The Research Library of Newfound Research

Tag: volatility

Quantitative Styles and Multi-Sector Bonds

This post is available as a PDF download here.

Summary­

  • In this commentary we explore the application of several quantitative signals to a broad set of fixed income exposures.
  • Specifically, we explore value, momentum, carry, long-term reversals, and volatility signals.
  • We find that value, 3-month momentum, carry, and 3-year reversals all create attractive quantile profiles, potentially providing clues for how investors might consider pursuing higher returns or lower risk.
  • This study is by no means comprehensive and only intended to invite further research and conversation around the application of quantitative styles across fixed income exposures.

In Navigating Municipal Bonds with Factors, we employed momentum, value, carry, and low-volatility signals to generate a sector-based approach to navigating municipal bonds.

In this article, we will introduce an initial data dive into applying quantitative signals to a broader set of fixed income exposures.  Specifically, we will incorporate 17 different fixed income sectors, spanning duration, credit, and geographic exposure.

  • U.S. Treasuries: Near (3-Month), short (1-3 Year), mid (3-5 Year) intermediate (7-10 Year), and long (20+ Year).
  • Investment-Grade Corporates: Short-term, intermediate-term, and Floating Rate corporate bonds.
  • High Yield: Short- and intermediate-term high yield.
  • International Government Bonds: Currency hedged and un-hedged government bonds.
  • Emerging Market: Local and US dollar denominated.
  • TIPs: Short- and intermediate-term TIPs.
  • Mortgage-Backed: Investment grade mortgage-backed bonds.

In this study, each exposure is represented by a corresponding ETF.  We extend our research prior to ETF launch by employing underlying index data the ETF seeks to track.

The quantitative styles we will explore are:

  • Momentum: Buy recent winners and sell recent losers.
  • Value: Buy cheap and sell expensive.
  • Carry: Buy high carry and sell low carry.
  • Reversal: Buy long-term losers and sell long-term winners.
  • Volatility: Buy high volatility and sell low volatility.1

The details of each style are explained in greater depth in each section below.

Note that the analysis herein is by no means meant to be prescriptive in any manner, nor is it a comprehensive review.  Rather, it is meant as a launching point for further commentaries we expect to write.

At the risk of spoiling the conclusion, below we plot the annualized returns and volatility profiles of dollar-neutral long-short portfolios.2  We can see that short-term Momentum, Value, Carry, and Volatility signals generate positive excess returns over the testing period.

Curiously, longer-term Momentum does not seem to be a profitable strategy, despite evidence of this approach being rather successful for many other asset classes.

Source: Bloomberg; Tiingo.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Returns are hypothetical and backtested.  Returns are gross of all management fees, transaction fees, and taxes, but net of underlying fund fees.  Total return series assumes the reinvestment of all distributions.

However, these results are not achievable by most investors who may be constrained to a long-only implementation.  Even when interpreted as over- and under-weight signals, the allocations in the underlying long/short portfolios differ so greatly from benchmark exposures, they would be nearly impossible to implement.

For a long-only investor, then, what is more relevant is how these signals forecast performance of different rank orderings of portfolios.  For example, how does a portfolio of the best-ranking 3-month momentum exposures compare to a portfolio of the worst-ranking?

In the remainder of this commentary, we explore the return and risk profiles of quintile portfolios formed on each signal.  To construct these portfolios, we rank order our exposures based on the given quantitative signal and equally-weight the exposures falling within each quintile.

Momentum

We generate momentum signals by computing 12-, 6- and 3- month prior total returns to reflect slow, intermediate, and fast momentum signals.  Low-ranking exposures are those with the lowest prior total returns, while high ranking exposures have the highest total returns.

The portfolios assume a 1-month holding period for momentum signals.  To avoid timing luck, four sub-indexes are used, each rebalancing on a different week of the month.

Annualized return and volatility numbers for the quintiles are plotted below.

A few interesting data-points stand out:

  • For 12-month prior return, the lowest quintile actually had the highest total return.However, it has a dramatically lower Sharpe ratio than the highest quintile, which only slightly underperforms it.
  • Total returns among the highest quintile increase by 150 basis points (“bps”) from 12-month to 3-month signals, and 3-month rankings create a more consistent profile of increasing total return and Sharpe ratio. This may imply that short-term signals are more effective for fixed income.

Source: Bloomberg; Tiingo.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Returns are hypothetical and backtested.  Returns are gross of all management fees, transaction fees, and taxes, but net of underlying fund fees.  Total return series assumes the reinvestment of all distributions.

Carry

Carry is the expected excess return of an asset assuming price does not change.  For our fixed income universe, we proxy carry using yield-to-worst minus the risk-free rate.  For non-Treasury holdings, we adjust this figure for expected defaults and recovery.

For reasonably efficient markets, we would expect higher carry to imply higher return, but not necessarily higher risk-adjusted returns.  In other words, we earn higher carry as a reward for bearing more risk.

Therefore, we also calculate an alternate measure of carry: carry-to-risk.  Carry-to-risk is calculated by taking our carry measure and dividing it by recent realized volatility levels.  One way of interpreting this figure is as forecast of Sharpe ratio.  Our expectation is that this signal may be able to identify periods when carry is episodically cheap or rich relative to prevailing market risk.

