The Research Library of Newfound Research

Tag: inflation

What Is Managed Futures?

Summary

  • Much like in 2008, managed futures as an investment strategy had an impressive year in 2022. With most traditional asset classes struggling to navigate the inflationary macroeconomic environment, managed futures has been drawing interest as a potential diversifier.
  • Managed futures is a hedge fund category that uses futures contracts as their primary investment vehicle. Managed futures managers can engage in many different investment strategies, but trend following is the most common.
  • Trend following as an investment strategy has a substantial amount of empirical evidence promoting its efficacy as an investment strategy. There also exist several behavioral arguments for why this anomaly exists, and why we might expect it to continue.
  • As a diversifier, multi-asset trend following has provided diversification benefits when compared to both stocks and bonds. Additionally, trend following has posted positive returns in the four major drawdowns in equities since 2000.

Cut short your losses, and let your winners run. – David Ricardo, 1838

What is Managed Futures?

Managed futures is a hedge fund category originating in the 1980s, named for the ability to trade (both long and short) global equity, bond, commodity, and currency futures contracts. Today, these strategies have been made available to investors in both mutual fund and ETF wrappers. The predominate strategy of most managed futures managers is trend following, so much so, that the terms are often used synonymously.

While trend following is by far the largest and most pronounced strategy in the category, it is not the only strategy used in the space.1 Managed futures can engage in trend following, momentum trading, mean reversion, carry-focused strategies, relative value trading, macro driven strategies, or any combination thereof. Any individual managed futures manager may have a certain bias towards one of the strategies, though, trend following is by far the most utilized strategy of the group2.

Figure 1: The Taxonomy of Managed Futures

Adapted from Kaminski (2014). The most common characteristics are highlighted in orange.

What is Trend Following?

Simply put, trend following is a strategy that buys (‘goes long’) assets that have been rising in price and sells (‘goes short’) assets that have been decreasing in price, based on the premise that this trend will continue. The precise method of measuring trends varies widely, but each primarily relies on the difference between an asset’s price today and the price of the same asset previously. Some common methods of measuring trends include total return measurements, moving averages, and regression lines. These different approaches are all mathematically linked, and empirical evidence does not suggest that one method is necessarily better than another3.

Trend following has a rich history in financial markets, with centuries of evidence supporting the idea that markets tend to trend. The obvious question to then ask is: why? The past few decades of academic research has focused on explaining theories such as the Efficient Market Hypothesis and research into explanatory market factors (such as value and size), diminishing the amount of research being conducted on trend following.

Figure 2: The Life Cycle of a Trend

Adapted from AQR. For illustrative purposes only.

The classification of trend following as an anomaly, however, has not left it without theories for why it works. There are a number of generally accepted explanations for why trend following works, and more importantly, why the anomaly might continue to persist.

Anchoring Bias: When new data enters the marketplace, investors can overly rely on historical data, thereby underreacting to the new information. This can be seen in Figure 3 where, after the catalyst of new information enters the market, the price of a security will directionally follow the fair value of the asset, but not with a large enough magnitude to match the fair value precisely.

Disposition Effect: Investors have a tendency to take gains on their winning positions too early and hold onto their losing positions too long.

Herding: After a noticeable trend has been established, investors “bandwagon” into the trade, prolonging the directional trend, and potentially pushing the price past the asset’s fair value4.

Confirmation Bias: Investors tend to ignore information that is contrary to an their beliefs. A positive (or negative) signal will be ignored if the investor has a differing view, extending the time frame for the convergence of an asset’s price to its fair value.

Rational Inattention Bias: Investors cannot immediately digest all information due to a lack of information processing resources (or mental capacity). Consequently, prices move towards fair value more slowly as the information is processed by all investors.

As previously mentioned, methodologies may vary widely when analyzing an asset’s trend, but the general theme is to view an asset’s current price relative to some measure of its recent history. For example, one common example of this is to observe an asset’s current price versus its 200-day moving average: initiating a long position when the price is above its moving average or a short position when it is below. Extending Figure 2, we can graphically depict the trade cycle attempting to take advantage of such a trend.

