.

U.S. EquitiesNewfound Trend Equity IndexTrend Equity Index Blend (PMI)Trend Equity Index Blend (Unemployment)
Annualized Return11.3%10.7%10.9%10.9%
Annualized Volatility14.7%11.1%11.8%13.5%
Maximum Drawdown50.8%25.8%36.1%36.0%
Sharpe Ratio0.490.590.580.50

Source: Quandl and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Calculations by Newfound Research. Results are hypothetical. Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results. You cannot invest in an index. Data is from Jan 1948 – Sep 2019.

A more robust trend following model may already provide more upside capture during non-recessionary periods but at the expense of more downside capture during recessions. However, we cannot confidently assert that the lower level of down-capture in the single specification of the trend model is not partially due to luck.

If we desire to more thoroughly evaluate the style of trend following, we must get more granular with the economic cycles.

Breaking Down the Economic Cycle

Moving beyond the simple classification of “recession” and “not-recession”, we can follow MSCI’s methodology, which we used here previously, to classify the economic cycle into four primary states: Expansion, Slowdown, Contraction and Recovery.

We will focus on the 3-month moving average (“MA”) minus the 12-month MA for each indicator we examine according to the decision tree below. In the tree, we use the terms better or worse since lower unemployment rate and higher PMI values signal a stronger economy.

Economic cycle

There is a decent amount of difference in the classifications using these two indicators, with the unemployment indicator signaling more frequent expansions and slowdowns. This should be taken as evidence that economic regimes are difficult to predict.

Source: Quandl and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Calculations by Newfound Research. Results are hypothetical. Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results. You cannot invest in an index. Data is from Jan 1948 – Sep 2019.

Once each indicator is in each state the transition probabilities are relatively close.

Source: Quandl and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Calculations by Newfound Research. Results are hypothetical. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.

This agrees with intuition when we consider the cyclical nature of these economic metrics. While not a perfect mathematical relationship, these states generally unfold sequentially without jumps from contractions to expansions or vice versa.

Trend Following in the Economic Cycle

Applying the four-part classification to the economic cycle shows where trend equity outperformed.

PMI IndicatorUnemployment Indicator
U.S. EquitiesTrend EquityU.S. EquitiesTrend Equity
Contraction7.6%10.3%1.0%7.3%
Recovery12.2%9.3%15.4%15.0%
Expansion14.3%14.4%13.9%11.3%
Slowdown7.2%5.4%10.5%8.0%

Source: Quandl and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Calculations by Newfound Research. Results are hypothetical. Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results. You cannot invest in an index. Data is from Jan 1948 – Sep 2019.

During contraction phases, regardless of indicators, trend equity outperformed buy-and-hold.

For the PMI indicator, trend equity was able to keep up during expansions, but this was not the case with the unemployment indicator. The reverse of this was true for recoveries: trend following was close to keeping up in the periods denoted by the unemployment indicator but not by the PMI indicator.

For both indicators, trend following underperformed during slowdowns.

This may seem contradictory at first, but these may be periods of more whipsaw as markets try to forecast future states. And since slowdowns typically occur after expansions and before contractions (at least in the idealized model), we may have to bear more of this whipsaw risk for the strategy to be adaptable enough to add value during the contraction.

The following two charts show the longest historical slowdowns for each indicator: the PMI indicator was for 11 months in late 2009 through much of 2010 and the unemployment rate indicator was for 16 months in 1984-85.

Source: Quandl and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Calculations by Newfound Research. Results are hypothetical. Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results. You cannot invest in an index.

In the first slowdown period, the trend equity strategy rode in tandem with equities as they continued to climb and then de-risked when equities declined. Equities quickly rebounded leaving the trend equity strategy underexposed to the rally.

In the second slowdown period, the trend equity strategy was heavily defensive going into the slowdown. This protected capital initially but then caused the strategy to lag once the market began to increase steadily.

The first period illustrates a time when the trend equity strategy was ready to adapt to changing market conditions and was unfortunately whipsawed. The second period illustrates a time when the trend equity strategy was already adapted to a supposedly oncoming contraction that did not materialize.

Using these historical patterns of performance, we can now explore how a strategy that systematically allocates to trend equity strategies might be constructed.