The portfolios assume a 12-month holding period for carry signals.  To avoid timing luck, 52 sub-indexes are used, each rebalancing on a different week of the year.

We see:

  • Higher carry implies a higher return as well as a higher volatility. As expected, no free lunch here.
  • Carry-to-risk does not seem to provide a meaningful signal. In fact, low carry-to-risk outperforms high carry-to-risk by 100bps annualized.
  • Volatility meaningfully declines for carry-to-risk quintiles, potentially indicating that this integrated carry/volatility signal is being too heavily driven by volatility.

Source: Bloomberg; Tiingo.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Returns are hypothetical and backtested.  Returns are gross of all management fees, transaction fees, and taxes, but net of underlying fund fees.  Total return series assumes the reinvestment of all distributions.

Value

In past commentaries, we have used real yield as our value proxy in fixed income.  In this commentary, we deviate from that methodology slightly and use a time-series z-score of carry as our value of measure. Historically high carry levels are considered to be cheap while historically low carry levels are considered to be expensive.

The portfolios assume a 12-month holding period for value signals.  To avoid timing luck, 52 sub-indexes are used, each rebalancing on a different week of the year.

We see not only a significant increase in total return in buying cheap versus expensive holdings, but also an increase in risk-adjusted returns.

Source: Bloomberg; Tiingo.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Returns are hypothetical and backtested.  Returns are gross of all management fees, transaction fees, and taxes, but net of underlying fund fees.  Total return series assumes the reinvestment of all distributions. 

Reversal

Reversal signals are the opposite of momentum: we expect past losers to outperform and past winners to underperform.  Empirically, reversals tend to occur over very short time horizons (e.g. 1 month) and longer-term time horizons (e.g. 3- to 5-years).  In many ways, long-term reversals can be thought of as a naive proxy for value, though there may be other behavioral and structural reasons for the historical efficacy of reversal signals.

We must be careful implementing reversal signals, however, as exposures in our universe have varying return dynamics (e.g. expected return and volatility levels).

To illustrate this problem, consider the simple two-asset example of equities and cash.  A 3-year reversal signal would sell the asset that has had the best performance over the prior 3-years and buy the asset that has performed the worst.  The problem is that we expect stocks to outperform cash due to the equity risk premium. Naively ranking on prior returns alone would have us out of equities during most bull markets.

Therefore, we must be careful in ranking assets with meaningfully different return dynamics.

(Why, then, can we do it for momentum?  In a sense, momentum is explicitly trying to exploit the relative time-series properties over a short-term horizon.  Furthermore, in a universe that contains low-risk, low-return assets, cross-sectional momentum can be thought of as an integrated process between time-series momentum and cross-sectional momentum, as the low-risk asset will bubble to the top when absolute returns are negative.)

To account for this, we use a time-series z-score of prior returns to create a reversal signal.  For example, at each point in time we calculate the current 3-year return and z-score it against all prior rolling 3-year periods.

Note that in this construction, high z-scores will reflect higher-than-normal 3-year numbers and low z-scores will reflect lower-than-normal 3-year returns. Therefore, we negate the z-score to generate our signal such that low-ranked exposures reflect those we want to sell and high-ranked exposures reflect those we want to buy.

The portfolios assume a 12-month holding period for value signals.  To avoid timing luck, 52 sub-indexes are used, each rebalancing on a different week of the year.

Plotting the results below for 1-, 3-, and 5-year reversal signals, we see that 3- and 5-year signals see a meaningful increase in both total return and Sharpe ratio between the lowest quintile.

Source: Bloomberg; Tiingo.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Returns are hypothetical and backtested.  Returns are gross of all management fees, transaction fees, and taxes, but net of underlying fund fees.  Total return series assumes the reinvestment of all distributions.

Volatility

Volatility signals are trivial to generate: we simply sort assets based on prior realized volatility.  Unfortunately, exploiting the low-volatility anomaly is difficult without leverage, as the empirically higher risk-adjusted return exhibited by low-volatility assets typically coincides with lower total returns.

For example, in the tests below the low quintile is mostly comprised of short-term Treasuries and floating rate corporates.  The top quintile is allocated across local currency emerging market debt, long-dated Treasuries, high yield bonds, and unhedged international government bonds.

As a side note, for the same reason we z-scored reversal signals, we also hypothesized that z-scoring may work on volatility.  Beyond these two sentences, the results were nothing worth writing about.

Nevertheless, we can still attempt to confirm the existence of the low-volatility anomaly in our investable universe by ranking assets on their past volatility.

The portfolios assume a 1-month holding period for momentum signals.  To avoid timing luck, four sub-indexes are used, each rebalancing on a different week of the month.

Indeed, in plotting results we see that the lowest volatility quintiles have significantly higher realized Sharpe ratios.

Source: Bloomberg; Tiingo.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Returns are hypothetical and backtested.  Returns are gross of all management fees, transaction fees, and taxes, but net of underlying fund fees.  Total return series assumes the reinvestment of all distributions.