Figure 3: The Life Cycle of a Trade

Source: Newfound Research, AQR. For illustrative purposes only

Of course, using such an idealized description of a trend is not typically what is found in the market, which leads to many false-starts, The risk-management decisions made to reduce the impact of these false-starts begins to highlight part of the attractiveness of the strategy as a diversifier.

Consider that the fair value of an asset is generally never known with a high degree of certainty. A trend following manager is thus reliant on the perceived direction of trend at any given time, and so, must make choices based on how the trend evolves or not.

Figure 4: Heads I Trend, Tails I Don’t

Adapted from Michael Covel. For illustrative purposes only.

When the model indicates that a trend has formed, the manager will initiate a position in the direction of the indicated trend (either short or long – blue line in Figure 4). As long as the trend continues, the strategy will hold that position, and only exit when the signal indicates that the trend no longer exists. At that time, the manager will remove the position, potentially taking the opposite position5.

The second case (red line in Figure 4) is one in which the trend reverses shortly after a position has been initiated. After establishing a position in the asset, the price of the asset reverts to its previous levels, possibly completely reversing in direction. In such a case, the signal will indicate that the trend no longer exists and recommend that the position be removed.

Historically, by quickly cutting losers and letting winning trades run, trend following has created a positively skewed return profile. Managed futures strategies tend to trade many different markets and underlying assets. This minimizes the impact of trends being rejected but may increase the probability of taking a position in an asset that has an outlier trend occurring that might be out of the scope of a traditional portfolio.

Kaminski (2014) refers to this characteristic as divergent risk taking6, where a divergent investor “profess[es] their own ignorance to the true structure of potential risks/benefits with some level of skepticism for what is knowable or is not dependable”.

This divergent risk behavior results in a positively skewed return distribution by not risking too much on a trade, removing the position if it goes against you, and allowing a trade to run if it is winning7.

The structural nature of trend following minimizes the size of any bets taken, and quickly eliminates a position if the bet is not paying off. By diversifying across many markets, asset classes, and economic goods, while maintaining sensible positions without directional bias, the strategy maintains staying power by not swinging for the fences and staying with a time-proven approach8, in a well-diversified manner.

Using Managed Futures as A Diversifier

The traditional investor portfolio has typically been dominated by two assets: stocks and bonds. In recent history, investors have even been able to use fixed income to buffer equity risk as high-quality bonds have exhibited flight-to-safety characteristics in times of extreme market turmoil. In the first two decades of the 2000s, this pairing has worked extremely well given that interest rates declined over the period, inflation remained low, and the bonds were resilient during the fallout of the tech bubble and the Great Financial Crisis.

In Figure 5, we chart the relationship between the year-over-year Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (“CPIAUCSL”) versus the 12-month correlation between U.S. Stocks and 10-Year U.S. Treasuries9. We can see that negative correlation is most pronounced when inflation is low. Positive correlation regimes, on the other hand, have historically occurred in all realized ranges of CPI changes, the most striking occurring when inflation was extraordinarily high.

Figure 5: The Relationship Between Inflation and Equity-Bond Correlation

Source: FRED, Kenneth French Data Library, Tiingo. For illustrative purposes only.

Since trend following can hold both long and short positions, it has the potential to trade price trends in  assets in any direction that may emerge from increasing inflation risks.   This is highlighted by the performance of trend following in 2022, where the year-to-date real returns of U.S. equities10, 10-Year U.S. Treasuries, and the SG CTA Trend Index as of December 31, 2022 , were -19.5%, -16.5%, and +27.4%, respectively.  During 2022, trend following strategies were generally long the U.S. Dollar, short fixed income securities, and short equity indices. Additionally, the managers tended to hold mixed positions in the commodity space, taking long and short positions in the individual commodity contracts exhibiting both positive and negative trends.

Importantly, the dynamics exhibited throughout different economic regimes (such as monetary inflation vs supply/demand inflation) will unfold differently, so positions that were profitable in 2022 will likely not be the same in all environments. Trend following as a strategy, is dynamic in nature, and will adjust positioning as trends emerge and fade, regardless of the economic regime.