Timing Trend Following with the Economic Cycle

One simple way to apply a systematic timing strategy for shifting between equities and trend following is to only invest in equities when a slowdown is signaled.

The charts below show the returns and risk metrics for models using the PMI and unemployment rate individually and a model that blends the two allocations.

Growth trend timing

Source: Quandl and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Calculations by Newfound Research. Results are hypothetical. Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results. You cannot invest in an index. Data is from Jan 1948 – Sep 2019.

Source: Quandl and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Calculations by Newfound Research. Results are hypothetical. Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results. You cannot invest in an index. Data is from Jan 1948 – Sep 2019.

The returns increased slightly in every model relative to buy-and-hold, and the blended model performed consistently high across all metrics.

Blending multiple models generally produces benefits like these shown here, and in an actual implementation, utilizing additional economic indicators may make the strategy even more robust. There may be other ways to boost performance across the economic cycle, and we will explore these ideas in future research.

Conclusion

Should investors rotate in and out of active strategies?

Not in most cases, since the typical drivers are short-term underperformance that is a necessary component of active strategies.

However, there may be opportunities to make allocation tweaks based on the economic cycle.

The historical data suggests that a specification-neutral trend-equity strategy has outperformed buy-and-hold equities during economic contractions for both economic indicators. The performance during recoveries and expansions was mixed across indicators. It kept up with the buy-and-hold strategy during expansions denoted by PMI but not unemployment. This relationship was reversed for recoveries denoted by unemployment. In both models, trend equity has also lagged during economic slowdowns as whipsaw becomes more prevalent.

Based on the most recent PMI data, the current cycle is a contraction, indicating a favorable environment for trend equity under both cycle indicators. However, we should note that December 2018 through March 2019 was also labeled as a contraction according to PMI. Not all models are perfect.

Nevertheless, there may be some evidence that trend following can provide differentiated benefits based on the prevailing economic environment.

While an investor may not use this knowledge to shift around allocations to active trend following strategies, it can still provide insight into performance difference relative to buy-and-hold and set expectations going forward.

Es-CAPE Velocity: Value-Driven Sector Rotation

This post is available as a PDF download here.

Summary­

  • Systematic value strategies have struggled in the post-2008 environment, so one that has performed well catches our eye.
  • The Barclays Shiller CAPE sector rotation strategy – a value-based sector rotation strategy – has out-performed the S&P 500 by 267 basis points annualized since it launched in 2012.
  • The strategy applies a unique Relative CAPE metric to account for structural differences in sector valuations as well as a momentum filter that seeks to avoid “value traps.”
  • In an effort to derive the source of out-performance, we explore various other valuation metrics and model specifications.
  • We find that what has actually driven performance in the past may have little to do with value at all.

It is no secret that systematic value investing of all sorts has struggled as of late.  With the curious exception, that is, of the Barclays Shiller CAPE sector rotation strategy, a strategy explored by Bunn, Staal, Zhuang, Lazanas, Ural and Shiller in their 2014 paper Es-cape-ing from Overvalued Sectors: Sector Selection Based on the Cyclically Adjusted Price-Earnings (CAPE) Ratio.  Initial performance suggests that the idea has performed quite well out-of-sample, which stands out among many “smart-beta” strategies which have failed to live up to their backtests.

Source: CSI Data.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

Why is this strategy finding success where other value strategies have not?  That is what we aim to explore in this commentary.

On a monthly basis, the Shiller CAPE sector rotation portfolio is rebalanced into an equal-weight allocation across four of the ten primary GICS sectors.  The four are selected first by ranking the 10 primary sectors based upon their Relative CAPE ratios and choosing the cheapest five sectors.  Of those cheapest five sectors, the sector with the worst trailing 12-month return (“momentum”) is removed.

The CAPE ratio – standing for Cyclically-Adjusted Price-to-Earnings ratio – is the current price divided by the 10-year moving average of inflation-adjusted earnings.  The purpose of this smoothing is to reduce the impact of business cycle fluctuations.

The potential problem with using the raw CAPE value for each sector is that certain sectors have structurally higher and lower CAPE ratios than their peers.  High growth sectors – e.g. Technology – tend to have higher CAPE ratios because they reinvest a substantial portion of their earnings while more stable sectors – e.g. Utilities – tend to have much lower CAPE ratios.  Were we to simply sort sectors based upon their current CAPE ratio, we would tend to create structural over- and under-weights towards certain sectors.