Of the results plotted above, our eyes might be drawn to the results in the short-term volatility measure. It would appear that the top quintile has both a lower total return and much higher volatility than the 3rd and 4th quintiles.  This might suggest that we could improve our portfolios risk-adjusted returns without sacrificing total return by avoiding those top-ranked assets.

Unfortunately, this is not so clear cut.  Unlike the other signals where the portfolios had meaningful turnover, these quintiles are largely stable.  This means that the results are driven more by the composition of the portfolios than the underlying signals.  For example, the 3rd and 4th quintiles combine both Treasuries and credit exposure, which allows the portfolio to realize lower volatility due to correlation.  The highest volatility quintile, on the other hand, holds both local currency emerging market debt and un-hedged international government bonds, introducing (potentially uncompensated) currency risk into the portfolio.

Thus, the takeaway may be more strategic than tactical: diversification is good and currency exposure is going to increase your volatility.

Oh – and allocating to zero-to-negatively yielding foreign bonds isn’t going to do much for your return unless currency changes bail you out.

Conclusion

In this study, we explored the application of value, momentum, carry, reversal, and volatility signals across fixed income exposures.  We found that value, 3-month momentum, carry, and 3-year reversal signals may all provide meaningful information about forward expected returns and risk.

Our confidence in this analysis, however, is potentially crippled by several points:

  • The time horizon covered is, at best, two decades, and several economic variables are constant throughout it.
  • The inflation regime over the time period was largely uniform.
  • A significant proportion of the period covered had near-zero short-term Treasury yields and negative yields in foreign government debt.
  • Reversal signals require a significant amount of formation data. For example, the 3-year reversal signal requires 6 years (i.e. 3-years of rolling 3-year returns) of data before a signal can be generated. This represents nearly 1/3rd of the data set.
  • The dispersion in return dynamics (e.g. volatility and correlation) of the underlying assets can lead to the emergence of unintended artifacts in the data that may speak more to portfolio composition than the value-add from the quantitative signal.
  • We did not test whether certain exposures or certain time periods had an outsized impact upon results.
  • We did not thoroughly test stability regions for different signals.
  • We did not test the impact of our holding period assumptions.
  • Holdings within quantile portfolios were assumed to be equally weighted.

Some of these points can be addressed simply.  Stability concerns, for example, can be addressed by testing the impact of varying signal parameterization.

Others are a bit trickier and require more creative thinking or more computational horsepower.

Testing for the outsized impact of a given exposure or a given time period, for example, can be done through sub-sampling and cross-validation techniques.  We can think of this as the application of randomness to efficiently cover our search space.

For example, below we re-create our 3-month momentum quintiles, but do so by randomly selecting only 10 of the exposures and 75% of the return period to test.   We repeat this resampling 10,000 times for each quintile and plot the distribution of annualized returns below.

Even without performing an official difference-in-means test, the separation between the low and high quintile annualized return distributions provides a clue that the performance difference between these two is more likely to be a pervasive effect rather than due to an outlier holding or outlier time period.

We can make this test more explicit by using this subset resampling technique to bootstrap a distribution of annualized returns for a top-minus-bottom quintile long/short portfolio.  Specifically, we randomly select a subset of assets and generate our 3-month momentum signals.  We construct a dollar-neutral long/short portfolio by going long assets falling in the top quintile and short assets falling in the bottom quintile.  We then select a random sub-period and calculate the annualized return.

Only 207 of the 10,000 samples fall below 0%, indicating a high statistical likelihood that the outperformance of recent winners over recent losers is not an effect dominated by a specific subset of assets or time-periods.

While this commentary provides a first step towards analyzing quantitative style signals across fixed income exposures, more tests need to be run to develop greater confidence in their efficacy.

Source: Bloomberg; Tiingo.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Returns are hypothetical and backtested.  Returns are gross of all management fees, transaction fees, and taxes, but net of underlying fund fees.  Total return series assumes the reinvestment of all distributions.

 


 

Quantifying Timing Luck

This blog post is available as a PDF download here.

Summary­­

  • When two managers implement identical strategies, but merely choose to rebalance on different days, we call variance between their returns “timing luck.”
  • Timing luck can easily be overcome by using a method of overlapping portfolios, but few firms do this in practice.
  • We believe the magnitude of timing luck impact is much larger than most believe, particularly in tactical strategies.
  • We derive a model to estimate the impact of timing luck, using only values that can be easily estimated from portfolios implemented without the overlapping portfolio technique.
  • We find that timing luck looms large in many different types of strategies.

As a pre-emptive warning, this week’s commentary is a math derivation.  We think it is a very relevant derivation – one which we have not seen before – but a derivation nonetheless.  If math is not your thing, this might be one to skip.

If math is your thing: consider this a request for comments.  The derivation here will be rather informal sketch, and we think there are other improvements still lingering.

What is “Timing Luck?”

The basic concept of timing luck is that when we choose to rebalance can have a profound impact on our performance results.  For example, if we rebalance an investment strategy once a month, the choice to rebalance at the end of the month will lead to different performance than had we elected to rebalance mid-month.

We call this performance differential “timing luck,” and we believe it is an overlooked, non-negligible portfolio construction risk.