In addition to historically providing a ballast in inflationary regimes, one of managed futures’ claims to fame stems from the strategy’s ability to provide negative correlation in times of financial stress, specifically, in equity crises. The net result of including an allocation to trend following strategies during these periods has been a reduction in portfolio drawdowns and portfolio volatility.

Though managed futures have been in existence since the 1980’s, the strategy garnered its popularity coming out of the Great Financial Crisis, as it was one of the few investment strategies to provide a positive return. While this event shot the strategy to prominence, it was not an isolated incident. In fact, this relationship has been repeated frequently throughout history.

Table 1 shows the cumulative nominal returns of stocks, bonds, and managed futures when the equity market realized a greater-than 20% drawdown.

Table 1: Nominal Return of Equities, Bonds, and Managed Futures During Equity Crises

Source: FRED, Kenneth French Data Library, BarclayHedge. Calculations by Newfound Research. Time period is based on data availability. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.

Since the inception of the SG CTA Trend Index11, bonds have provided diversification benefits in three of the four large drawdowns. 2022, however, was the first period in which inflation has been a concern in the market, and U.S. Treasuries were insufficient to reduce risk in a traditional portfolio.

We can see, though, that the SG CTA Trend Index provided similar diversification benefits during the drawdowns in the first two decades of the century, but also proved capable while inflation shocks rose to prominence in 2022.

Figure 6: Performance From 1999 to 2022

Source: BarclayHedge, Tiingo. 60/40 Portfolio is the Vanguard Balance Index Fund (“VBINX”) and returns presented are net of the management fee of the fund. Time period is based on data availability. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.

Conclusion

Traditional portfolios consisting of equity and fixed income exposure have enjoyed two decades of strong performance due to favorable economic tailwinds. With the changing economic regime and uncertainty facing markets ahead, however, investors have begun searching for potential additions to their portfolios to protect against inflation and to provide diversifying exposure to other macroeconomic headwinds.

Trend following as a strategy has extensive empirical evidence supporting both its standalone performance, as well as the diversifying benefits in relation to traditional asset classes such as stocks and bonds. In addition, trend following is mechanically convex in that it can provide positive returns in both bull and bear markets.

Managed futures is a strong contender as an addition to a stock-and-bond heavy portfolio. Finding its roots in the 1980s, the strategy has a tenured history in the investment landscape with a demonstrated history of providing diversifying exposure in times of equity crisis.

In this paper, we have shown that trend following is a robust trading strategy with behavioral underpinnings, suggesting that the strategy has staying power in the long-run, as well as desirable characteristics due to the mechanical nature of the strategy.

As a potential addition to a traditional investment portfolio, managed futures provides a source of diversification beyond that of mainstream asset classes, as well as strong absolute returns on a standalone basis.

APPENDIX A: TREND FOLLOWING AS AN OPTIONS STRADDLE

A trend following strategy can benefit from both positive and negative price trends. If prices are increasing, then a long position can be initiated; if prices are decreasing, then a short position can be initiated. Said differently: a trend following strategy can potentially profit from both increases or decreases in price.

This characteristic is immediately reminiscent of a long position in an option straddle, where a put and call option are purchased with the same strike price. This option position would, thereby, benefit if the price moves largely either positive or negative12.

Figure A1: Long Straddle Payoff Profile

Source: Newfound Research. For illustrative purposes only.

Empirically, these strategies have in fact performed remarkably similar. To illustrate this, we will create two simple strategies.

The first strategy is a simple trend following strategy that takes a long position in the S&P 500 when its prior 12-month return is positive, and a short position when its negative.

The second strategy will attempt to replicate the delta-position of a straddle expiring in one month, struck at the close price of the S&P 500 twelve months ago. We then compute the delta of this position using the Black-Scholes model13 and take a position in the S&P 500 equal to the computed delta. For example, if the price of the S&P 500 12-months ago was $3,000, we would calculate the delta of a straddle struck at $3,000. Since the delta of this position will range between -1 and 1, the strategy will use this as an allocation to the S&P 500.

Figure A2: Replicating Trend Following with Straddles

Source: Tiingo. Calculations by Newfound Research. Returns assume the reinvestment of all dividends. The S&P 500 is represented by the Vanguard 500 Index Fund Investor Shares (“VFINX”). For illustrative purposes only. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.