To adjust for this structural difference, the strategy uses the idea of a Relative CAPE ratio, which is calculated by taking the current CAPE ratio and dividing it by a rolling 20-year average CAPE ratio1 for that sector.  The thesis behind this step is that dividing by a long-term mean normalizes the sectors and allows for better comparison.  Relative CAPE values above 1 mean that the sector is more expensive than it has historically been, while values less than 1 mean it is cheaper.

It is important to note here that the actual selection is still performed on a cross-sector basis.  It is entirely possible that all the sectors appear cheap or expensive on a historical basis at the same time.  The portfolio will simply pick the cheapest sectors available.

Poking and Prodding the Parameters

With an understanding of the rules, our first step is to poke and prod a bit to figure out what is really driving the strategy.

We begin by first exploring the impact of using the Relative CAPE ratio versus just the CAPE ratio.

For each of these ratios, we’ll plot two strategies.  The first is a naïve Value strategy, which will equally-weight the four cheapest sectors.  The second is the Shiller strategy, which chooses the top five cheapest sectors and drops the one with the worst momentum.  This should provide a baseline for comparing the impact of the momentum filter.

Strategy returns are plotted relative to the S&P 500.

Source: Siblis Research; Morningstar; CS Data.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

For the Relative CAPE ratio, we also vary the lookback period for calculating the rolling average CAPE from 5- to 20-years.

Source: Siblis Research; Morningstar; CSI Data.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

A few things immediately stand out:

  • Interestingly, standard CAPE actually appears to perform better than Relative CAPE for both the traditional value and Shiller implementations.
  • The Relative CAPE approach fared much more poorly from 2004-2007 than the simple CAPE approach.
  • There is little difference in performance for the Value and Shiller strategy for standard CAPE, but a meaningful difference for Relative CAPE.
  • While standard CAPE value has stagnant relative performance since 2007, Relative CAPE appears to continue to work for the Shiller approach.
  • A naïve value implementation seems to perform quite poorly for Relative CAPE, while the Shiller strategy appears to perform rather well.
  • There is meaningful performance dispersion based upon the lookback period, with longer-dated lookbacks (darker shades) appearing to perform better than shorter-period lookbacks (lighter shades) for the Relative CAPE variation.

The second-to-last point is particularly curious, as it implies that using momentum to “avoid the value trap” creates significant value (no pun intended; okay, pun intended) for the strategy.

Varying the Value Metric (in Vain)

To gain more insight, we next test the impact of the choice of the CAPE ratio. Below we plot the relative returns of different Shiller-based strategies (again varying lookbacks from 5- to 20-years), but use price-to-book, trailing 12-month price-to-earnings, and trailing 12-month EV/EBITDA as our value metrics.

A few things stand out:

  • Value-based sector rotation seems to have “worked” from 2000 to 2009, regardless of our metric of choice.
  • Almost all value-based strategies appear to exhibit significant relative out-performance during the dot-com and 2008 recessions.
  • After 2009, most value strategies appear to exhibit random relative performance versus the S&P 500.
  • All three approaches appear to suffer since 2016.

Source: Siblis Research; Morningstar; CSI Data.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

At this point, we have to ask: is there something special about the Relative CAPE that makes it inherently superior to other metrics?

A Big Bubble-Based Bet?

If we take a step back for a moment, it is worth asking ourselves a simple question: what would it take for a sector rotation strategy to out-perform the S&P 500 over the last decade?

With the benefit of hindsight, we know Consumer Discretionary and Technology have led the pack, while traditionally stodgy sectors like Consumer Staples and Utilities have lagged behind (though not nearly as poorly as Energy).

As we mentioned earlier, a naïve rank on the CAPE ratio would almost certainly prefer Utilities and Staples over Technology and Discretionary.  Thus, for us to outperform the market, we must somehow construct a value metric that identifies the two most chronically expensive sectors (ignoring back-dated valuations for the new Communication Services sector) as being among the cheapest.

This is where dividing by the rolling 20-year average comes into play.  In spirit, it makes a certain degree of sense. In practice, however, this plays out perfectly for Technology, which went through such an enormous bubble in the late 1990s that the 20-year average was meaningfully skewed upward by an outlier event.  Thus, for almost the entire 20-year period after the dot-com bubble, Technology appears to be relatively cheap by comparison.  After all, you can buy for 30x earnings today what you used to be able to buy for 180x!