As an example, consider a simple stock/cash timing model that rebalances monthly, investing in a broad U.S. equity index when its 12-1 month return is positive, and a constant maturity 1-year U.S. Treasury index otherwise.  Depending on which day of the month you choose to rebalance (we will assume 21 variations to represent 21 trading days), your results may be dramatically different.

Source: Kenneth French Data Library, Federal Reserve of St. Louis.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  Performance is backtested and hypothetical.  Performance figures are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes.  Performance assumes the reinvestment of all distributions.

The best performing strategy had an annualized return of 11.1%, while the worst returned just 9.6%.  Compounded over 55 years, and that 150 basis point (“bps”) differential leads to an astounding difference in final wealth.  With a standard deviation between 50-year annualized returns of 0.42%, the 1-year annualized estimate of performance variation due to timing luck is 314bps!

Again, an identical process is employed: the only difference between these results is the choice of what day of the month to rebalance.

That small choice, and the good luck or misfortune it realizes, can easily be the difference between “hired” and “fired.”

Is There a Solution to Timing Luck?

In the past, we have argued that overlapping portfolios can be utilized to minimize the impact of timing luck.  The idea of overlapping portfolios is as follows: given an investment process and a holding period, we can invest across multiple managers that invest utilizing the same process but have offset holding periods.[1]

For example, below each manager has a four time-step holding period, and we utilize four managers to minimize timing luck from a single implementation.

The proof that this approach minimizes timing luck is as follows.

Assume that we have N managers, all following an identical investment process with identical holding period, but whose rebalance points are offset from one another by one period.

Consider that at any point in time, we can define the portfolio of Manager #2 to be the portfolio of Manager #1 plus a dollar-neutral long/short portfolio that captures the differences in holdings between them.  Similarly, Manager #3’s portfolio can be thought of as Manager #2’s portfolio plus a dollar-neutral long/short portfolio.  This continues in a circular manner, where Manager #1’s portfolio can be thought of as Manager #N’s portfolio plus a dollar-neutral long/short.

Given that the managers all follow an identical process, we would expect them to have the same long-term expected return.  Thus, the expected return of the dollar-neutral long/short portfolios is zero.

However, the variance of the dollar-neutral long/short portfolios captures the risk of timing luck.

In allocating capital between the N portfolios, our goal is to minimize timing luck.  Put another way, we want to find the allocation that results in the minimum variance portfolio of the long/short portfolios.  Fortunately, there is a simple, closed form solution for calculating the minimum variance portfolio:

Here, w is our solution (an Nx1 vector of weights), Sigma is the covariance matrix and  is an Nx1 vector of 1s.  To solve this equation, we need the covariance matrix between the long/short portfolios.  Since each portfolio is employing an identical process, we can assume that each of the long/short portfolios should have equal variance.  Without loss of generality, we can assume variances are equal to 1 and replace our covariance matrix, Sigma, with a correlation matrix, C.

The correlations between long/short portfolios will largely depend on the process in question and the amount of overlap between portfolios.  That said, because each manager runs an identical process, we would expect that the long-term correlation between Portfolio #2’s long/short and Portfolio #1’s long/short to be identical to the correlation between Portfolio #3’s long/short and Portfolio #2’s.  Similarly, the correlation between Portfolio #3’s and Portfolio #1’s long/shorts should be the same as the correlation between Portfolio #N’s and Portfolio #2’s.

Following this logic (and remembering the circular nature of the rebalances), we can ignore exact numbers and fill in a correlation matrix using variables:

This correlation matrix has two special properties.  First, being a correlation matrix, it is symmetric.  Second, it is circulant: each row is rotated one element to the right of the preceding row.  A special property of a symmetric circulant matrix is that its inverse – in this case C-1 – is also symmetric circulant.  This property guarantees that C-11 is equal to k1 for some constant k.

Which means we can re-write our minimum variance solution as:

Since the constant  will cancel out, we are left with:

Thus, our optimal solution is an equal-weight allocation to all N portfolios.

Highlighted in gold below, we can see the result of this approach using the same stock/cash example as before.  Specifically, the gold portfolio uses each of the 21 variations as a different sub-portfolio.

Source: Kenneth French Data Library.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Past performance is not an indicator of future results.  Performance is backtested and hypothetical.  Performance figures are gross of all fees, including, but not limited to, manager fees, transaction costs, and taxes.  Performance assumes the reinvestment of all distributions.

While we have a solution for timing luck, a question that lingers is: “how much will timing luck affect my particular strategy?”

The Setup

We assume an active investment strategy with constant portfolio of variance (S2), constant and continuous annualized turnover (T; e.g. 0.5 for 50% annual turnover), and consistent rebalances at discrete frequency (f; e.g. 1/12 for monthly).

We will also assume that the portfolio contains no static components.  This allows us to interpret 100% turnover as meaning that the entire portfolio was turned over, rather than that 50% of the portfolio was turn over twice.

To quantify the magnitude of timing luck, we will calculate the variance of a dollar-neutral, long/short portfolio that is long a discrete implementation (i.e. rebalancing at a fixed interval) of this strategy (D) and short the theoretically optimal infinite overlapping portfolio implementation (M – for “meta”).

As before, the expected return of this long/short is zero, but its variance captures the return differences created by timing luck.