For both strategies, we will assume that any excess capital is held in cash, returning 0%. Figure A2 plots the growth of $1 invested in each strategy.

As we can see, the option strategy and the trend following strategy provide a roughly equivalent return profile. In fact, if we compare the quarterly returns of the two strategies to the S&P 500, an important pattern emerges. Both strategies exhibit convex relationships in relation to the S&P 500.

Figure A3: Trend Following Relationship to the Underlying

Source: Newfound Research. For illustrative purposes only.

Figure A4: Straddle Replication Relationship to the Underlying

Source: Newfound Research. For illustrative purposes only.

APPENDIX B: Index Definitions

U.S. Stocks: U.S. total equity market return data from Kenneth French Library. Performance is gross of all costs (including, but not limited to, advisor fees, manager fees, taxes, and transaction costs) unless explicitly stated otherwise. Performance assumes the reinvestment of all dividends.

10-Year U.S. Treasuries: The 10-Year U.S. Treasury index is a constant maturity index calculated by assuming that a 10-year bond is purchased at the beginning of every month and sold at the end of that month to purchase a new bond at par at the beginning of the next month. You cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses, or sales charges. The referenced index is shown for general market comparison and is not meant to represent any Newfound index or strategy. Data for 10-Year U.S. Treasury yields come from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis economic database (“FRED”).

SG Trend Index:  The SG Trend Index is designed to track the largest 10 (by AUM) CTAs and be representative of the managed futures trend-following space.

 


Anatomy of a Bull Market: Follow-Up

Based on our post from earlier today (“Anatomy of a Bull Market“), we received a request to decompose U.S. equity returns over rolling 10-year periods.

The graph presenting this data is below. To perform these calculations, we calculate the annualized return generated by each source (inflation, dividends, earnings growth, and valuation changes), take the absolute value, and then normalize so that the total sums to one.

Data Source: Robert Shiller’s data library.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Monthly data is used to make these calculations. Past performance does not guarantee future results. 

On average over all rolling 10-year periods, each source contributed the following percentage to total return (ordered from biggest to smallest contributor):

  1. Dividends: 31%
  2. Valuation Changes: 28%
  3. Inflation: 25%
  4. Earnings Growth: 16%

We also performed the analysis for shorter (3-year) and longer (30-year) rolling periods.

Data Source: Robert Shiller’s data library.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Monthly data is used to make these calculations. Past performance does not guarantee future results. 

Over shorter time horizons, valuation changes start to dominate returns:

  1. Valuation Changes (40%)
  2. Dividends (25%)
  3. Inflation (21%)
  4. Earnings Growth (15%)

Data Source: Robert Shiller’s data library.  Calculations by Newfound Research.  Monthly data is used to make these calculations. Past performance does not guarantee future results. 

But over longer periods, the impact of valuations starts to approach zero as shorter-term fluctuations offset each other.  Inflation and dividend yield together drive 70%+ of 30-year returns on average:

  1. Dividends (44%)
  2. Inflation (28%)
  3. Earnings Growth (15%)
  4. Valuation Changes (13%)

[Note: An earlier version of this post used total return data.  We amended the analysis to use annualized returns.]

 

Indexed Annuity: Masking Risk, Not Destroying It

What is an Indexed Annuity?

In recent conversations with current and potential clients, we have seen an uptick in the use of indexed annuities as a tool for risk management.

For the uninitiated, Fidelity succinctly described an indexed annuity in a recent blog post:

“An indexed annuity is a contract issued and guaranteed by an insurance company. You invest an amount of money (premium) in return for protection against down markets; the potential for some investment growth, linked to an index (e.g., the S&P 500® Index); and, in some cases, a guaranteed level of lifetime income through optional riders.”

The rules that govern the performance credited to an indexed annuity account tend to be relatively simple and intuitive.  A hypothetical example would be something like this:

  • If the S&P 500 loses value over the policy year, the account is credited 0%.
  • If the S&P 500 gains between 0% and 5% over the policy year, the policy is credited with the S&P 500’s gain.
  • If the S&P 500 gains more than 5% over the policy year, the policy is credited with 5%.