The result is a significant – and near-permanent tilt – towards Technology since the beginning of 2012, which can be seen in the graph of strategy weights below.

One way to explore the impact of this choice is calculate the weight differences between a top-4 CAPE strategy and a top-4 Relative CAPE strategy, which we also plot below.  We can see that after early 2012, the Relative CAPE strategy is structurally overweight Technology and underweight Financials and Utilities.  Prior to 2008, we can see that it is structurally underweight Energy and overweight Consumer Staples.

If we take these weights and use them to construct a return stream, we can isolate the return impact the choice of using Relative CAPE versus CAPE has.  Interestingly, the long Technology / short Financials & Utilities trade did not appear to generate meaningful out-performance in the post-2012 era, suggesting that something else is responsible for post-2012 performance.

Source: Siblis Research; Morningstar; CSI Data.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

The Miraculous Mojo of Momentum

This is where the 12-month momentum filter plays a crucial role.  Narratively, it is to avoid value traps.  Practically, it helps the strategy deftly dodge Financials in 2008, avoiding a significant melt-down in one of the S&P 500’s largest sectors.

Now, you might think that valuations alone should have allowed the strategy to avoid Technology in the dot-com fallout.  As it turns out, the Technology CAPE fell so precipitously that in using the Relative CAPE metric the Technology sector was still ranked as one of the top five cheapest sectors from 3/2001 to 11/2002.  The only way the strategy was able to avoid it?  The momentum filter.

Removing this filter makes the relative results a lot less attractive.  Below we re-plot the relative performance of a simple “top 4” Relative CAPE strategy.

Source: Siblis Research; Morningstar; CSI Data.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

Just how much impact does the momentum filter have?  We can isolate the effect by taking the weights of the Shiller strategy and subtracting the weights of the Value strategy to construct a long/short index that isolates the effect.  Below we plot the returns of this index.

It should be noted that the legs of the long/short portfolio only have a notional exposure of 25%, as that is the most the Value and Shiller strategies can deviate by.  Nevertheless, even with this relatively small weight, when isolated the filter generates an annualized return of 1.8% per year with an annualized volatility of 4.8% and a maximum drawdown of 11.6%.

Scaled to a long/short with 100% notional per leg, annualized returns jump to 6.0%. Though volatility and maximum drawdown both climb to 20.4% and 52.6% respectively.

Source: Siblis Research; Morningstar; CSI Data.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

Conclusion

Few, if any, systematic value strategies have performed well as of late.  When one does – as with the Shiller CAPE sector rotation strategy – it is worth further review.

As a brief summary of our findings:

  • Despite potential structural flaws in measuring cross-sectional sector value, CAPE outperformed Relative CAPE for a naïve rank-based value strategy.
  • There is significant dispersion in results using the Relative CAPE metric depending upon which lookback parameterization is selected.Initial tests suggest that the longer lookbacks appear to have been more effective.
  • Using valuation metrics other than CAPE – e.g. P/B, P/E (TTM), and EV/EBITDA (TTM) – do not appear as effective in recent years.
  • Longer lookbacks allow the Relative CAPE methodology to create a structural overweight to the Technology sector over the last 15 years.
  • The momentum filter plays a crucial role in avoiding the Technology sector in 2001-2002 and the Financial sector in 2008.

 

Taken all together, it is hard to not question whether these results are unintentionally datamined.  Unfortunately, we just do not have enough data to extend the tests further back in time for truly out-of-sample analysis.

What we can say, however, is that the backtested and live performance hinges almost entirely a few key trades:

  • Avoiding Technology in 2001-2002 due to the momentum filter.
  • Avoiding Financials in 2008 due to the momentum filter.
  • Avoiding a Technology underweight in recent years due to an inflated “average” historical CAPE due to the dot-com bubble.
  • Avoiding Energy in 2014-2016 due to the momentum filter.

 

Three of these four trades are driven by the momentum filter.  When we further consider that the Shiller strategy is in effect the returns of the pure value implementation – which suffered in the dot-com run-up and was a mostly random walk thereafter – and the returns of the isolated momentum filter, it becomes rather difficult to call this a value strategy at all.