Differences between the Discrete and Continuous Portfolios

The long/short portfolio is defined as (D – M).  However, we would expect the holdings of D to overlap with the holdings of M.  How much overlap will depend on both portfolio turnover and rebalance frequency.

Assume, for a moment, that M does not have infinite overlapping portfolios, but a finite number N, each uniformly spaced across the holding period.

If we assume 100% turnover that is continuous, we would expect that the first overlapping portfolio, implemented at t=1/N, to have (1 – 1/N) percent of its holdings identical to D (i.e. not “turned over”).  On the other hand, the portfolio implemented at t = (N-1)/N will have just 1/N percent of its holdings identical to D.

Thus, we can say that if M contains N discrete overlapping portfolios, we can expect M and D to overlap by:

Which we can reduce,

If we take the limit as N goes to infinity – i.e. we have infinite overlapping portfolios – then we are simply left with:

Thus, the overlap we expect between our discretely implemented portfolio, D, and the portfolio with infinite overlapping portfolios, M, is a simple function of the expected turnover during the holding period.

We can then define our long/short portfolio:

Where Q is the portfolio of holdings in M that are not in D.

We should pause here, for a moment, as this is where our assumption of “no static portfolio elements” becomes relevant.  We defined (1) to be the amount M and D overlap.   Technically, if we allow securities to be sold and then repurchased, (1) represents a lower limit to how much M and D overlap.  As an absurd example, consider a portfolio that creates 100% turnover by buying and selling the same 1% of the portfolio 100 times.  Thus, Q in (6) need not necessarily be unique from D; part of D could be contained in Q.

By assuming that no part of the portfolio is static, we are assuming that over the (very) long run, the average turnover experience over a holding period does not include repurchase of sold securities, and thus (1) is the amount of overlap and D and Q are independent holdings.

This assumption is likely fairer for traditionally active portfolios that focus on security selection, but potentially less realistic for tactical strategies that often sell and re-purchase the same exposure.  More on this later.

Defining,

We can re-write,

Solving for Timing Luck

We can then solve for the variance of the long/short portfolio,

Expanding:

As D and Q both represent viable allocation schemes for the portfolio, we will assume that they share the same long-term portfolio variance, S2.  This assumption may be fair, over the long run, for traditional stock-selection portfolios, but likely less fair for highly tactical portfolios that can meaningfully shift their portfolio risk exposures.

Thus,

Replacing back our definition for a, we are left with:

Or, that the annualized volatility due to timing luck (L) is:

What is Corr(D,Q)?

The least easily interpreted – or calculated – term in our equation is the correlation between our discrete portfolio, D, and the non-overlapping securities found in the infinite overlapping portfolios implementation, Q.

The intuitive interpretation here is that when the securities held in our discrete portfolio are highly correlated to those that are not held but the optimal strategy recommends we hold, then we would expect the difference to have less impact.  On the other hand, if those securities are negatively correlated, then the discrete rebalance choice could lead to significant additional volatility.

Estimating this value, however, may be difficult to do empirically.

One potential answer is to use the intra-portfolio correlation (“IPC”) of an equal-weight portfolio of representative assets or securities.  The intuition here is that we expect each asset to experience, on average, an equivalent amount of turnover due to our assumption that there are no static positions in the portfolio.

Thus, taking the IPC of an equal-weight portfolio of representative securities allows us to express the view that while we do not know which securities will be different at any given point in time, we expect over the long-run that all securities will be “missing” with equal frequency and magnitude, and therefore the IPC is representative of the long-term correlation between D and Q.

Estimating Timing Luck in our Stock/Cash Tactical Strategy

The assumptions required for our estimate of timing luck may work well with traditional security selection portfolios (or, at least, quantitative implementations of factors like value, momentum, defensive etc.), but will it work with tactical portfolios?

Using our prior stock/cash example, let’s estimate the expected magnitude of timing luck.  Using one of the discrete implementations, we estimate that turnover is 67% per year.  Our rebalance frequency is monthly (1/12) and the intra-portfolio correlation between stocks and bonds is assumed to be 0%.  Finally, the long-term volatility of the strategy is about 12.2%.

Using these figures, we estimate:

This is a somewhat disappointing result, as we had calculated prior that the actual timing luck was 314bps.  Our estimate is less than 1/6th of the actual figure!

Part of the problem may be that many of the assumptions we outlined are violated with our example tactical strategy.  We think the bigger problem is that our estimates for these variables, when using a highly tactical strategy, are simply wrong.

In our equation, we assumed that turnover would be continuous.  This is because we are using turnover as a proxy for the decay speed of our alpha signal.

What does this mean?  As an example, value strategies rely on value signals that tend to decay slowly.  When a stock is identified as being a value stock, it tends to stay that way for some time.  Therefore, if you build a portfolio off of these signals, you would expect low turnover.  Momentum signals, on the other hand, tend to decay more quickly.  A stock that is labeled as high momentum this month may no longer be high momentum in three months’ time.  Thus, momentum strategies tend to be high turnover.

This relationship does not necessarily hold for tactical strategies.

In our tactical example, we rebalance monthly because we believe the time-series momentum has a short forecast horizon.  However, with only two assets, the strategy can go years without turnover.  Worse, the same strategy might miss a signal because it is only sampling in a discrete manner and therefore understate true turnover in a continuous framework.