In this example, the 5% figure is referred to as the “cap.”

While these rules may be simple and intuitive, the trade-offs inherent in such a contract are less clear.

Recently, I’ve been stealing the following phrase from my co-PM, Corey, quite frequently: “Risk cannot be destroyed, it can only be transformed.”  I think this concept is especially applicable to indexed annuities.

Fortunately, indexed annuity-like payoff structures can be created with stocks, bonds, and options.  By evaluating these replicating portfolios, we can start to develop a more complete cost/benefit analysis and perhaps better understand how these types of products may or may not fit into certain client portfolios.

For those not interested in the details, the takeaways are quite simple:

  • Indexed annuities depend on interest income to finance investments in the equity markets.
  • When interest rates are low, there is little capital available to make these equity investments.
  • Limited capital means either (i) low equity participation rates or (ii) low caps that restrict potential upside.
  • Low participation rates and/or low caps on index participation are a recipe for muted returns, which may make it difficult to stay ahead of inflation.

In short, indexed annuities suffer from many of the same problems that plague traditional asset classes in low interest rate and high valuation environments.

Example #1: Stocks and Bonds

Say we have $1,000,000 to invest.  We want to invest it for ten years.  We’d like some equity upside, but want to guarantee that we will get back our $1,000,000 at maturity.  How might we go about doing this?

It’s not all that complicated.  We just need to make two investments.

  1. Buy a Treasury STRIP that matures 10 years from today with face value of $1,000,000.  Today, this would cost approximately $834,000.
  2. Invest the remaining $166,000 in the S&P 500 (or any other equity strategy).

10 years from now, the Treasury STRIP will be worth $1,000,000.  As a result, we will breakeven even if we lose our entire equity investment.  If equities end the period flat, we will have $1,166,000 – an annualized return of 1.55%.  If equities appreciate over the next decade, our return will exceed 1.55%.  The chart below plots the annualized portfolio return for various S&P 500 scenarios.

1

So where is the risk?

The portfolio consists of a 83.4% allocation to a zero-coupon Treasury bond and a 16.6% allocation to equities.  For those familiar with indexed annuity lingo, this 16.6% is the participation rate.  This is essentially a very conservative asset allocation model.  It may be low risk, but it is certainly not risk-free despite the fact that the portfolio will be worth at least the minimum $1,000,000 in 10 years.

First, the value of the account can dip below $1,000,000 prior to maturity.  Suppose that over the next year interest rates are unchanged and equities crash 50%.  The account value will be $932,277, a 6.8% loss.  On a side note, I actually think this may be one of the key benefits of an indexed annuity product: helping investors maintain a more optimal investment horizon by masking over short-term fluctuations.

Second, the go-forward appeal of this strategy will be highly dependent on interest rates.  Higher interest rates will make the strategy relatively more attractive.  Why?

Higher interest rates –> Lower STRIP prices –> More money to invest in equities

If 10-year STRIP rates were 5.00% instead of 1.83%, the STRIP would only cost approximately $614,000, leaving a $386,000 to invest in equities.  Now instead of a 16.6%/83.4% stock/bond split, we get a 38.6%/61.4% split while still taking no risk of a 10-year loss.

Below, we plot what our hypothetical indexed annuity replicating portfolio would have looked like historically over different interest rate regimes.

2

Unsurprisingly, the performance of the hypothetical indexed annuity tends to lag in strong equity markets and shine when equity markets crash.  That being said, the simulated performance is quite compelling on a risk-adjusted-basis.

3

The picture changes, however, when we re-run the historical simulations using today’s interest rates.  The average annual return drag increases from just 1.05% with historical rates to a whopping 6.40% with current rates.  6.40% of drag vs. equities is especially problematic once we factor in low expected equity returns and inflation.  While the risk of capital loss may be effectively mitigated, we have just substituted it for the risk that we fail to meet our growth objectives.

Once again, risk cannot be destroyed, it can just be transformed.

Indexed annuities are not immune from the low interest rate malaise currently gripping the markets.