As of the date of this document, neither Newfound Research nor Corey Hoffstein holds a position in the securities discussed in this article and do not have any plans to trade in such securities.  Newfound Research and Corey Hoffstein do not take a position as to whether this security should be recommended for any particular investor.  


Your Style-age May Vary

This post is available as PDF download here.

Summary­

  • New research from Axioma suggests that tilting less – through lower target tracking error – can actually create more academically pure factor implementation in long-only portfolios.
  • This research highlights an important question: how should long-only investors think about factor exposure in their portfolios?Is measuring against an academically-constructed long/short portfolio really appropriate?
  • We return to the question of style versus specification, plotting year-to-date excess returns for long-only factor ETFs.While the general style serves as an anchor, we find significant specification-driven performance dispersion.
  • We believe that the “right answer” to this dispersion problem largely depends upon the investor.

When quants speak about factor and style returns, we often do so with some sweeping generalizations.  Typically, we’re talking about some long/short specification, but precisely how that portfolio is formed can vary.

For example, one firm might look at deciles while another looks at quartiles.  One shop might equal-weight the holdings while another value-weights them.  Some might include mid- and small-caps, while others may work on a more realistic liquidity-screened universe.

More often than not, the precision does not matter a great deal (with the exception of liquidity-screening) because the general conclusion is the same.

But for investors who are actually realizing these returns, the precision matters quite a bit.  This is particularly true for long-only investors, who have adopted smart-beta ETFs to tap into the factor research.

As we have discussed in the past, any active portfolio can be decomposed into its benchmark plus a dollar-neutral long/short portfolio that encapsulates the active bets.   The active bets, then, can actually approach the true long/short implementation.

To a point, at least.  The “shorts” will ultimately be constrained by the amount the portfolio can under-weight a given security.

For long-only portfolios, increasing active share often means having to lean more heavily into the highest quintile or decile holdings.  This is not a problem in an idealized world where factor scores have a monotonically increasing relationship with excess returns.  In this perfect world, increasing our allocation to high-ranking stocks creates just as much excess return as shorting low-ranking stocks does.

Unfortunately, we do not live in a perfect world and for some factors the premium found in long/short portfolios is mostly found on the short side.1  For example, consider the Profitability Factor.  The annualized spread between the top- and bottom-quintile portfolios is 410 basis points.  The difference between the top quintile portfolio and the market, though, is just 154 basis points.  Nothing to scoff at, but when appropriately discounted for data-mining risk, transaction costs, and management costs, there is not necessarily a whole lot left over.

Which leads to some interesting results for portfolio construction, at least according to a recent study by Axioma.2  For factors where the majority of the premium arises from the short side, tilting less might mean achieving more.

For example, Axioma found that a portfolio optimized maximize exposure to the profitability factor while targeting a tracking error to the market of just 10 basis points had a meaningfully higher correlation than the excess returns of a long-only portfolio that simply bought the top quintile.  In fact, the excess returns of the top quintile portfolio had zero correlation to the long/short factor returns.  Let’s repeat that: the active returns of the top quintile portfolio had zero correlation to the returns of the profitability factor.  Makes us sort of wonder what we’re actually buying…

Source: Kenneth French Data Library; Calculations by Newfound Research.

 

Cumulative Active Returns of Long-Only Portfolios

So, what does it actually mean for long-only investors when we plot long/short equity factor returns?  When we see that the Betting-Against-Beta (“BAB”) factor is up 3% on the year, what does that imply for our low-volatility factor ETF?  Momentum (“UMD”) was down nearly 10% earlier this year; were long-only momentum ETFs really under-performing by that much?

And what does this all mean for the results in those fancy factor decomposition reports the nice consultants from the big asset management firms have been running for me over the last couple of years?

Source: AQR. Calculations by Newfound Research.

We find ourselves back to a theme we’ve circled many times over the last few years: style versus specification.  Choices such as how characteristics are measured, portfolio concentration, the existence or absence of position- and industry/sector-level constraints, weighting methodology, and rebalance frequency (and even date!) can have a profound impact on realized results.  The little details compound to matter quite a bit.

To highlight this disparity, below we have plotted the excess return of an equally-weighted portfolio of long-only style ETFs versus the S&P 500 as well as a standard deviation cone for individual style ETF performance.