If we were to look at the turnover of a tactical strategy implemented with the same rules but rebalanced daily, we would see a turnover rate over 300%.  This would increase our estimate up to 215bps.  Still well below the realized 314bps, but certainly high enough to raise eyebrows about the impact of timing luck in tactical portfolios not implemented using overlapping portfolios.

We should also remember that timing luck is determined by the difference in holdings between the discrete strategy and the meta strategy.  We had assumed that the portfolios D and Q would have the same volatility, but in a strategy that shifts between stocks and bonds, this most certainly is not the case.  This means that long-run volatility in such a tactical strategy can actually be misleadingly low.

Consider the situation when the tactical strategy goes to cash based upon a short-lived signal; i.e. the meta strategy will not build a significant cash position.  The realized volatility of the strategy will dampen the perceived timing luck, when in reality the volatility difference between the two portfolios is quite large.

In our specific tactical example, we know that when D is stocks, Q is bonds and vice versa.  With this insight, we can re-write equation (10):

Which we can simplify as:

Which is simply just a constant times the variance of a portfolio that is 100% long stocks and -100% short bonds (or vice versa; the variance will be the same).

If we use this equation and the variance of a long/short stock/bond portfolio and our prior estimate of 300% turnover, we get an estimate of timing luck volatility of 191bps.

Note that using this concept, there may be a more generic solution that is possible using some measure of active variance (likely scaled by active share).

Conclusion

In this piece we have demonstrated the potentially massive impact of timing luck, addressed how to solve for it, and derived a model that can be used to estimate the magnitude of timing luck risk in strategies that do not employ an overlapping portfolios technique.

While our derived approach is not perfect – as we saw in its application with our tactical example – we believe it is an important step forward in being able to quantify the potential risk that timing luck creates.

 


 

[1] In reality, we probably wouldn’t hire a different manager to implement the same strategy with different rebalance timing even if we could find such managers. A more feasible solution would be for a single manager to run different sleeves implementing each rebalance iteration.

 

The State of Risk Management

How effective is your method of managing portfolio risk? We compare and contrast different approaches – including fixed income, managed futures, low volatility equities, and tactical – to explore the relative protection they can deliver versus the return drag they can create.

Indexed Annuity: Masking Risk, Not Destroying It

What is an Indexed Annuity?

In recent conversations with current and potential clients, we have seen an uptick in the use of indexed annuities as a tool for risk management.

For the uninitiated, Fidelity succinctly described an indexed annuity in a recent blog post:

“An indexed annuity is a contract issued and guaranteed by an insurance company. You invest an amount of money (premium) in return for protection against down markets; the potential for some investment growth, linked to an index (e.g., the S&P 500® Index); and, in some cases, a guaranteed level of lifetime income through optional riders.”

The rules that govern the performance credited to an indexed annuity account tend to be relatively simple and intuitive.  A hypothetical example would be something like this:

  • If the S&P 500 loses value over the policy year, the account is credited 0%.
  • If the S&P 500 gains between 0% and 5% over the policy year, the policy is credited with the S&P 500’s gain.
  • If the S&P 500 gains more than 5% over the policy year, the policy is credited with 5%.

In this example, the 5% figure is referred to as the “cap.”

While these rules may be simple and intuitive, the trade-offs inherent in such a contract are less clear.

Recently, I’ve been stealing the following phrase from my co-PM, Corey, quite frequently: “Risk cannot be destroyed, it can only be transformed.”  I think this concept is especially applicable to indexed annuities.

Fortunately, indexed annuity-like payoff structures can be created with stocks, bonds, and options.  By evaluating these replicating portfolios, we can start to develop a more complete cost/benefit analysis and perhaps better understand how these types of products may or may not fit into certain client portfolios.

For those not interested in the details, the takeaways are quite simple:

  • Indexed annuities depend on interest income to finance investments in the equity markets.
  • When interest rates are low, there is little capital available to make these equity investments.
  • Limited capital means either (i) low equity participation rates or (ii) low caps that restrict potential upside.
  • Low participation rates and/or low caps on index participation are a recipe for muted returns, which may make it difficult to stay ahead of inflation.

In short, indexed annuities suffer from many of the same problems that plague traditional asset classes in low interest rate and high valuation environments.

Example #1: Stocks and Bonds

Say we have $1,000,000 to invest.  We want to invest it for ten years.  We’d like some equity upside, but want to guarantee that we will get back our $1,000,000 at maturity.  How might we go about doing this?

It’s not all that complicated.  We just need to make two investments.

  1. Buy a Treasury STRIP that matures 10 years from today with face value of $1,000,000.  Today, this would cost approximately $834,000.
  2. Invest the remaining $166,000 in the S&P 500 (or any other equity strategy).

10 years from now, the Treasury STRIP will be worth $1,000,000.  As a result, we will breakeven even if we lose our entire equity investment.  If equities end the period flat, we will have $1,166,000 – an annualized return of 1.55%.  If equities appreciate over the next decade, our return will exceed 1.55%.  The chart below plots the annualized portfolio return for various S&P 500 scenarios.