4

I think it’s also important to consider the appropriate benchmark for this type of investment.  In my view, ending the 10-year period with $1,000,000 is not “breaking even.”  In our initial example, we could have avoided equities entirely and used all of our capital to buy a Treasury STRIP.  Today, our $1,000,000 could purchase approximately $1,199,000 notional of these bonds.  In other words, if we stick to our 10-year investment horizon, then we can guarantee that our account is worth $1,199,000 10 years down the road.  This equates to a 1.83% annualized return.  This is our benchmark.

5

When we plot the simulated performance (assuming today’s interest rates) vs. this breakeven benchmark, we see that performance did in fact slip below 1.83% for investor’s that initiated their investment between October 1998 and January 2001.  These investors would have struggled because they experienced both the popping of the tech bubble and the global financial crisis.  Lo and behold, risk exists.  In essence, the replicated indexed annuity is investing the future interest to be earned on the STRIP investment in equities.  If this investment isn’t profitable, the investor would have been better off sticking the Treasuries.

Example #2: Options and Bonds

One way we can deal with the low equity participation rates caused by low interest rates from our first example is to introduce leverage.  Specifically, we can do so by using equity index options.

Again assume that we have $1,000,000 to invest for ten years.  We still want to impose a $1,000,000 floor on our account value at the end of the period, but now we want 100% participation with equity gains (at least up to some cap).

How would we go about doing this?

We start by buying $1,000,000 of 10-year Treasury notes at par.  Today, the interest rate on this investment would be 1.88%.  Treasury bonds pay interest semi-annually and so the investment will generate $9,400 in interest payments every six months.

To get our equity participation, we will use this cash flow to buy at-the-money call options on SPY that expire in six months.  Let’s say each of these options costs $10, so we can buy 940 options.  This is problematic.  We want 100% participation in equity gains.  To get this at SPY’s current price of around $206, we need to buy 4,854 options ($1,000,000 divided by $206).

940 options gives us a participation rate of less than 20%, not too much different than our portfolio in Example #1 above.

Fortunately, we can solve our issue with a bit of financial engineering.  Say that call options with the same expiry and a strike of $209 (about 1.5% out-of-the-money) are trading at $8.  If we sell one of these options for each $206 strike call we buy, we have created a bullish call spread.  These call spreads only cost $2 each, allowing us to buy the 4,854 units we need.

We now get 100% participation in equity gains.  However, we have paid a price for this.  Namely, we only get 100% participation for gains up to 1.5%.  We have sold the rights to any gains in excess of 1.5% in order to finance our call purchases.  We have “capped” our six equity return at 1.5%.

At the end of six months, we will re-invest any option payoffs into Treasury notes/bills.  As a result, we may have slightly more than $9,400 to buy options for the next six-month period.

We continue this process for ten years (or 20 six-month periods).  Even if the worst case scenario plays out and the market goes down each and every period, we will still receive our $1,000,000 principal back from the 10-year Treasury note investment.

Below, we again simulate how such an approach would have hypothetically performed relative to the S&P 500.

6

When we use historical interest rates, the results are once again pretty compelling.  On average, the simulated indexed annuity trails the S&P 500 by less 1% per year, while providing nice downside protection.

Unfortunately, when we repeat the simulation using today’s interest rates, we see that this simulation has the same shortcomings as our first one.

When interest rates are low, our Treasury bond position throws off very little cash.  With low cash flow, we aren’t able to buy very many at-the-money call options.  As a result, we need to sell calls with strikes that are quite close to today’s equity prices in order to finance our at-the-money call purchases.  This effectively sets our cap very low and puts strict limits on how much equity upside can be realized.  The annualized drag to the equity markets is now nearly 5% per year.

7

Once again, risk has not been eliminated.  Our “reward” for buying the Treasury bond is the interest payments.  We use these interest payments to get leveraged market exposure through options.  If the market declines, the options will expire worthless and we have lost our interest payments.

The commonsense benchmark for this portfolio is just a 10-year Treasury bond.  The 3/31/16 rate that was used in the simulation was 1.78%.  This 1.78% is our benchmark.  We see below that the simulated indexed annuity barely beats out this benchmark in most cases.