While most of the ETFs are ultimately anchored to their style, we can see that short-term performance can meaningfully deviate.

Source: CSI Analytics.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Results are hypothetical.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions.   Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes, with the exception of underlying ETF expense ratios.  Past performance is not an indicator of future results.   Year-to-Date returns are computed by assuming an equal-weight allocation to representative long-only ETFs for each style.  Returns are net of underlying ETF expense ratios.   Returns are calculated in excess of the SPDR&P 500 ETF (“SPY”).  The ETFs used for each style are (in alphabetical order): Value: FVAL, IWD, JVAL, OVLU, QVAL, RPV, VLU, VLUE; Size: IJR, IWM, OSIZ; Momentum: FDMO, JMOM, MMTM, MTUM, OMOM, QMOM, SPMO; Low Volatility: FDLO, JMIN, LGLV, OVOL, SPLV, SPMV, USLB, USMV; Quality; FQAL, JQUA, OQAL, QUAL, SPHQ; Yield: DVY, FDVV, JDIV, OYLD, SYLD, VYM; Growth: CACG, IWF, QGRO, RPG, SCHG, SPGP, SPYG; Trend: BEMO, FVC, LFEQ, PTLC.  Newfound may hold positions in any of the above securities.

 

Conclusion

In our opinion, the research and data outlined in this commentary suggests a few potential courses of action for investors.

  • For certain styles, we might consider embracing smaller tilts for purer factor exposure.
  • To avoid specification risk, we might embrace the potential benefits of multi-manager diversification.
  • Or, if there is a particular approach we prefer, simply acknowledge that it may not behave anything like the academic long/short definition – or even other long-only implementations – in the short-term.

Academically, we might be able to argue for one approach over another.  Practically, the appropriate solution is whatever is most suitable for the investor and the approach that they will be able to stick with.

If a client measures their active returns with respect to academic factors, then understanding how portfolio construction choices deviate from the factor definitions will be critical.

An advisor trying to access a style but not wanting to risk choosing the wrong ETF might consider asking themselves, “why choose?”  Buying a basket of a few ETFs will do wonders to reduce specification risk.

On the other hand, if an investor is simply trying to maximize their compound annualized return and nothing else, then a concentrated approach may very well be warranted.

Whatever the approach taken, it is important to remember that results between two strategies that claim to implement the same style can and will deviate significantly, especially in the short run.

 


 

Harvesting the Bond Risk Premium

This post is available as a PDF download here.

Summary­

  • The bond risk premium is the return that investors earn by investing in longer duration bonds.
  • While the most common way that investors can access this return stream is through investing in bond portfolios, bonds often significantly de-risk portfolios and scale back returns.
  • Investors who desire more equity-like risk can tap into the bond risk premium by overlaying bond exposure on top of equities.
  • Through the use of a leveraged ETP strategy, we construct a long-only bond risk premium factor and investigate its characteristics in terms of rebalance frequency and timing luck.
  • By balancing the costs of trading with the risk of equity overexposure, investors can incorporate the bond risk premium as a complementary factor exposure to equities without sacrificing return potential from scaling back the overall risk level unnecessarily.

The discussion surrounding factor investing generally pertains to either equity portfolios or bond portfolios in isolation. We can calculate value, momentum, carry, and quality factors for each asset class and invest in the securities that exhibit the best characteristics of each factor or a combination of factors.

There are also ways to use these factors to shift allocations between stocks and bonds (e.g. trend and standardizing based on historical levels). However, we do not typically discuss bonds as their own standalone factor.

The bond risk premium – or term premium – can be thought of as the premium investors earn from holding longer duration bonds as opposed to cash. In a sense, it is a measure of carry. Its theoretical basis is generally seen to be related to macroeconomic factors such as inflation and growth expectations.1

While timing the term premium using factors within bond duration buckets is definitely a possibility, this commentary will focus on the term premium in the context of an equity investor who wants long-term exposure to the factor.

The Term Premium as a Factor

For the term premium, we can take the usual approach and construct a self-financing long/short portfolio of 100% intermediate (7-10 year) U.S. Treasuries that borrows the entire portfolio value at the risk-free rate.