1

So where is the risk?

The portfolio consists of a 83.4% allocation to a zero-coupon Treasury bond and a 16.6% allocation to equities.  For those familiar with indexed annuity lingo, this 16.6% is the participation rate.  This is essentially a very conservative asset allocation model.  It may be low risk, but it is certainly not risk-free despite the fact that the portfolio will be worth at least the minimum $1,000,000 in 10 years.

First, the value of the account can dip below $1,000,000 prior to maturity.  Suppose that over the next year interest rates are unchanged and equities crash 50%.  The account value will be $932,277, a 6.8% loss.  On a side note, I actually think this may be one of the key benefits of an indexed annuity product: helping investors maintain a more optimal investment horizon by masking over short-term fluctuations.

Second, the go-forward appeal of this strategy will be highly dependent on interest rates.  Higher interest rates will make the strategy relatively more attractive.  Why?

Higher interest rates –> Lower STRIP prices –> More money to invest in equities

If 10-year STRIP rates were 5.00% instead of 1.83%, the STRIP would only cost approximately $614,000, leaving a $386,000 to invest in equities.  Now instead of a 16.6%/83.4% stock/bond split, we get a 38.6%/61.4% split while still taking no risk of a 10-year loss.

Below, we plot what our hypothetical indexed annuity replicating portfolio would have looked like historically over different interest rate regimes.

2

Unsurprisingly, the performance of the hypothetical indexed annuity tends to lag in strong equity markets and shine when equity markets crash.  That being said, the simulated performance is quite compelling on a risk-adjusted-basis.

3

The picture changes, however, when we re-run the historical simulations using today’s interest rates.  The average annual return drag increases from just 1.05% with historical rates to a whopping 6.40% with current rates.  6.40% of drag vs. equities is especially problematic once we factor in low expected equity returns and inflation.  While the risk of capital loss may be effectively mitigated, we have just substituted it for the risk that we fail to meet our growth objectives.

Once again, risk cannot be destroyed, it can just be transformed.

Indexed annuities are not immune from the low interest rate malaise currently gripping the markets.

4

I think it’s also important to consider the appropriate benchmark for this type of investment.  In my view, ending the 10-year period with $1,000,000 is not “breaking even.”  In our initial example, we could have avoided equities entirely and used all of our capital to buy a Treasury STRIP.  Today, our $1,000,000 could purchase approximately $1,199,000 notional of these bonds.  In other words, if we stick to our 10-year investment horizon, then we can guarantee that our account is worth $1,199,000 10 years down the road.  This equates to a 1.83% annualized return.  This is our benchmark.

5

When we plot the simulated performance (assuming today’s interest rates) vs. this breakeven benchmark, we see that performance did in fact slip below 1.83% for investor’s that initiated their investment between October 1998 and January 2001.  These investors would have struggled because they experienced both the popping of the tech bubble and the global financial crisis.  Lo and behold, risk exists.  In essence, the replicated indexed annuity is investing the future interest to be earned on the STRIP investment in equities.  If this investment isn’t profitable, the investor would have been better off sticking the Treasuries.

Example #2: Options and Bonds

One way we can deal with the low equity participation rates caused by low interest rates from our first example is to introduce leverage.  Specifically, we can do so by using equity index options.

Again assume that we have $1,000,000 to invest for ten years.  We still want to impose a $1,000,000 floor on our account value at the end of the period, but now we want 100% participation with equity gains (at least up to some cap).

How would we go about doing this?

We start by buying $1,000,000 of 10-year Treasury notes at par.  Today, the interest rate on this investment would be 1.88%.  Treasury bonds pay interest semi-annually and so the investment will generate $9,400 in interest payments every six months.

To get our equity participation, we will use this cash flow to buy at-the-money call options on SPY that expire in six months.  Let’s say each of these options costs $10, so we can buy 940 options.  This is problematic.  We want 100% participation in equity gains.  To get this at SPY’s current price of around $206, we need to buy 4,854 options ($1,000,000 divided by $206).

940 options gives us a participation rate of less than 20%, not too much different than our portfolio in Example #1 above.

Fortunately, we can solve our issue with a bit of financial engineering.  Say that call options with the same expiry and a strike of $209 (about 1.5% out-of-the-money) are trading at $8.  If we sell one of these options for each $206 strike call we buy, we have created a bullish call spread.  These call spreads only cost $2 each, allowing us to buy the 4,854 units we need.

We now get 100% participation in equity gains.  However, we have paid a price for this.  Namely, we only get 100% participation for gains up to 1.5%.  We have sold the rights to any gains in excess of 1.5% in order to finance our call purchases.  We have “capped” our six equity return at 1.5%.

At the end of six months, we will re-invest any option payoffs into Treasury notes/bills.  As a result, we may have slightly more than $9,400 to buy options for the next six-month period.

We continue this process for ten years (or 20 six-month periods).  Even if the worst case scenario plays out and the market goes down each and every period, we will still receive our $1,000,000 principal back from the 10-year Treasury note investment.

Below, we again simulate how such an approach would have hypothetically performed relative to the S&P 500.

6

When we use historical interest rates, the results are once again pretty compelling.  On average, the simulated indexed annuity trails the S&P 500 by less 1% per year, while providing nice downside protection.