9

A Word About Dividends

Research Affiliates estimates that U.S. large-cap equities have a 10-year expected return of 1.3% after inflation.  On a nominal basis – or adding back in inflation of 2.0% – this number becomes 3.3%.  Of this 3.3%, they believe that inflation will contribute +2.0%, dividends will contribute 2.2%, and growth will contribute 1.3%.  But, this adds up to 5.5%.  What gives?  Research Affiliates believes that equity valuations will gradually revert back to historical norms.  They estimate that this will be a 2.2% annualized drag on performance.

As you can see, dividends are a crucial part of equity returns.  If we remove the 2.2% dividend yield, the above expected return number drops from an already meager 3.3% to only 1.1%.

This is problematic for indexed annuity investors, since credits are often based on price, not total, return of the equity index.

To test the impact of this, we can perform some Monte Carlo simulations using the Research Affiliates capital market assumptions.  We compare a 20/80 S&P 500/Barclays Aggregate portfolio to the following indexed annuity (note: we took this structure from a popular product in today’s market):

  • 4% bonus on initial investment
  • 100% participation rate on S&P 500 with a cap of 2.5%
  • S&P 500 return is measured using the annual, point-to-point methodology (i.e. we compute the return using just the beginning of year and end of year S&P 500 values)

We performed 10,000 simulations of 10-year periods.  The following histogram plots the annualized out/underperformance of the 20/80 portfolio vs. the indexed annuity over 10-year periods.  Positive numbers mean the 20/80 portfolio outperformed.  Negative numbers mean the indexed annuity outperformed.  All returns are annualized.

10

On average, the 20/80 returned 3.45% per year over a 10-year period.  The indexed annuity returned 1.89% per year.  The 20/80 portfolio beat the indexed annuity in 88.8% of the simulations.

Indexed annuity proponents may point to the risk management benefits of the product in trying to reconcile these statistics.  There are a few problems with this argument.

First, the 20/80 portfolio isn’t all that risky to begin with.  It only lost money over 10-years in 1.1% of the simulations.  And this is using today’s capital market assumptions where both U.S. stocks and bonds are overvalued and therefore offer low future expected returns.

Second, and much more importantly, we have to consider inflation.  To see why, consider the simplest form of risk management, holding cash.  This will guarantee that you protect your capital, until you wake up a decade later only to realize that inflation has eroded your purchasing power.

If we deduct 2.0% of inflation per year, the “risk management” scoreboard changes dramatically.  The 20/80 loses money on an inflation-adjusted basis in 15.9% of the simulations, while the annuity fails to keep up with inflation 59.9% of the time!  In our experiment, you are more likely to lose money than make money with the annuity over a decade.  Hardly risk-free!

Conclusion

Risk cannot be destroyed, it can only be transformed.  Warren Buffett famously said, “If you’ve been playing poker for half an hour and still don’t know who the patsy is, you’re the patsy.”  The same idea holds true with any financial product.  There is always risk somewhere.  If someone selling a product says otherwise, then be very, very suspicious.

For indexed annuities, the main risk is that potential returns are severely limited when interest rates are as low as they are now.  High interest rates are the fuel that may allow these products to deliver equity-like returns with less downside risk.  Without high interest rates, however, you are going nowhere fast.  Going nowhere fast is a problem when inflation is always nipping at your heels.  Downside risk management is great, until it restricts your growth so much that your purchasing power erodes over time.

Data Sources and Disclosures

Data comes from the Federal Reserve, Research Affiliates, CBOE, and Morningstar.  Calculations were performed by Newfound Research.

Index annuity guarantees are subject to the credit of the issuing insurance company.

All returns are hypothetical and backtested and reflect unmanaged index returns.  Returns do not reflect fees.  Past performance does not guarantee future results.  Results are not indicative of any Newfound index or strategy.  Hypothetical performance results have many inherent limitations and are not indicative of results that any investor actually attained.  An investor cannot invest directly in an index.  Index returns are unmanaged and do not reflect fees and expenses.

For the options analysis, we use historical VIX levels with a 20% premium applied to reflect the higher implied volatility typically associated with longer-term options.

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