This factor, shown in bold in the chart below, has exhibited a much tamer return profile than common equity factors.

Source: CSI Analytics, AQR, and Bloomberg. Calculations by Newfound Research. Data from 1/31/1992 to 6/28/2019. Results are hypothetical.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

Source: CSI Analytics, AQR, and Bloomberg. Calculations by Newfound Research. Data from 1/31/1992 to 6/28/2019. Results are hypothetical.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

But over the entire time period, its returns have been higher than those of both the Size and Value factors. Its maximum drawdown has been less than 40% of that of the next best factor (Quality), and it is worth acknowledging that its volatility – which is generally correlated to drawdown for highly liquid assets with non-linear payoffs – has also been substantially lower.

The term premium also has exhibited very low correlation with the other equity factors.

Source: CSI Analytics, AQR, and Bloomberg. Calculations by Newfound Research. Data from 1/31/1992 to 6/28/2019. Results are hypothetical.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

A Little Free Lunch

Whether we are treating bonds as factor or not, they are generally the primary way investors seek to diversify equity portfolios.

The problem is that they are also a great way to reduce returns during most market environments through their inherently lower risk.

Anytime that an asset with lower volatility is added to a portfolio, the risk will be reduced. Unless the asset class also has a particularly high Sharpe ratio, maintaining the same level of return is virtually impossible even if risk-adjusted returns are improved.

In a 2016 paper2, Salient broke down this reduction in risk into two components: de-risking and the “free lunch” affect.

The reduction in risk form the free lunch effect is desirable, but the risk reduction from de-risking may or may not be desirable, depending on the investor’s target risk profile.

The following chart shows the volatility breakdown of a range of portfolios of the S&P 500 (IVV) and 7-10 Year U.S. Treasuries (IEF).

Source: CSI Analytics and Bloomberg. Calculations by Newfound Research. Data from 1/31/1992 to 6/28/2019. Results are hypothetical.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

Moving from an all equity portfolio to a 50/50 equity reduces the volatility from 14.2% to 7.4%. But only 150 bps of this reduction is from the free lunch effect that stems from the lower correlation between the two assets (-0.18). The remaining 530 bps of volatility reduction is simply due to lower risk.

In this case, annualized returns were dampened from 9.6% to 7.8%. While the Sharpe ratio climbed from 0.49 to 0.70, an investor seeking higher risk would not benefit without the use of leverage.

Despite the strong performance of the term premium factor, risk-seeking investors (e.g. those early in their careers) are generally reluctant to tap into this factor too much because of the de-risking effect.

How do investors who want to bear risk commensurate with equities tap into the bond risk premium without de-risking their portfolio?

One solution is using leveraged ETPs.

Long-Only Term Premium

By taking a 50/50 portfolio of the 2x Levered S&P 500 ETF (SSO) and the 2x Levered 7-10 Year U.S. Treasury ETF (UST), we can construct a portfolio that has 100% equity exposure and 100% of the term premium factor.3

But managing this portfolio takes some care.

Left alone to drift, the allocations can get very far away from their target 50/50, spanning the range from 85/15 to 25/75. Periodic rebalancing is a must.

Source: CSI Analytics and Bloomberg. Calculations by Newfound Research. Data from 1/31/1992 to 6/28/2019. Results are hypothetical.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

Of course, now the question is, “How frequently should we rebalance the portfolio?”

This boils down to a balancing act between performance and costs (e.g. ticket charges, tax impacts, operational burden, etc.).

On one hand, we would like to remain as close to the 50/50 allocation as possible to maintain the desired exposure to each asset class. However, this could require a prohibitive amount of trading.

From a performance standpoint, we see improved results with longer holding periods (take note of the y-axes in the following charts; they were scaled to highlight the differences).

Source: CSI Analytics and Bloomberg. Calculations by Newfound Research. Data from 1/31/1992 to 6/28/2019. Results are hypothetical.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

The returns do not show a definitive pattern based on rebalance frequency, but the volatility decreases with increasing time between rebalances. This seems like it would point to waiting longer between rebalances, which would be corroborated by a consideration of trading costs.