Unfortunately, when we repeat the simulation using today’s interest rates, we see that this simulation has the same shortcomings as our first one.

When interest rates are low, our Treasury bond position throws off very little cash.  With low cash flow, we aren’t able to buy very many at-the-money call options.  As a result, we need to sell calls with strikes that are quite close to today’s equity prices in order to finance our at-the-money call purchases.  This effectively sets our cap very low and puts strict limits on how much equity upside can be realized.  The annualized drag to the equity markets is now nearly 5% per year.

7

Once again, risk has not been eliminated.  Our “reward” for buying the Treasury bond is the interest payments.  We use these interest payments to get leveraged market exposure through options.  If the market declines, the options will expire worthless and we have lost our interest payments.

The commonsense benchmark for this portfolio is just a 10-year Treasury bond.  The 3/31/16 rate that was used in the simulation was 1.78%.  This 1.78% is our benchmark.  We see below that the simulated indexed annuity barely beats out this benchmark in most cases.

9

A Word About Dividends

Research Affiliates estimates that U.S. large-cap equities have a 10-year expected return of 1.3% after inflation.  On a nominal basis – or adding back in inflation of 2.0% – this number becomes 3.3%.  Of this 3.3%, they believe that inflation will contribute +2.0%, dividends will contribute 2.2%, and growth will contribute 1.3%.  But, this adds up to 5.5%.  What gives?  Research Affiliates believes that equity valuations will gradually revert back to historical norms.  They estimate that this will be a 2.2% annualized drag on performance.

As you can see, dividends are a crucial part of equity returns.  If we remove the 2.2% dividend yield, the above expected return number drops from an already meager 3.3% to only 1.1%.

This is problematic for indexed annuity investors, since credits are often based on price, not total, return of the equity index.

To test the impact of this, we can perform some Monte Carlo simulations using the Research Affiliates capital market assumptions.  We compare a 20/80 S&P 500/Barclays Aggregate portfolio to the following indexed annuity (note: we took this structure from a popular product in today’s market):

  • 4% bonus on initial investment
  • 100% participation rate on S&P 500 with a cap of 2.5%
  • S&P 500 return is measured using the annual, point-to-point methodology (i.e. we compute the return using just the beginning of year and end of year S&P 500 values)

We performed 10,000 simulations of 10-year periods.  The following histogram plots the annualized out/underperformance of the 20/80 portfolio vs. the indexed annuity over 10-year periods.  Positive numbers mean the 20/80 portfolio outperformed.  Negative numbers mean the indexed annuity outperformed.  All returns are annualized.

10

On average, the 20/80 returned 3.45% per year over a 10-year period.  The indexed annuity returned 1.89% per year.  The 20/80 portfolio beat the indexed annuity in 88.8% of the simulations.

Indexed annuity proponents may point to the risk management benefits of the product in trying to reconcile these statistics.  There are a few problems with this argument.

First, the 20/80 portfolio isn’t all that risky to begin with.  It only lost money over 10-years in 1.1% of the simulations.  And this is using today’s capital market assumptions where both U.S. stocks and bonds are overvalued and therefore offer low future expected returns.

Second, and much more importantly, we have to consider inflation.  To see why, consider the simplest form of risk management, holding cash.  This will guarantee that you protect your capital, until you wake up a decade later only to realize that inflation has eroded your purchasing power.

If we deduct 2.0% of inflation per year, the “risk management” scoreboard changes dramatically.  The 20/80 loses money on an inflation-adjusted basis in 15.9% of the simulations, while the annuity fails to keep up with inflation 59.9% of the time!  In our experiment, you are more likely to lose money than make money with the annuity over a decade.  Hardly risk-free!

Conclusion

Risk cannot be destroyed, it can only be transformed.  Warren Buffett famously said, “If you’ve been playing poker for half an hour and still don’t know who the patsy is, you’re the patsy.”  The same idea holds true with any financial product.  There is always risk somewhere.  If someone selling a product says otherwise, then be very, very suspicious.

For indexed annuities, the main risk is that potential returns are severely limited when interest rates are as low as they are now.  High interest rates are the fuel that may allow these products to deliver equity-like returns with less downside risk.  Without high interest rates, however, you are going nowhere fast.  Going nowhere fast is a problem when inflation is always nipping at your heels.  Downside risk management is great, until it restricts your growth so much that your purchasing power erodes over time.

Data Sources and Disclosures

Data comes from the Federal Reserve, Research Affiliates, CBOE, and Morningstar.  Calculations were performed by Newfound Research.

Index annuity guarantees are subject to the credit of the issuing insurance company.

All returns are hypothetical and backtested and reflect unmanaged index returns.  Returns do not reflect fees.  Past performance does not guarantee future results.  Results are not indicative of any Newfound index or strategy.  Hypothetical performance results have many inherent limitations and are not indicative of results that any investor actually attained.  An investor cannot invest directly in an index.  Index returns are unmanaged and do not reflect fees and expenses.

For the options analysis, we use historical VIX levels with a 20% premium applied to reflect the higher implied volatility typically associated with longer-term options.

Powered by WordPress & Theme by Anders Norén