The issues with waiting longer between the rebalance are twofold:

  1. Waiting longer is essentially a momentum trade. The better performing asset class garners a larger allocation as time progresses. This can be a good thing – especially in hindsight with how well equities have done – but it allows the portfolio to become overexposed to factors that we are not necessarily intending to exploit.
  2. Longer rebalances are more exposed to timing luck. For example, a yearly rebalance may have done well from a performance perspective, but the short-term performance could vary by as much as 50,000 bps between the best performing rebalance month and the worst! The chart below shows the performance of each iteration relative to the median performance of the 12 different monthly rebalance strategies.

Source: CSI Analytics and Bloomberg. Calculations by Newfound Research. Data from 1/31/1992 to 6/28/2019. Results are hypothetical.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

As the chart also shows, tranching can help mitigate timing luck. Tranching also gives the returns of the strategies over the range of rebalance frequencies a more discernible pattern, with longer rebalance period strategies exhibiting slightly higher returns due to their higher average equity allocations.

Under the assumption that we can tranche any strategy that we choose, we can now compare only the tranched strategies at different rebalance frequencies to address our concern with taking bets on momentum.

Pausing for a minute, we should be clear that we do not actually know what the true factor construction should be; it is a moving target. We are more concerned with robustness than simply trying to achieve outperformance. So we will compare the strategies to the median performance of the previously monthly offset annual rebalance strategies.

The following charts shows the aggregate risk of short-term performance deviations from this benchmark.

The first one shows the aggregate deviations, both positive and negative, and the second focuses on only the downside deviation (i.e. performance that is worse than the median).4

Both charts support a choice of rebalance frequency somewhere in the range of 3-6 months.

Source: CSI Analytics and Bloomberg. Calculations by Newfound Research. Data from 1/31/1992 to 6/28/2019. Results are hypothetical.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

With the rebalance frequency set based on the construction of the factor, the last part is a consideration of costs.

Unfortunately, this is more situation-specific (e.g. what commissions does your platform charge for trades?).

From an asset manager point-of-view, where we can trade with costs proportional to the size of the trade, execute efficiently, and automate much of the operational burden, tranching is our preferred approach.

We also prefer this approach over simply rebalancing back to the static 50/50 allocation more frequently.

In our previous commentary on constructing value portfolios to mitigate timing luck, we described how tranching monthly is a different decision than rebalancing monthly and that tranching frequency and rebalance frequency are distinct decisions.

We see the same effect here where we plot the monthly tranched annually rebalanced strategy (blue line) and the strategy rebalanced back to 50/50 every month (orange line).

Source: CSI Analytics and Bloomberg. Calculations by Newfound Research. Data from 1/31/1992 to 6/28/2019. Results are hypothetical.  Results assume the reinvestment of all distributions. Results are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  

Tranching wins out.

However, since the target for the term premium factor is a 50/50 static allocation, running a simple allocation filter to keep the portfolio weights within a certain tolerance can be a way to implement a more dynamic rebalancing model while reducing costs.

For example, rebalancing when the allocations for SSO and UST we outside a 5% band (i.e. the portfolio was beyond a 55/45 or 45/55) achieved better performance metrics than the monthly rebalanced version with an average of only 3 rebalances per year.

Conclusion

The bond term premium does not have to be reserved for risk-averse investors. Investors desiring portfolios tilted heavily toward equities can also tap into this diversifying return stream as a factor within their portfolio.

Utilizing leveraged ETPs is one way to maintaining exposure to equities while capturing a significant portion of the bond risk premium. However, it requires more oversight than investing in other factors such as value, momentum, and quality, which are typically packaged in easy-to-access ETFs.

If a fixed frequency rebalance approach is used, tranching is an effective way to reduce timing risk, especially when markets are volatile. Aside from tranching, we find that, historically, holding periods between 3 and 6 months yield results close in line with the median rolling short-term performance of the individual strategies. Implementing a methodology like this can reduce the risk of poor luck in choosing the rebalance frequency or starting the strategy at an unfortunate time.

If frequent rebalances – like those seen with tranching – are infeasible, a dynamic schedule based on a drift in allocations is also a possibility.

Leveraged ETPs are often seen as risk trading instruments that are not fit for retail investors who are more focused on buy-and-hold systems. However, given the right risk management, these investment vehicles can be a way for investors to access the bond term premium, getting a larger free lunch, and avoiding undesired de-risking along the way.

Page 4 of 10

Powered by WordPress & Theme by Anders Norén